

Midlands State University



Assessing the impact of United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) on the African Union's peace and security efforts with reference to the 2007 to 2014 Somalia conflict

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This dissertation is submitted in partial fulfilment of the Master of Science in International Affairs programme, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Politics and Public Management, Midlands State University, Gweru, Zimbabwe.

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These undersigned certify that they have read and recommended to the Midland State University for acceptance, a research project entitled “**Assessing the impact of United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) on the African Union’s peace and security efforts with reference to the 2007 to 2014 Somalia conflict**” submitted by **Nyarai Sabeka** in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree Master of Science in International Affairs

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to my husband and our son Alex Anotidaishe, your love and support continue to motivate me. The Almighty God has indeed blessed me.

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ABSTRACT

The AU in its 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration pledged not to bequeath to future generations of Africans a legacy of wars and guns by silencing the guns by 2020. Since then the AU through its guiding principle of “African Solutions to African Problems” has made significant strides to enhance peace and security on the continent. In Somalia, the AU through AMISOM has shown that it is capable of conducting a successful peacekeeping operation as evidenced by the political and security developments in Somalia namely the inauguration of a new Federal Parliament and the swearing in of Hassan Sheik Mohammad as President in 2012. However, AMISOM like all other AU PSOs continues to be plagued by lack of military resources, adequate funding and institutional capacity to manage its operations. As a result, the AU through Article 17 (4) of the PSC made a provision to cooperate and work closely with international partners on issues of peace, security and stability in Africa. Moreover, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) which has developed since 2002 also provides a vision framework for African and external partnership. In that regard, the AU has engaged international partners including the USA to enhance continental peace and security and also deal with humanitarian and developmental challenges facing Africa. Meanwhile, to ensure better engagement with Africa, in 2007 then USA President George W. Bush announced that his country was creating a military command whose central focus was Africa the US Africa Command. However, the idea of a foreign military command in Africa has been met with resistance from most African states who argue such a development could undermine all the achievements made by the AU throughout the years. Considering the progress made by AMISOM in Somalia there are concerns that AFRICOM’s involvement in the country could undermine the AU’s peace and security efforts in helping resolve the conflict. Against this background, this study seeks to assess the impact of US African Command (AFRICOM) on the AU’s peace and security efforts with reference to the 2007 to 2014 Somalia conflict.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACOTA	Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance
AFRICOM	United States Africa Command
AGOA	African Growth and Opportunity Act
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
BTI	Bertelsmann Shiftungs Transformation Index
CCS	Centre for Creative Solutions
CEWAS	Continental Early Warning System
CJTF-HOA	Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa
DoD	Department of Defence
DoS	Department of State
GWOT	Global War on Terror
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
HSN	Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
IGASOM	Inter-Governmental Authority Peace Support Mission in Somalia
ISS	Institute of Security Studies
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSSP	Somalia's National Security and Stabilisation Plan
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
PEPFAR	Presidents Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSO	Peace Support Operation
REC	Regional Economic Committee
UN-SMG	United Nations Monitoring Group in Somalia
SNF	Somali National Forces
SPF	Somali Police Force
SSF	Somali Security Forces
SRCC	Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission
TCC	Troop Contributing Country
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TSC	Theatre Security Solutions
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UN	United Nations
UNHRC	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USA	United States of America

USAID	United States Agency for International Development
US-CENTCOM	United States Central Command
US-EUCOM	United States European Command
US-PAMCOM	United States Pacific Command
ZDF	Zimbabwe Defence Forces
ZNA	Zimbabwe National Army

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Chapter Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the research question by clearly stating what the research seeks to address and why. The chapter will also give a brief background to the study, the objectives and research questions that the research seeks to address, a preliminary literature review, the theoretical frame work upon which the research is anchored on and the research methodology adopted.

1.2 Context of the Study

1.2.1 Background to the study

The overall aim of this study was to assess the impact of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) on the African Union (AU)'s peace and security efforts with reference to the 2007-2014 Somalia conflict. Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States of America (USA)'s foreign policy strategy has seen an increase in multilateral security relationships with Africa's continental and regional organisations. As a result, there has been increased collaboration in confronting peace and security issues on the African continent between the USA and the AU. To signal the beginning of a new phase in the USA's foreign policy in Africa, on 6 February 2007, then USA President George W. Bush announced that his country was creating a new military command AFRICOM whose central focus was Africa. In a statement, President Bush stated the new military command's mission is "to enhance efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote common goals of development, health, education, democracy and economic growth by strengthening bilateral and multilateral

security cooperation with African states and creating new opportunities to bolster their capabilities.”¹

Since then the USA through AFRICOM has sought to establish an enduring strategic level partnership with the AU especially on its peace and security agenda. The partnership has, however, been criticized by some AU member states who argue that AFRICOM’s activities could undermine the AU’s peace and security efforts. According to Berouk the establishment of AFRICOM has been perceived as countercyclical to the AU’s own efforts in providing a strategic response to African conflicts.²

The African leadership of the AU declared in their Solemn Declaration on the 50th Anniversary of the founding of the organization made a pledge not to bequeath to future generations of Africans a legacy of wars and conflicts by silencing the guns by 2020³. In this regard, the leadership pledged to make peace a reality for all African people and to rid the continent of wars, end inter and intra-community conflicts, human rights violations, humanitarian disasters and violent conflicts. To make this pledge a reality, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) Protocol Article 17(4), stipulates that it will cooperate and work closely with relevant international partners on issues of peace, security and stability in Africa⁴. Resultantly, this provision provides a legal basis for a possible working partnership between the PSC and international organisations such as AFRICOM in pursuit of its continental peace and security agenda.

Although the AU through the PSC protocol has made provisions to work with other international organisations in pursuit of its continental peace and security agenda, possible implications of such a partnership cannot be ignored. Traditionally realists and more recently constructivists claim that “national interests” is a key explanatory tool in the analysis and understanding of

¹ See <http://www.georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov>, 6 February 2007, accessed 11 September 2014.

² Berouk M 2009, *The Establishment and Implications of the United States Africa Command: An African Perspective*, Institute of Security Studies (ISS)

³ See the AU Concept Note on Silencing the Guns: Pre-requisites for Realising a Conflict free Africa by the Year 2020 for the open session of the Peace and Security Council of the AU, 24 April 2014

⁴ See the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union.

contemporary foreign policy.⁵ For the AU the maintenance of continental peace and security is very crucial. As such, the transformation of the AU from the Organisation of the African Union (OAU) in 2002 saw the emerging of a more robust organization which has the ability to respond to the evolving needs of the continent. Through the PSC the AU has established a continent wide peace and security architecture.⁶ The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) denote a complex set of interrelated institutions and mechanisms that function at continental, regional and national level.⁷ At national level the architecture consists of AU member states which in most cases have the capabilities to ensure conflict management, regionally it relies on Regional Economic Communities (RECs), while at continental level a number of institutions coordinated by the PSC. The key components of APSA include the PSC, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWAS), the African Standby Force (ASF), the Panel of the Wise and the Peace Fund of which the PSC is the central pillar of the APSA and has been the most visible component.⁸

In quest of continental peace and security Somalia has been a concern to the AU since 1991 after a civil war broke out following the deposal of the late President Said Barre. According to Nduwimana since then Somalia has experienced various forms and levels of insecurity which have negatively affected the Somali population, neighboring countries and Africa at large⁹. As such the AU has underscored its commitment in helping resolve the Somali conflict. To that effect, the AU through a resolution during the 69th meeting of the PSC [PSC/PR/COMM (LXIX)] urged the deployment of troops with the sole purpose of providing an African response to the multifaceted security challenges and imminent collapse of Somalia. Consequently the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) began operating on 19 January 2007.¹⁰

⁵ Scott Burchill (2005), *The National Interest in International Relations Theory*, Palgrave Macmillan

⁶ John Moolakkattu *The role of the African Union in continental peace and security governance*, India Quartley, a Journal of Internal Affairs, June 2010 , vol. 66, no.2, pp151-165

⁷ Tim Murithi *The African Union evolving role in peace operations: the African Union Mission in Burundi, The African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia*, African Security Review 17.1, Institute of Security Studies

⁸ See *African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)*, Moving Africa Forward 2010 Assessment Study

⁹ Lt. Col Donatien Nduwimana, 2013, *AMISOM in Somalia: A Ray of Hope?*, Occasional Paper Series 4, No.4, The International Peace Support Training Centre, Nairobi, Kenya

¹⁰ See *Appraising the role of the African Union in Somalia (AMISOM)* by Neus Ramis Segui a PHD researcher at the Institute of Security Studies
http://www.academia.edu/2315973/APPRISING_THE_ROLE_OF_THE_African_Union_IN_SOMALIA_AMISOM

Although AMISOM has encountered years of bloody fighting especially against Islamist groups the importance of this AU led Peace Support Operation (PSO) cannot be undermined. Some of the most notable achievements of AMISOM include the eradication of al-Shabaab forces from the control of strategic areas and the protection of key Government institutions (the former Transitional Federal institutions and the current parliament and presidency).¹¹ However, AMISOM just like other AU missions faces various challenges including lack of military resources, funding and the institutional capacity to manage its operations. As a result, these challenges continue to undermine AMISOM's mandate to effectively bring peace and security to Somalia thus rendering the mission ineffective in contributing to the overall security situation in the country. Against this backdrop it could be deemed reasonable that Article 17(4) of the PSC Protocol makes provision to cooperate and work closely with relevant international partners on issues of peace, security and stability in Africa

On the other hand, for the USA Africa has emerged as a vital strategic partner especially post the September 11 era in pursuit of its Global War on Terror (GWOT) policy.¹² The USA GWOT policy involves combating terrorism and violent extremism. Moreover, the USA considers Somalia a safe haven for extremists due to close ties of Somali terrorist organization al-Shabaab to al-Qaeda¹³. The USA has identified Africa as a future potential base for terrorist attacks against the country because of Africa's proximity to the Arabian Peninsula, the instability in Somalia and a large number of African countries where the government's control is weak and policing are poor.¹⁴ Besides the GWOT policy other USA security concerns in Africa revolve around the need to secure energy and other vital mineral resources like cobalt, coltan, diamonds, gold, manganese, petroleum and uranium from the continent.¹⁵ AFRICOM's Commander, General David Rodriguez aptly captured the reality of Africa's growing strategic importance to the USA when he stated:

¹¹ See the Bertelsmann Stiftungs Transformation Index (BTI) 2014 Somalia Country Brief

¹² Thomas-Jensen C, *Beyond AFRICOM: Toward a Comprehensive US Africa Policy*, Yale Journal of International Affairs, Volume 3, Issue 1, Winter 2008

¹³ Thomas-Jensen C (2008) *ibid*

¹⁴ Garth Shelton (2006) quoted in *The United States Africa Command: Enhancing American Security of Fostering African Development*, African Security Review 17.1 Institute of Security Studies by Christopher Isike, Ufo Okeke-Uzodike and Lysias Gilbert

¹⁵ See <http://www.fpif.org>

*“Africa continues to present a broad spectrum of opportunities and challenges to the United States and our allies and partners. US Africa Command is working closely with allies and partners to build relationships and capacity vital to the advancing of security, prosperity, international order and the promotion of universal values”.*¹⁶

Against that background, Somalia could be important to the USA for 5 reasons.¹⁷ Firstly, Somalia’s geographical location namely its proximity to major international sea lines of communication and its location between the Middle East and the whole of Africa. Secondly, Somalia continues to be viewed as a haven for regional maritime piracy therefore making it one of the largest fronts for combating piracy. Thirdly, more than 20 years of continuous conflict has resulted in over 1 million refugees worldwide including at least 150000 in the USA.¹⁸ Fourthly, Somalia is alleged to host large volumes of hydrocarbon resources. Lastly, the presence of al-Shabaab has continued to cause violence in and outside Somalia’s borders. Consequently, USA foreign policy objectives in Somalia include promoting political and economic stability, preventing the use of Somalia as a safe haven for international terrorism and alleviating humanitarian crisis caused by years of conflict, drought, flooding and poor governance.¹⁹ As a result, the USA has welcomed AMISOM’s successes in fighting al-Shabaab and has underscored its continued commitment to support the mission and the Somali National Forces (SNF) in their quest for peace and security in Somalia.

The USA maintains the establishment of AFRICOM is meant to enhance Africa’s developmental and security challenges. Former USA president George W Bush stated AFRICOM would work in collaboration with African institutions such as the AU and sub-regional economic organisations to engage in continuous dialogue with African leaders and grant aid to those countries that embrace the concept.²⁰ During his 2013 state of the Union address, President

¹⁶ See statement by General David M. Rodriguez, USA Commander, United States Africa Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee

¹⁷ See thesis by Major Paul Frantz United States Air Force, *The Effectiveness Of US Policies for Al-Shabaab* 2011

¹⁸ See Josh Richardson “*Somalia Diaspora: A key Counterterrorism Ally*” quoted in thesis by Major Paul Frantz (ibid)

¹⁹ See <http://africom.mil/africa/east-africa/federal-republic-of-somalia> (accessed 2 March 2015)

²⁰ See remarks by George W. Bush on World Aid Day on 30 November, 2008 in Osita C.E, Anigbo C, Dokubo C.Q. *Nigeria’s Security Interest in Africa*. Lagos. NIIA pub, 2010.

Obama emphasized the importance of enabling the security capabilities of partner and allied countries. He stated:

*“We don’t need to send tens of thousands of our sons and daughters abroad or occupy other nations, instead, we will need to help countries like Yemen, Libya and Somalia provide for their own security and help allies who take fight to terrorists as we have in Mali”.*²¹

It is alleged the establishment of AFRICOM enables the USA to better address the challenges to American and allied interests in a more focused way across Africa.²² Nonetheless, AFRICOM has played a critical role in conducting pre-deployment training for AU forces in Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, Sierra Leone and Uganda under the auspices of the State Department’s Global Peace Initiatives such that there is increasing evidence that the efforts are producing tangible benefits by helping degrade the capabilities of al-Shabaab.²³ However, USA intervention in the Horn of Africa has had devastating effects in the region²⁴. For example the January 2007 USA bombing of Somalia resulted in civilian casualties and mass exodus of refugees into neighboring countries. As a result, Somalia has been plunged into instability which has allowed piracy to run rampant off the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Arden. Against this background, it is significant to assess the impact of the AFRICOM on the AU’s peace and security efforts with reference to the 2007-2014 Somalia conflict.

1.3 Justification

The establishment of AFRICOM is likely to be regarded as being an obstruction to the AU’s guiding principle of “African Solutions to African Problems”. Such a development is interpreted as violating Africa’s common position on the continents defense and security strategies and is feared it could undermine the continent’s Non-Aggression Pact, solemn declaration on Africa’s

²¹ See President Barack Obama’s 2013 State of the Union address

²² John R. Deni *AFRICOM’s role in shaping the future in Africa*, in Focus Quarterly, Jewish Policy Centre, Summer 213

²³ John R. Deni *ibid*

²⁴ Fah G.L.T, *Dealing with AFRICOM: The Political Economy of Anger and Protest*, The Journal of Pan African Studies, Vo.3, No.1, March 2010

common defense and security.²⁵ Moreover, Africa is still grappling with the consequences of colonialism and the Cold War era proxy wars, therefore, having a foreign command on the continent could undermine all the peace and security efforts made by the AU over the years²⁶. As such any efforts to forge partnerships with foreign military commands like AFRICOM have been viewed with suspicion and fear that it could destabilize an already fragile country like Somalia and the continent at large.

Resultantly, the aim of this study was to assist with strategic and scholarly analysis on whether the AU should partner with AFRICOM in pursuit of its peace and security initiatives in Somalia and Africa as a whole. The study also made recommendations on how the AU could formulate a suitable working framework with AFRICOM to ensure sustainable peace and security initiatives in Somalia.

1.4 Research Objectives

The objectives of the study were:

- a) To establish the impact of the AFRICOM on the AU's peace and security efforts in the 2007-2014 Somalia conflict.
- b) To examine the challenges facing a possible AU-AFRICOM partnership in implementing peace and security initiatives in Somalia.
- c) To proffer recommendations on how AFRICOM can work with the AU in achieving sustainable peace and security in Africa and more specifically in Somalia.

1.5 Research Questions

Based on the above stated objectives, the research was designed to address the following questions:

- a) What is the impact of AFRICOM on the AU's peace and security efforts in the 2007-2014 Somalia conflict?

²⁵ Dr Okumu W 2007, *Africa Command: Opportunity for Enhanced Engagement or the Militarization of the US-Africa Relation*, African Security Analysis, Institute of Security Studies (ISS)

²⁶ Dr Okumu *ibid*

- b) How important is AFRICOM in implementing peace and security initiatives in Somalia?
- c) What are the challenges facing the AU-AFRICOM partnership in implementing peace and security initiatives in Somalia?
- d) How effective is the AU-AFRICOM partnership in ensuring sustainable peace and security in Somalia?
- e) What measures can be put in place to ensure an effective AU-AFRICOM partnership in order to achieve sustainable peace and security in Somalia.

1.6 Research Hypothesis

The establishment of AFRICOM in Somalia could undermine peace and security initiatives by AMISOM and result in the escalation of violent activities.

1.7 Preliminary Literature Review

The announcement of the creation of a USA military command in Africa by then President George W. Bush in 2007 sparked a lot of research and debate on different aspects of the prospect of a foreign military command in Africa. Despite exhibiting different areas of interest the majority of the publications express a general consensus that the sudden shift in policy toward Africa and ultimately the creation of AFRICOM by the USA is motivated mainly by security and economic interests on the continent.

Most publications by foreign policy experts and experts in peace and security studies tend to focus more on the rationale behind the USA sudden shift in foreign policy toward Africa. The majority of this group of thinkers view the GWOT policy as being at the center of USA security interests in Africa. Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack the USA through the DoD has undertaken many initiatives in Africa in the guise of fighting terrorism. According to Ploch (2011) besides the GWOT policy USA growing interest in Africa revolves around natural resources particularly oil.²⁷ Meanwhile, Gilbert, Uzodike and Isike (2009) state USA interests in Africa revolve around 3 main factors that is securing Africa's oil resources, containing

²⁷ See Lauren Ploch *Africa command: US strategic interests and the role of US military in Africa* 22 July 2011

international terrorism and containing the expansion of China in Africa²⁸. These views confirm that USA interests in Africa are not only motivated by security interests but also economic interests. These analyses bring to question whether the creation of AFRICOM is meant to enhance Africa's security challenges or is merely a guise for the pursuit, actualization and consolidation of USA strategic state-centric security and economic interests on the continent. However, these groups of thinkers tend to focus more on exploring the motivating factor behind the USA sudden shift in interest toward Africa at the expense of examining the possible impact or implication such a shift could have on Africa's peace and security agenda. Meanwhile, the majority of publications by African researchers and scholars tend to offer an African perspective with regards to the establishment of AFRICOM, African response to the Command, its possible implications on the continent's peace and security architecture and how Africa can benefit from the Command if at all. However, most of the publications are more focused on exploring the various African responses to the establishment of AFRICOM. Makinda (2007) provides an interesting overview on how African policy makers and analysts have been divided over the creation of AFRICOM.²⁹ To Makinda this confusion is a result of failure by the USA to sufficiently explain the new Command especially its mandate which he claims has fueled various myths and speculations among Africans. Meanwhile, Ayokhai and Ogbang (2013) remind us that the concept of national interest provides the integrated framework within which the calculation of instrumental responses (military, economic, social, health) to these multiple threats is made.³⁰ Consequently, African states' responses to the creation of AFRICOM have been guided by this concept.

On the other hand, another group of scholars tend to be more concerned with the implications of AFRICOM on Africa's peace and security agenda. Most of the publications examine how the creation of AFRICOM is changing or shaping conflicts in Africa. Chan (2010) provides a brief overview on how the USA's support of Ethiopia has hardened Islamic groups in the southern

²⁸ Lysias Dodd Gilbert, Ufo Okeke Uzodike and Christopher Isike, *The United States Africa Command: Security for whom?*, The Journal of Pan African Studies vol.2, no.9, March 2009

²⁹ See Samuel Makinda, *Why AFRICOM has not won over Africans*, 24 November 2007

³⁰ Fred Ekpe F. Ayokhai and Ellah Timothy Ogbang in *Nigeria's response to the US African Command (AFRICOM) project in the Gulf of Guinea* Online International Journal of Arts and Humanities Vol. 2 Issue 8 pp 208-217 October 2013

part of Somalia.³¹ Chan maintains USA's support of Ethiopia has fueled the anger of Islamic groups in Somalia which has resulted in the increase in violent activities. Meanwhile Mesfin (2009) provides an interesting examination of the implications of AFRICOM on both the USA and the AU. For the USA, AFRICOM offers a more integrated framework for pursuing its interests in Africa while for Africa the establishment of AFRICOM could be taken as a credible commitment by the USA to help address security challenges facing the continent. However, the majority of publications lack in-depth analysis on the possible impact of AFRICOM on the AU's peace and security initiatives. Most of the publications examine Africa in its broad perspective or state specific but not with specific and in-depth reference to the AU's peace and security initiatives in Africa.

Another school of thought explores the possibility of an AU-AFRICOM partnership in pursuing continental peace and security objectives. The majority of publications underscore both the AU and USA/AFRICOM provisions to work with each other in pursuit of continental peace and security. Most of the publications identify the various challenges hampering AU-USA cooperative efforts and proffer recommendations on how the two can work together towards sustainable peace and security on the continent. Mangala (2011) provides an interesting overview on the relationship between the PSC and AFRICOM in the broader context of the APSA.³² To Mangala the AU should assess possible areas that it could strategically leverage its partnership with AFRICOM in order to strengthen its APSA.

Despite focusing on different areas of analysis what is striking about the publications is how they complement each other in helping understand Africa-USA relations post the September 11, 2001 terrorist incident. In addition the literature offers critical analysis on how AFRICOM is shaping and influencing Africa-USA relations. However, the majority of the publications provide a broad overview of AFRICOM's impact on Africa's peace and security agenda thereby making case study studies necessary. This will allow African governments to make informed decisions on

³¹ See Stephen Chan's presentation paper, *The origins of AFRICOM: The Obama administration, the Sahara-Sahel and US militarization of Africa*, Bulletin No.85 Spring 2010 for Concerned Africa Scholar

³² See Jack Mangala, *The PSC and AFRICOM-From opposition to possible partnership in The African Union Peace and Security Council-A five year appraisal* ISS Monograph 187 edited by Tim Murithi and Hallelujah Lulie

whether to welcome AFRICOM and if so how best to collaborate to ensure successful country specific security initiatives. In addition, there are limited in-depth studies on the impact of AFRICOM on the AU's continental peace and security efforts thereby the need to assess the impact of AFRICOM on the AU's peace and security initiatives with Somalia as the case study.

1.8 Theoretical Framework

The regime theory emerged in the study of international relations in the 1970s and has become the major focus of scholarship in both Europe and North America.³³ The theory emerged in order to explain cooperation among states that are in pursuit of self-interest rationally in the international system which is characterized by an anarchical structure.³⁴ As a result, the regime theory has been awarded for being able to tackle the puzzles of international cooperation and institutional building in a world of sovereign states. Though the study of regimes has been long plagued by definitional issues and has been accused of lacking conceptual clarity,³⁵ the mostly opted definition of regimes is from Stephen Krasner. Krasner defines regimes as “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actors expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”³⁶ The discussion of regimes saw basically three schools of thought emerge³⁷ which seek to explain the origins and relative influence of regimes. The three schools of thought are neoliberal, realism and cognitivist. Neoliberal thoughts center their analysis by viewing regimes as mechanisms which facilitate optimal outcomes by reducing uncertainty. Realism focuses on the role played by power in creating and sustaining regimes as well as the consequences they might have on the distribution of power in the international system. Cognitivist insights center on the fact that regimes are

³³ Christer Jonsson and Jonas Tollberg, *Institutional Theory* in Guy Peters, Jon Oierre and Gerry Stoker (eds), *Institutional Theory in Political Science*, 2008 “*New Institutionalism*”, London and New York Continuum

³⁴ Arre Niemann, *Regime Theory* in Mark Bevir (2007), *Encyclopedia of Governance*, Sage Publications

³⁵ Rochester J.M (1986), *The Rise and Fall of International Organisations as a Field of Study*, International Organisation 40 (4), 777-781

³⁶ Stephen D. Krasner(1983c), *Structural causes and Regimes as Intervening Variables* in Stephen D. Krasner (eds), *International Regimes*, Cornwell University Press, New York

³⁷ Stephen D. Krasner *ibid*

fundamentally social entities therefore norms, identities and discourse are important in shaping regimes and are in turn influenced by regimes.³⁸

For the purposes of our study, the regime theory could help us understand under what means and conditions the AU and AFRICOM sought to cooperate in relation to solving the 2007-2014 Somali conflict. Therefore, it could be said the AU-AFRICOM partnership sought to remove specific issue-areas related to peace and security especially dealing with the threat of terrorism, insurgency and the recurring humanitarian crisis facing Somalia. These security challenges cannot be tackled by Somalia or the AU alone due mainly to lack of financial and logistical capacity making international cooperation the more important. Moreover, the regime theory has long addressed the question of how cooperation can be sustained in an anarchical world especially in security related issues.³⁹ This allows for the assessment of AFRICOM's impact on the AU's peace and security efforts in the 2007-2014 Somalia conflict and proffer recommendations which will ensure sustainable peace and security in Somalia.

1.9 Methodology

1.9.1 Research Design

The study adopted the qualitative research method. Qualitative research methods provide for in depth analysis of a situation and a meaningful interpretation of the role of those involved in that situation.⁴⁰ Qualitative research attempts to understand the unique interactions in a particular situation, with the objective to understand in-depth the characteristics of the situation under study.⁴¹ Therefore, qualitative research method seeks to truthfully present findings to others who are interested in the research topic. Resultantly, the qualitative approach allowed the researcher to gather in-depth information on the implications of AFRICOM on the AU's peace and security efforts in Somalia.

³⁸Eric Brahm 2005, *International Regimes*, Beyond Intractability
<http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/international-regimes> (accessed 14 April 2015)

³⁹Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons (1987), *Theories of International Regimes*, International Organisations no.3, 491-572

⁴⁰Patton J 1996, *Analysis of Thinking and Research About Qualitative Methods*, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum

⁴¹See Patton J. (1996) *ibid*

1.9.2 Case Study

There are four types of qualitative research methods namely grounded theory, ethnography, phenomenology and case study research. This research used the case study research methodology. Case studies are widely used in organisational studies in the social science disciplines of sociology, industrial relations, anthropology and business.⁴² The use of a case study allows for exploration of individuals or organisations through complex interventions, relationships or communities and supports the deconstruction and subsequent reconstruction of various phenomena.⁴³

A case study is an intensive study of a single unit with the aim to generalize a larger set of units⁴⁴ or a phenomenon of some sort occurring in a bounded context⁴⁵ which in the case of this study is Somalia. In this instance one must ask whether the analysis is on an individual or a program or a process or the difference between organisations.⁴⁶ The case study approach can be used when: (a) the focus of the study is to answer “how” and “why” questions; (“b) one cannot manipulate the behaviour of those involved in the study; (c) one wants to cover contextual conditions believed to be relevant to the phenomenon under study; or (d) the boundaries are not clear between the phenomenon and context.⁴⁷ An in-depth analysis and explanatory information on the implications of AFRICOM on the AU’S peace and security agenda on the continent was done through in-depth interviews that were done with the research participants.

These are a number of case studies that can be adopted by researchers. These are explanatory, exploratory, descriptive, multi-case studies, intrinsic and instrumental. The case of Somalia is explanatory as the research sought to answer questions with regards to the implications of

⁴² Hartley J.F (1994) quoted in Florian Kohlbacher, *The use of Qualitative Content Analysis in Case Study Research*, Forum: Qualitative Social Research , Vol.7, No.1, Art 21-January 2006

⁴³ Yin Robert K (2009), *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, Sage Publications

⁴⁴ Gerring J, *What is a Case Study and What is it good for?*, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 98, No.2, May 2004, pp 341-354

⁴⁵ Miles Matthew B and Huberman Michael A (1994), *Qualitative Data Analysis: A Methods Sourcebook*, Sage Publications

⁴⁶ Miles and Huberman (1994) *ibid*

⁴⁷ See Yin (2003) *ibid*

AFRICOM on the AU's peace and security initiatives in Somalia. Such a study is too complex for the survey or experimental strategies.

1.9.3 Data Collection Methods

The research made use of two types of data collection methods namely primary and secondary data collection.

1.9.3(a) Primary data

Primary data can be identified as first-hand information collected for the specific purpose at hand. There are three methods of collecting primary data namely, observation, questionnaires and in depth interviews.⁴⁸ Primary data for this research was collected through in depth interviews both face to face and through the telephone. In-depth interviews provide the factual and interpretive aspects of the implications of AFRICOM on the continent's peace and security efforts with particular reference to Somalia. On the other hand, the method of interviews allows in-depth information to be extracted on the topic.⁴⁹

The research used the general interview guide approach as it allows some general information about the implications of AFRICOM on the AU's peace and security efforts in Somalia to be collected from each interviewee. This approach allowed for some degree of freedom and adaptability in gathering the information from the interviewee. The use of telephone interviews allowed for the gathering of information more rapidly and addressed the issue of distance and unavailability of key respondents. The researcher interviewed defense and military attachés especially those in Embassies representing countries in the Horn of Africa, defense and military personnel from the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) and Zimbabwe Defense Forces (ZDF) and academic scholars who specialize in peace and security studies.

Questionnaires were also used to collect primary data. Questionnaires were sent electronically to defense officials from the US embassy and African states particularly those in AMISOM.

⁴⁸ Saunders Mark et al (1997), *Research Methods for Business* 5th Edition, Students Pearson Education

⁴⁹ McNamara C (1999), *General Guidelines for Conducting Interviews*, Minnesota

Questionnaires allow for the gathering of information from a larger population thereby making generalisations possible. Therefore, participants were selected through a carefully selected sample. The questionnaires targeted defense officials from AU member states, AFRICOM and AMISOM personnel, academic researchers in the field of security studies, personnel in sub-regional, regional and continental organisation's peace and security departments.

1.9.3(b) Secondary data

However, due to the distance between Somalia and Zimbabwe the researchers' country of residence and time constraints, the researcher used secondary data which was obtained from research papers, previous studies, journals, academic articles and books on the topic of study.

1.9.4 Population and Sampling Techniques

Population in research can be defined as the collection of all the observations of a random variable under study from which one seeks to draw conclusions from.⁵⁰ Population can also be defined as the total collection of elements about which the researcher seeks to make an inference.⁵¹ The population of this study comprises the defense and military attachés especially those in Embassies representing countries in the Horn of Africa, defense and military personnel from the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) and Zimbabwe Defense Forces (ZDF) and academic scholars who specialize in peace and security studies.

1.9.4(a) Sampling techniques

Sampling techniques are methods by which the researcher can derive a sample from a population. Sampling involves selecting a representative subset of observations from a

⁵⁰ Wagner (2005), *The Sage Handbook of Organizational Research Methods*, Professor David Buchanan and Professor Alan Bryman (eds)

⁵¹ Cooper Donald R and Schindler Pamela S (2003), *Business Research Methods*, McGraw Hill

population to determine the characteristics of the random variable under investigation.⁵² Sampling is classified into two basic methods: non-probability or probability.⁵³

Since our research was of qualitative in nature the non-probability method was used. However, the probability of each case being selected is not known when using non-probability sampling techniques. Examples of non-probability methods are

- quota sampling
- convenience or haphazard sampling
- snowball sampling
- volunteer sampling
- judgment sampling

The research used convenience and purposive sampling. The immediate advantage is that the method is easy to use; however, that advantage is greatly offset by the presence of bias. Although useful applications of the technique are limited, it can deliver accurate results when the population is homogeneous. Convenience sampling was for the quick gathering of information and allowed faster analysis of data collected. This involves selecting those cases, which are easiest to obtain for one's sample.⁵⁴

On the other hand, purposive sampling allowed researcher to select representatives that they deem best for the research. Due to the short academic calendar the two sampling methods used were ideal because they are less time consuming. This approach is used when a sample is taken based on certain judgments about the overall population. The underlying assumption is that the investigator will select units that are characteristic of the population. Meanwhile, the critical issue on purposive sampling is objectivity. The researcher made appointments prior to the interviews. On the day of collecting data, those who were available in office and willing to participate were selected. The researcher selected 20 participants as indicated in table 1.

⁵² Henry Gary (1990), *Practical Sampling*, Vol.21 of Applied Social Research Methods Series, Sage Publication, University of Michigan

⁵³ Barnnet Vic (2009), *Sample Survey Principles and Methods 3rd Ed*, Wiley Publications

⁵⁴ Saunders M, Lewis P and Thornhill A (2006), *Understanding Research Approaches*, Sage Publications, London

Table 1: Sample size

Targeted Population	Sample size	Response rate
Academic in peace and security		5
Defense and military personnel		6
Security personnel		4
Total	20	15

Source:

1.9.5 Data Analysis

The research made use of content analysis. Qualitative data has several features to take into consideration when planning the presentation of findings.⁵⁵ The data can either be subjective, interpretative, descriptive, holistic and copious thereby making it difficult to know where or how to start.⁵⁶ Information gathered from the interviews was presented in the form of tables. Each of the responses from the interview was written under a specific objective which it fell under.

1.9.6 Limitations

The qualitative research data collection method is likely to be time consuming. Consequently, the data collected will be from a smaller sample making it more expensive. Although the research was focused on Somalia as a particular case of reference, there was limited time to carry out a proper and thorough research due to the short academic calendar of the Master of Science in International Affairs programme. As a result, it was difficult to visit Somalia and interview all personnel relevant to the research. As a result, the research failed to capture essential information from key Somali government officials, AMISOM personnel and key peace and security academic researchers

⁵⁵ Silverman D (2005), *Doing Qualitative Research (2nd Ed)*, Sage Publications, London

⁵⁶ Silverman (2003) *ibid*

1.9.7 Delimitations

The use questionnaires sent through electronic mail and secondary sources of data sought to fill the lacuna created by the use of primary data which limited the number of respondents by increasing the sample size.

1.9.8 Ethical Considerations

Ethical behavior helps protect individuals, communities' environment and offers the potential to increase the sum of good in the world⁵⁷. As such, the researcher tried to be mindful of the ethical and data protection issues when conducting the research. The research ensured informed consent and made sure participants understood the aims and objectives of the research.

To ensure the research outcome was reflective of the findings the issue of objectivity in order to avoid bias when analyzing and interpreting the data collected was observed. As such use of appropriate research methodology in order to eliminate bias was observed and the researcher disclosed personal and financial interests that could affect the research.

1.10 Research Outline

The research paper will be structured as follows:

Chapter One

Introduction

The chapter introduces the research question stating what the research seeks to study and why. The chapter will also give a brief background of the study, a preliminary literature review, theoretical framework and research methodology which will be used to collect, analyze and present the findings.

⁵⁷ Israel M and Hay I 2006, *Research Ethics for Social Scientists: Between Ethical Conduct and Regulatory Compliance*, Sage Publications, United Kingdom

Chapter Two

Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

The section will critically review literature on AFRICOM; its establishment, mandate, implications on Africa's peace and security efforts and its partnership with the AU. The chapter will also review literature on African response to the establishment of AFRICOM. Lastly, the chapter will discuss the theoretical framework upon which the research is anchored on.

Chapter Three

An overview on the impact of AFRICOM on the AU's peace and security efforts with reference to the 2007-2014 Somalia conflict

The section gives an overview on the impact of the AFRICOM on the AU's peace and security efforts in the 2007-2014 Somalia. The chapter will begin by giving a brief overview of the Somalia conflict with particular reference to the period 2007-2014, and then proceed to discuss the AU's peace and security initiatives through AMISOM in Somalia during the period under review. Lastly the chapter examines the USA peace and security in helping resolve the Somali conflict and how these initiatives have impacted on the AU's efforts.

Chapter Four

Constraints facing a possible AU-AFRICOM partnership in implementing peace and security initiatives in Somalia

The section assesses the constraints facing a possible AU-AFRICOM partnership in implementing peace and security initiatives in Somalia.

Chapter Five

Qualitative analysis of research findings

The section gives a qualitative analysis of the research findings.

Chapter Six

Conclusions and Recommendations

The chapter concludes the study and proffers recommendations on how the AU and AFRICOM can ensure sustainable peace and stability in Somalia.

Resource Requirements

Travel and accommodation expenses	\$600
Food and other needs while on field trips	\$150
Stationary for data collection purposes	\$50
Communication when conducting telephone interviews, contacting Supervisor	\$120
Research Assistant	\$150
TOTAL	\$1070

Research Timetable

Time	Task
September 2014	Seek approval of the research and work on introductory chapters
October-November 2014	Review literature and work on theory chapters
December 2014-January 2014	Prepare research instruments and start gathering information
February 2015	Analyse and collate the data gathered
March 2015	Submit draft to Supervisor
April 2015	Work on corrections and produce final draft

Conclusion

The chapter introduced the question highlighting the research seeks to address and why. The chapter gave a brief background to the study with a focus on the AU and AFRICOM especially

in relation to their roles in ensuring continental peace and security. The chapter also discussed the research objectives and questions to be addressed, provided a preliminary literature review, the theoretical frame work upon which the research is anchored on and the research methodology adopted.

The next chapter will review literature on AFRICOM focusing on its establishment, mandate, implications on Africa's peace and security efforts and its partnership with the AU in helping resolve Africa's political, security, developmental and humanitarian challenges. Lastly, the chapter will discuss the theoretical modeling which the research is anchored on.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK

2.0 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the literature on AFRICOM; its establishment, mandate, implications on Africa's peace and security efforts and its partnership with the AU in helping resolve Africa's political, security, developmental and humanitarian challenges. Lastly, the chapter looks at the theoretical modeling which the research is anchored on. This literature overview is divided into four parts. The first part focuses on the establishment of AFRICOM highlighting USA strategic interests in Africa that motivated the creation of the Command. The second part looks at Africa's response to the creation of AFRICOM stressing how African governments and policy makers are divided with some arguing the Command represents a neocolonial agenda while others believe it could help the continent address its security and developmental challenges. The third part provides an overview on the implications of AFRICOM on Africa's peace and security assessing whether the Command will improve or worsen the security situation on the continent. The last part will look at the possibility of an Africa-AFRICOM partnership by examining the pros and cons of such a collaboration.

2.1 Literature Review

The majority of the publications on AFRICOM in broad and its partnership with the AU in particular are in scholarly journals, academic research papers, foreign policy papers and academic articles by foreign policy experts, military personnel and peace and security studies experts. Most publications especially from foreign policy experts and experts in peace and security studies focus on the rationale behind the USA sudden shift in foreign policy toward Africa. On the other hand, African researchers and scholars offer an African perspective with regards to the establishment of AFRICOM, African response to the Command, its possible

implications on the continents peace and security architecture and how Africa can benefit from the Command if at all.

However, there are limited in-depth studies on the impact of AFRICOM on the AU's continental peace and security efforts. Former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo during a keynote address on Foreign Policy in Nigeria's Democratic Transition, published by the Presidential Advisory Council on International Relations, 2005 page 14-19 states due to lack of recognition, research accorded to the formulation of AFRICOM in relation to Africa and specifically to Nigeria has been limited. As a result, foreign policy suffers from low level of participation making the concept not too popular. What is interesting about the literature is that there is a general consensus that the sudden shift in policy toward Africa and ultimately the creation of AFRICOM by the USA is motivated mainly by security and economic interests on the continent. At the center of USA security interests in Africa lies its GWOT policy. Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack the USA through the DoD Washington has undertaken many initiatives in Africa in the guise of fighting terrorism. Washington maintains Africa's poorly governed spaces could provide a safe haven for terrorist activities. On the other hand, USA economic interests in Africa revolve around securing energy resources particularly oil. What is striking about the publications is how they complement each other in helping understand Africa-USA relations post the September 11, 2001 terrorist incident. Despite their various areas of focus the publications offer critical analysis on how AFRICOM is shaping and influencing Africa-USA relations. However, the majority of the publications provide a broad overview of AFRICOM's impact on Africa's peace and security agenda thereby making studies that are case study specific necessary. This will allow African governments to make informed decisions on whether to welcome AFRICOM and how best to collaborate to ensure successful country specific security initiatives.

2.2.1 The establishment of AFRICOM and US strategic interests of in Africa

Lauren Ploch (2011), in a paper titled *Africa command: US strategic interests and the role of US military in Africa* provides a broad overview of USA strategic interests in Africa and the role of USA efforts to pursue those interests. Ploch comprehensively discusses AFRICOM's mission, its coordination with other government agent, its location and human resource requirements. The

article helps understand Africa's growing strategic importance to the USA. Ploch maintains USA growing interest in Africa revolve around natural resources especially energy, concern over violent extremist activities, the potential threat posed by under-governed spaces such as maritime and illicit trafficking. Ploch states US counterterrorism and other policy documents confirm Africa's vulnerability to international terrorism as a result of factors which include poverty, ungoverned spaces, proximity to the Middle East and growing radical Islam in some countries. Ploch also states humanitarian crises, armed conflict and more general challenges such as HIV and AIDS are some other USA concerns in Africa. Therefore, AFRICOM aims to protect USA strategic objectives and interests in the continent by working with African states and regional organisations to strengthen their defense capabilities to ensure greater regional security and stability.

Gilbert L. Taguem Fah *Dealing with AFRICOM: The Political Economy of Anger and Protest* Journal of Pan African Studies, vol. 3, no.6, March 2006 examines whether the establishment of AFRICOM in Africa signals the official beginning of post-Cold War American imperialism and hegemony in Africa. What is interesting about this article is the fact that it is based on the assumption that AFRICOM presents a continuation of American militarization of Africa. Fah's assumption with regards to AFRICOM arguments well with Pan Africanists who maintain America's sudden shift in its foreign policy towards Africa is in fact a strategy to exert control over the continent to serve its own interest. Fah's hypothesis assumes that the American militarization of Africa is changing the local culture of violence for the worse. He explains that the fight against AFRICOM in Africa is so crucial that the continent has to adopt efficient approaches which go beyond foreign policy options. He opines that Africa should harness the talents of civil society groups within and outside Africa, the African Diaspora, African intellectuals, artists, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOS) and anti-AFRICOM movements. Premised on the Pan African ideology, Fah stresses the fate of Africa in relation to AFRICOM lies in the hands of Africans. Therefore, he calls for the involvement of all relevant African stakeholders in coming up with an effective strategy to stop the militarization of Africa. However, Fah makes it clear that his opposition of AFRICOM does not underplay the threat of terrorism or other security concerns that exist in Africa but is concerned that AFRICOM

programmes could worsen instability, sustain insecurity and undermine peace-building efforts on the continent.

Lysias Dodd Gilbert, Ufo Okeke Uzodike and Christopher Isike *The United States Africa Command: Security for whom?*, The Journal of Pan African Studies vol.2, no.9, March 2009 provides a careful analysis on the factors behind the sudden and significant shift in Washington's perception toward Africa which has led to the creation of AFRICOM. The paper addresses an important question *AFRICOM whose security?* The question helps understand whether the creation of AFRICOM is meant to enhance Africa's security challenges or is merely a guise for the pursuit, actualization and consolidation of USA strategic state-centric security interests on the continent. By tracing Africa and USA military collaboration such as the Combined Joint Task Force: Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) which have been established over the years Gilbert, Uzodike and Isike help us understand why the sudden need to create a military command specifically for Africa has raised a lot of questions on whose security the USA is concerned about. They note Africa and USA military collaborations have been established over the years which range from bilateral and multilateral military security whose mandate is to address mutual security interests. Consequently, Gilbert, Uzodike and Isike argue if the mitigation of human security challenges, peacekeeping and developmental enhancement were the primary concerns of Washington then the creation of AFRICOM is not the best option. Instead they opine the extension of the various military collaborations is a better option. As such it is reasonable to argue the establishment of AFRICOM is a deliberate neo-imperialistic and hegemonic design by the USA to control Africa's military in order to better enhance its strategic interests on the continent. The article states these strategic interests revolve around 3 main factors securing Africa's oil resources, containing international terrorism and containing the expansion of China in Africa.

2.2.2 African response to the establishment of AFRICOM

Samuel Makinda (2007) *Why AFRICOM has not won over Africans* provides an interesting overview on how African policy makers and analyst have been divided over the creation of AFRICOM. Makinda provides the answers to why the announcement of the AFRICOM project

has brought so much debate despite Africa being previously covered by the USA under EUCOM, CENTCOM and PAMCON. The article provides 3 comprehensive answers to why African policy makers and analyst have taken a negative view to AFRICOM. Firstly, Makinda accuses the USA of failing to sufficiently explain the new Command especially its mandate which he claims has fueled myths and speculations. Secondly, he states lack of transparency in discussion of AFRICOM and USA military relations with African states has raised questions what governance ethos the Command would foster in the future if its current relationship with African governments is shrouded with secrecy. The last reason revolves around how the architects of AFRICOM failed to recognize the achievements Africa has made with respect to its own security through the AU. As such the USA has been accused of taking the AU for granted and thus neglected consulting with the organisation's officials before the announcement of AFRICOM.

Fred Ekpe F. Ayokhai and Ellah Timothy Ogbang *Nigeria's response to the US African Command (AFRICOM) project in the Gulf of Guinea* Online International Journal of Arts and Humanities vol. 2 Issue 8 pp 208-217 October 2013 assess the response of Nigeria to AFRICOM in light of her national interest in the Gulf of Guinea and her leadership. The article reminds us that the concept of national interest provides the integrated framework within which the calculation of instrumental responses (military, economic, social, health) to these multiple threats is made. Ayokhai and Ogbang state there is what they term an "arc of instability" for the Pentagon which they allege stretches from the western hemisphere through Africa and the Middle East to Asia. They claim for the USA the so called "arc of instability" include countries that it accuses of harboring terrorist organisations linked to al-Qaeda thereby making them fertile ground for terrorist recruitment and incubation. As such AFRICOM could be argued to be part of the USA strategy in its global project of securing Africa by controlling both territorial space and the resources therein. The analysis by Ayokhai and Ogbang that the establishment of AFRICOM has a lot of implications for the African states especially in the area of national interest, national security and sovereignty is very relevant to our study. The authors conclude by stating AFRICOM project is unpopular because it is perceived as a reflection of an imperialist and

expansionist agenda of the USA which carries with it grave security implications for Nigeria and other states in the Gulf of Guinea.

J. Peter Ham *America's New Africa Command: Paradigm shift or step backwards* the Brown Journal of World Affairs, vol.xv, issue 1 Fall/Winter 2008 provides a brief overview of AFRICOM's origins including USA interests and developments in Africa motivating its establishment, its structure and its interagency involvement in view of key security and developmental issues. However, what is interesting about the article is its analysis of African responses to the new Command which Pham states have been mixed. Pham states those in opposition of the establishment of AFRICOM view the initiative as a neocolonial effort to dominate the continent anew. Others, recalling the rather episodic history of USA commitments in Africa have questioned the sustainability of the new effort. Some are concerned USA renewed interest in Africa is motivated by China's growing influence on the continent which could lead to a "great-power militarization of the continent". While others fear USA counterterrorism efforts is likely to create new dangers for African security. Pham notes those in support of the Command like Liberia's President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf believe USA interests in Africa could enhance the continent's own peace and security priorities.

2.2.3 Implications of AFRICOM on Africa's peace and security

In a forum with Daniel Volman and Jeremy Keenan, Bulletin No.85 Spring 2010 for Concerned Africa Scholar, Stephen Chan in a presentation paper *The origins of AFRICOM: The Obama administration, the Sahara-Sahel and US militarization of Africa* provides a brief overview on how the USA support of Ethiopia has hardened Islamic groups in the southern part of Somalia. This analysis is critical to our study as it helps assess the impact of USA peace and security efforts in Somalia. Chan maintains USA's support of Ethiopia has fueled the anger of Islamic groups in Somalia. The USA seems oblivious to the long standing enmity and military action that have taken place between the two countries over the years. Chan reminds us that AFRICOM is not a development agency when he questions how the USA would bring development through a military command. He suggests if the USA wants to bring development in Africa it should make

use of African not American contractors. Chan also notes that USA through AFRICOM seeks to pursue its national interest is largely motivate by the war on terror.

In a 2011 Master thesis titled *The Impact of the US Global War on Terror on Moroccan and Algerian Security*, Jennifer Mayock provides an overview on the impact of the USA GWOT policy on Algeria and Morocco's security and geopolitics. The thesis is crucial to our study as it examines the impact of AFRICOM on the continents peace and security agenda by arguing the intensification of USA military presence in the two Maghreb states has left the northwest African region insecure. In the thesis Mayock explores how the USA military's strong-arm approach towards imposing a liberal democratic structure design undermines the success of its counterterrorism efforts. Against that background, the thesis focuses on 3 issues, the first being the long term security situation of the two states stressing that their security depends upon their cooperation toward democratization, liberalization and counterterrorism, secondly USA involvement in ensuring the democratization of the two states and lastly USA' hopes of eradicating al-Qaeda strongholds. Mayock's research focused on Algeria and Morocco due to their growing strategic importance to the US especially post the September 11 terrorist attacks as a result of their proximity to Iraq and their ties with al-Qaeda. Mayock cautions that due to the broad nature of the topic and need for more time to gain greater insight into the success and failures of the GWOT there is need for further investigations. Therefore it makes our research more crucial in assessing the impact of AFRICOM on the continents peace and security efforts. She opines that there is need for more time in order to in Algeria and Morocco.

The establishment and implications of the United States Africa Command: An African perspective ISS Paper 183, April 2009 by Berouk Mesfin provides an African perspective with regards to the establishment of AFRICOM. Mesfin explores how AFRICOM is supposed to oversee security and conduct military operations in Arica. Moreover, the article examines how AFRICOM can work its way through the misunderstandings in both USA and Africa in order to either worsen or improve Africa's peace and security environment. However, for the purpose of our study Mesfin provides an interesting examination of positive and negative implications of AFRICOM on both the USA and the AU. For the USA, AFRICOM offers a more integrated framework for pursuing its interests in Africa. AFRICOM is likely to allow the USA to effectively

secure access to oil; curb china's growing political, diplomatic and economic influence, oversee counterterrorism efforts and anticipate security challenges in Africa. For Africa the establishment could be taken as a credible commitment by the USA to help address security challenges facing the continent. Mesfin opines although AFRICOM was not designed to address ongoing conflicts and prevent nascent crises from intensifying the Command could provide the context and guidance for solving Africa's political and military crises early or at least dampen unwelcome developments and reverse any external disruptions on the continent. On the negative, Mesfin explains how AFRICOM could be representing the militarization of USA policy toward Africa. As such an increase in USA involvement and militarization of Africa could fuel terrorism as military power is absolutely no panacea for terrorist threats.

2.2.4 The possibility of an Africa-AFRICOM partnership

In *Beyond AFRICOM: Toward a Comprehensive US Africa Policy* Yale Journal of International Affairs, Winter 2008 Colin Thomas-Jensen examines how the US can formulate a comprehensive policy in its counterterrorism activities in the Horn of Africa. The article exposes critical weaknesses of the US counterterrorism efforts, its policy tools and its capacity to implement policy in Africa. This brings insight on how AFRICOM can work with US civilian agencies particularly the State Department and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) in order to effectively tackle Africa's security challenges. However, Thomas-Jensen is concerned it could difficult to formulate a comprehensive working relationship from the perspectives of both civilian and military actors due to the increasing gap between the US military and civilian agencies. Thomas-Jensen looks at the Horn of Africa and the Sahel region in particular especially making reference to the Chad Basin, Somalia, Eritrea and Ethiopia. The selection of the Horn of Africa and the Sahel is of particular interest because the USA considers continent and has affected the capacity of international humanitarian agencies to deal with the security challenges. On the overall the article assists on how best the USA can make African governments appreciate its military assistance through AFRICOM and its civil agencies in helping tackle the continents security challenges as it has failed to articulate clearly to Africa what AFRICOM is all about. Thomas-Jensen concludes his article by recommending that the USA help increase the capacity of civilian agencies especially with regards to human and

financial resources. Secondly, that the USA counter the growing suspicions of the objectives of its military assistance by African governments. Thirdly, he suggests that the USA works multilaterally to achieve shared objectives. Lastly, Thomas-Jensen suggests that the USA works directly with African governments, sub-regional, regional and continental organisations.

Jack Mangala an associate Professor of Political Science and African Studies at Grand Valley State University, USA in a paper *The PSC and AFRICOM-From opposition to possible partnership in The African Union Peace and Security Council-A five year appraisal* ISS Monograph 187 edited by Tim Murithi and Hallelujah Lulie provides an overview on the relationship between the PSC and AFRICOM in the broader context of the APSA. Mangala discusses AFRICOM's contributions to the AU's regional peace and security initiatives stressing that AFRICOM in its *2010 Posture Statement* emphasized the importance of region wide efforts to establish common security networks such as the AU's cooperative security architecture. It reminds us that although AFRICOM faces resistance from some African states it could play an important role in assisting the AU pursue its peace and security agenda. Mangala also offers a conceptual, contextual and strategic interpretation of AFRICOM. Mangala states the reconceptualization of USA foreign policy toward Africa which is expressed through AFRICOM is motivated by 3 key factors namely GOT, energy security and countering China's growing influence on the continent. Mangala brings to light the fact that since inception AFRICOM's conceptual framework has been refined several times which has led to a confused and mixed image. This might also explain why AFRICOM is unpopular because its agenda is not well understood. In that regard, Mangala discusses the various reactions AFRICOM has received at both national and the AU level which he explains has generated mixed reactions ranging from stiff opposition to cautious optimism. Africa's reaction to AFRICOM will determine whether the AU-AFRICOM partnership could be a success. According to Mangala the AU should assess possible areas that it could strategically leverage its partnership with AFRICOM in order to strengthen its APSA. Mangala's work shows that even though the rationale behind the creation of AFRICOM is motivated by the USA self-interest, the AU through a formalized general framework of cooperation a partnership could help pursue its continental peace and security agenda.

Lauren Ploch, Analyst in African Affairs to the Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division of the Congressional Research Service in *US Africa Command: A more active American approach to addressing African security challenges, IPGI/2009* provides an interesting overview on how USA security strategy toward Africa is driven by protecting trade interest, reducing armed conflict and countering proliferation and terrorism. Ploch emphasizes building partnership capacity is a key component of the strategy and has been at the forefront of US military strategy toward Africa. The article brings to question whether a sustainable Africa-AFRICOM partnership is possible by addressing to what extent USA goals and proposals for security engagement coincide with African security priorities. The USA has reiterated its commitment to increasing its interaction with regional organisations such as the AU including through AFRICOM.

John R. Deni in *AFRICOM's role in shaping the future in Africa* in Focus Quarterly, Jewish Policy Center, Summer 2013 provides an interesting overview on how AFRICOM plays an important role in the defense of USA and its allies interests in Africa and beyond. According to Deni AFRICOM's security cooperation effort is arguably the Command's most important contribution to USA national security thus forming a critical enabling element in American defense, diplomatic and development across Africa. The article illustrates that a partnership between AFRICOM and Africa is possible especially through Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) events, activities and programmes. Deni argues such a partnership could assist Africa solve its security challenges at the same time allowing the USA to pursue its national interests on the continent. Deni explains how AFRICOM has played a critical role in Somalia by conducting pre-deployment training for the AU forces in Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, Sierra Leone and Uganda under the auspices of the State Departments Global Peace Initiatives. Deni maintains there is increasing evidence that AFRICOM training effort is having tangible benefit in AU forces to degrade the capabilities of al-Shabaab.

2.3 Theoretical Framework

This study sought to anchor its discussion on the international regime theory. The emergence of the study of international regimes significantly changed how international organisations were studied by marking a shift away from the exclusive focus on formal international organisations (Brahm, 2005). The regime theory which gained popularity in the 1970s seeks to understand the means and conditions under which states cooperate with one another. Stoyanov (2012) maintains the theory gained popularity as states became increasingly involved in international agreements and rules. In this regard, Niemann (2007) states the regime theory seeks to explain cooperation among states that pursue their self-serving defined interests rationally in an international system which is characterized by an anarchical structure. Moreover, globalization has contributed to the establishment and mass popularity of the regime theory as it has aided interaction in the international realm.

The study of regimes took off with the publication of a special issue of the journal *International Organisations* in 1982 (Brahm, 2005). However, Rochester (1986) points out that the study of regimes has long been plagued by definitional issues and a lack of conceptual clarity. According to Haggard and Simmons (1987) there are three contending definitions of international regimes. The first definition is by Donald Pachula and Raymond Hopkins who equate regimes with patterned behavior. Pachula and Hopkins argue “*Regimes exists in every substantive issue area in international relations.....wherever there is regularity in behavior some kinds of principles, norms or rules must exist to account for it*”. However, Haggard and Simmons (1987) stress that the existence of patterned behavior alone should not lead one to conclude a regime lurks below the surface. They argue deducing regimes from patterned behavior makes it difficult to decide how they mediate, constrain or influence behavior. The second definition is by Oran Young. Young (1989) defines regimes as specialized arrangements that pertain to well defined activities, resources or geographical areas which usually involves only some subset of members of the international community. Young’s definition treats regimes as multilateral agreements among states which aim to regulate national actions within an issue area. The third and mostly opted definition is by Stephen Krasner (Niemann, 2007). Krasner (1983) defines regimes as “implicit

and explicit principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actors expectations converge in a given area of international studies”.

Meanwhile other interesting analyses of regimes are by Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger (2000) and Niemann (2005). The former conserve “regimes are deliberately constructed, partial international orders on either a regional or global scale which are intended to remove specific issue-areas of international politics from the sphere of self-help behavior”. They argue by creating a shared expectation about appropriate behavior and by upgrading the level of transparency in the issue area, regimes assist states and other actors to cooperate with the view of reaping joint gains in the form of additional welfare or security. Furthermore, Niemann (2005) states regimes are often understood as specific cooperative institutions. Niemann differentiates regimes from other general institutions by stating regimes are tied to specific issue areas and like other organisations they cannot appear as actors in the international system. To Haggard and Simmons (1987) regime analysis seeks to fill the gap created by traditional theories namely idealist and realist traditions.

According to Krasner (1983) basically three schools of thought have shaped the discussion of regimes. These include interest based (neoliberalism), power based (realism) and knowledge based (cognitivist) theories which provide numerous insights from which it is possible to draw some general findings about cooperation. Neoliberalism emphasizes the role of international regimes in helping states realize common interests. The neoliberal analysis portrays states as rational egoists who are only interested by pursuing their own absolute interests. Neoliberals stress that international politics is not always characterized by pure conflict thus making cooperation an attractive option. However, the cooperation is plagued by pervasive uncertainty as states are unsure whether they can rely on the promises made by their cooperation partners. According to Axelrod (1984) regimes attempt to reduce the uncertainty by increasing mutual transparency of behavior and linking issues. In other words, regimes help remove the fear of being cheated or exploited by the other parties thus creating an opportunity for states to embark on collaborative ventures.

Realist scholars of international regimes like Robert Gilpin, Stephen Krasner and Joseph Grieco argue power is no less central in cooperation than in conflict among nations. Post-classical realists acknowledge that regime based inter-state cooperation is a reality that is in need of an explanation. According to post-classical realists the distribution of capabilities among actors critically affects both the prospects for effective regimes to emerge and persist in an issue area and the nature of regimes that emerge as far as the issue of allocation of benefits is concerned (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 2000). In its earliest form this line of thinking was premised on the hegemonic stability theory.

The founding fathers of the hegemonic stability theory include Organiski (1958), Charles Kindleberger (1973) and Robert Gilpin (1983). The hegemonic stability theory interprets regimes as international public goods that are in short supply unless a dominant actor (or hegemon) takes the lead in their provision and enforcement. In other words hegemonic stability theorists believe regimes can only be upheld in the presence of a strong leader who has stake in them. However, states are in constant struggle for survival and independence due to lack of a common government. Therefore according to hegemonic stability theorists when states are contemplating regime based cooperation with others they need to take into account both absolute and relative gains since today's friend can be tomorrow's enemy. Resultantly, states tend to be more sensitive to relative gains in favor of others and therefore have a tendency to try and abstain from cooperation even when it could be beneficial in absolute terms.

On the other hand, cognitivists accuse realists and neoliberals of ignoring a significant source of variation in international behavior. According to this school of thought realists and neoliberals treat actors' preferences and perceived options as facts which are either assumed or observed but not theorized about. Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger (2000) point out that there two cognitivist schools of thought in regime analysis that is the weak and strong cognitivism. According to Goldenstein and Keohane (1993) weak (or minimalist) cognitivists focus on the role of causal beliefs in regime formation and change. Weak cognitivists accuse neoliberals and realists of underrating both the degree of uncertainty which decision makers face in many issue-areas and their capacity for complex learning which extends to both means and ends. According

to this school of thought the uncertainty surrounding casual relationships creates demand for reliable issue-specific knowledge which can become a source of political influence for those who supply it.

On the other hand, strong (or maximalist) cognitivists emphasize the social character of international relations. Just like their counterparts strong cognitivists are concerned with the actor's knowledge. They reject the idea that states are rational actors who are atomistic in the sense that their identities, power and fundamental interests are prior to international society and its institutions. According to this school of thought states are as much shaped by international institutions as they shape them. Strong cognitivists argue any durable pattern of interaction affects actor's self-understanding and their image of others. Consequently, institutionalized cooperation is likely to initiate the process in which actor's egoism is dampened and actors increasingly respect rather than merely take into account the legitimate interest of others (Wendt, 1994). In the process cooperative norms are internalized even when initially they were perceived as mere instruments to further their goals by the actors. Consequently, strong cognitivists tend to attribute a greater measure of effectiveness and robustness to international institutions compared to neoliberals and realists (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1997).

In relation to our research, the international regime theory helps us understand the means and conditions under which the AU-AFRICOM sought to cooperate to help to resolve the 2007-2014 Somali conflict. As pointed out by Niemann (2007) regime theory seeks to explain cooperation among states that pursue self-serving defined interests rationally in an anarchical system. Based on this interpretation, it could be argued both the AU and AFRICOM through cooperation seek to pursue their self-serving interests rationally. For the AU resolving the 2007-2014 Somali conflict not only brings peace and stability in the region but also builds confidence in the organisation's ability to deal with conflicts thereby living up to its founding principle "African solutions, to African problems." On the other hand, the USA through AFRICOM seeks to pursue its GWOT policy in Africa, secure energy resources and counter China's growing influence on the continent.

In addition, taking upon Young's (1989) definition of regimes the AU and AFRICOM seek to work together toward an issue area which in this case is to help resolve the Somali crisis namely political stability and the recurring humanitarian crises. Therefore, it is important for the two institutions to come up with multilateral agreements in order to effectively bring about sustainable peace and security in Somalia. Moreover, as neoliberal regime theorists note the issue of transparency is crucial if the AU and AFRICOM are to cooperate in resolving the Somali crisis. Due to the controversy surrounding the creation and particularly the mandate of AFRICOM especially among African states, policy makers and scholars it is imperative that the USA deals with this uncertainty by being transparent when it comes to its activities in Africa. The establishment of AFRICOM has been received with pessimism among many Africans who feel AFRICOM is the latest USA neocolonial tool.

Realist regime theorists direct our attention to the role of power in creating and sustaining regimes as well as possible consequences regimes might have on the distribution of power in the international system. The issue of power will likely be at play when it comes to the AU- AFRICOM partnership in helping resolve the Somali conflict. It will be interesting to note who will take the lead on the mission and enforcement of peace and security initiatives in Somalia. As such as noted by Okomo (2007) the establishment of AFRICOM is likely to be regarded as being an obstruction to the AU's guiding principle of "African Solutions to African Problems" thereby undermining the AU's peace and security initiatives in Somalia.

Conclusion

This chapter provided an overview of the literature on AFRICOM; its establishment, mandate, implications on Africa's peace and security efforts and its partnership with the AU. The literature indicated that the majority of the publications award a section which focuses on the rationale behind the USA sudden shift in foreign policy toward Africa. What is interesting is that most of the literature is in agreement that USA interests in Africa revolves around two major issues that is the fight against terror and securing natural resources particularly oil. The chapter went on to examine the theoretical framework upon which the research is anchored on. The international

regime theory seeks to understand the means and conditions under which states cooperate with one another.

The next chapter will provide an overview on the impact of AFRICOM on the AU's peace and security efforts in the 2007-2014

CHAPTER THREE

AN OVERVIEW ON THE IMPACT OF AFRICOM ON THE AU'S PEACE AND SECURITY EFFORTS IN THE 2007-2014 SOMALIA CONFLICT

“The American military expansion on the continent poses significant challenges to democratization and domestic security”⁵⁸

3.0 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview on the impact of AFRICOM on the AU's peace and security efforts in the 2007-2014 Somali conflict. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section provides a brief overview of the Somali conflict particularly the period 2007-2014. The second section looks at the AU's peace and security initiatives in helping resolve the 2007-2014 Somali conflict. The third section examines the USA's engagement in the Somalia conflict which during the period under review came under AFRICOM's area of responsibility and examines its impact on the AU's peace and security efforts in the 2007-2014 Somalia conflict.

3.1 An overview of the Somali conflict

Somalia has been in conflict situation since 1991 after a civil war broke out following the deposal of the late President Said Barre. According to Nduwimana (2013) since then Somalia has experienced various forms and levels of insecurity which have negatively affected the Somali population. Nduwimana (2013) attributes to a large extent the violence in Somalia to a proliferation of structured violence which he states entail complex and interrelated political, social and economic drivers.

⁵⁸ See article by Opalo K June 2014 *“The consequences of US war on terrorism in Africa”*

3.1.1 Clan cleavages as a source of conflict

According to the Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (BTI) 2014 Somalia Country Brief since 1991 most of Somalia's armed clashes have been fought in the name of clannism and clan cleavages. Research studies including the Conflict Analysis Regional Report-Somaliland Centre for Creative Solutions (CCS) 2004 state that in Somalia clans define relationships and although clan identities are not static and fixed they are shaped and manipulated according to changing situations. According to the 2014 Somalia Risk Assessment by the Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism the major clans in Somalia are the Darood, Dir, Hawiyya and Isaak who are descendants of Samaal while minor clans are descendants of Saab which are the Digil and Rahanweyn clans. As such there is no social identity, access or legitimacy without clan membership. As a result, one can only exercise privileges such as access to land, employment and social services if they are part of a clan group.

However, the World Bank (2005) maintains this does not mean clans are inherently conflictual but rather can be manipulated in order to acquire control over resources and power. As such warlords and divisive political leaders have emphasized clan differences and formulate demands that play in those differences. Therefore clan identities have been used as a tool to mobilize militia and have spilled over to clashes over resources and power. The World Bank (2005) concludes “ *Nearly all armed conflicts in contemporary Somalia break out along clan lines.....clans are not the basis for conflict; rather their deliberate manipulation creates and exacerbates divisions*”. As a result, clan cleavages are alleged to make broad based reconciliation efforts in Somalia difficult to achieve.

3.1.2 The threat of insurgency from Islamist militant groups

From 2007-2014 Somalia has experienced ongoing violence. Most of the violence has been attributed to the rise of Islamist groups which in 2006 gained control of the southern part of Somalia including the capital Mogadishu. According to Bradburg and Healy (2010) the conflict situation in Somalia has been made more complex by the emergence of a variety of Islamist

movements seeking to establish an Islamic state in Somalia at the same time pursuing a regional and global agenda. Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (HSM) commonly known as al-Shabaab a Somalia-based militant group has been accused of being responsible for conflict and violence especially in the southern part of the country, where it seeks to impose its own strict form of Sharia Law. Although the militant group was initially considered an affiliate to al-Qaeda it formalized its ties with the latter in February 2012. The (BTI) 2014 Somalia Country Brief states since 2007 al-Shabaab expanded its sphere of control and dominated the southern and central parts of Somalia so much that by end of 2009 the insurgent group had increased its presence in Mogadishu. It is worth noting that when al-Shabaab initially first expanded its operations in 2007-2008 the Bush administration officially designated the militant group a foreign terrorist organization (Dagne, 2012).

During the 111th Congress 2nd session the USA House of Representatives noted besides its close ties to al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab's expansion and growing influence in the region was made possible by the government of Eritrea. Since 2007 it is alleged the Eritrean government has provided political and material support in form of arms, munitions and training which have facilitated al-Shabaab's operations. The United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia (UN-SMG) has on several occasions found evidence which proves Eritrea's support for Al-Shabaab. In July 2007, the UN-SMG reported:

“Huge quantities of arms have been provided to the Al-Shabaab by and through Eritrea.....the weapons in caches and otherwise in possession of the Shabab include an unknown number of missiles, suicide belts and explosives with timers and detonators” (USA House of

Representative. Res 1708)

In response to the evidence provided by the SMG, the UN in December 2009 sanctioned the government of Eritrea under Resolution 1907 for supporting militants in Somalia (UNSC Resolution 1907, S/RES/1907). The sanctions included an arms embargo, travel bans and asset freezes of businesses and government officials. However, according to Roach and Walser (2012) the sanctions were not effective.

3.1.3 The threat of piracy

According to Roach and Walser (2012) years of lawlessness in Somalia led to many Somalis to resort to illegal ventures such as piracy in search of a source of living. They note most of the pirates are former fisherman and militia fighters who are principally based in Eyl in the north-eastern part of Puntland and in Xarardheere in central Somalia. The Gulf of Aden is one of the busiest waterways in the world with an estimated 3 000 ships sailing through it. It is estimated that approximately 7% of the maritime commerce and over 10% of waterborne transportation of all transits flow through the Gulf (Carafano, Weitz and Andersen, 2009). As a result, piracy in Somalia adversely affects the flow of commerce and costs the shipping industry and consumers billions of dollars a year. Although piracy is a very risky business due to its enormous profits it continues to expand and advance its tactics. As noted by Carafano, Weitz and Andersen (2009) in 2008 alone pirates obtained an estimated US\$30 million through ransom demands. As a result of such massive profits there has been a sharp increase in the number of hijacking incidents. For instance in May 2012 Somali pirates were holding 12 vessels and 173 hostages (Roach and Walser, 2012).

3.1.4 Humanitarian crisis

The conflict in Somalia has been further complicated by drought and famine. In 2011 Somalia faced a severe drought which initiated one of the worst humanitarian crises in two decades. The drought led the UN to declare a famine. The famine is estimated to have impacted 4 million people and led to about 750 000 people to be considered at risk of starvation (The Guardian, 5 September 2011). The ongoing humanitarian crises in Somalia led the UN's Director of Humanitarian Operations John Ging in 2014 following a three day visit to the country appeal to the world to keep its attention on Somalia (The Independent, 19 February 2014). This was after new figures showed more than 850 000 Somalis are in desperate need of food. In addition, the UNHRC states more than twenty years of conflict and waves of drought have resulted in a

massive exodus of Somalis. According to the UNHRC in the first half of 2011 alone, more than 83 000 Somalis fled into Kenya and over 54 000 into Ethiopia.⁵⁹

3.2 The AU's peace and security efforts in Somalia

According to Nduwimana (2013) despite a number of peace initiatives implemented in the hope of stabilizing Somalia none managed to bring about peace and security. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM) of 2005 was one of the peace initiatives established with the hope of bringing stability to Somalia. However, as noted by Nduwimana, IGASOM failed to deploy successfully mainly due to lack of funding and challenges with the neutrality of the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs). As a result, the AU during the 69th meeting of the PSC [PSC/PR/Comm (LXIX)] through a resolution urged the deployment of troops to Somalia with the sole purpose of providing an African response to the multifaceted security challenges and imminent collapse of Somalia. The resolution saw AMISOM begin its mission in Somalia on 19 January 2007. According to Segui (2013) AMISOM was launched as a result of a failure to implement the IGASOM. Initially IGASOM was meant to replace Ethiopian troops and assist the Mogadishu government in its fight against al-Shabaab.

AMISOM is a an active, regional peacekeeping mission whose mandate include supporting the Somali government and its institutions to help stabilize the country, advancing the process of dialogue and reconciliation, facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance and creating conditions for long term stability, reconstruction and development in Somalia (UNSC, 2012). AMISOM is premised on the notion "Africa should solve African Problems". Malan (2012) states it is through this notion that the AU has mandated a range of peacekeeping missions including AMISOM in a bid to respond to the complex conflicts engulfing the continent. Since 2007, AMISOM has worked with the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) and Ethiopian forces against a complex Islamist insurgency spearheaded by al-Shabaab. However through various peace negotiations a moderate group of Islamist forces were included into the

⁵⁹ See UNHCR *Crisis in Horn of Africa* <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4e1ff4b06.html> accessed 14 April 2015

TFG. Unfortunately, the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from Somalia in January 2009 and the election of Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud a moderate Islamist as President AMISOM failed to bring stability to Somalia.

By end of 2009 al-Shabaab had expanded its sphere of control and had dominated southern and central of Somalia especially the capital Mogadishu. The insurgent group began building administrative structures in these parts (BTI 2014 Somalia Country Brief). However, al-Shabaab's dominance was short lived as AMISOM in mid-2011 raised its troops from the originally planned 8000 to 12000 and managed to force the insurgent group out of Mogadishu. By 2013 the Somali National Forces (SNF) with the support of AMISOM had effectively evicted al-Shabaab from most of the major urban centers in Somalia including Mogadishu, Baidoa and the port cities of Marka and Kismayo (Segui, 2013). According to the BTI 2014 Somalia Country Brief the military defeat of al-Shabaab by joint international and national forces, the election of a Federal parliament and government in 2012 raised hopes for a political breakthrough which could eventually end the Somali conflict and enable broad based reconciliation and reconstruction processes. However, Alasaow (2012) argues al-Shabaab continues to undermine the AU's peace and security initiatives in Somalia through its ability to mount deadly attacks not only on Somali population but also neighboring countries.

Besides dealing with the insurgency of militant groups AMISOM has to deal with a serious humanitarian crisis. However, Segui (2013) notes the humanitarian aspect by AMISOM is limited to a facilitation role due to human and material constraints. Between 2007 and 2012 alone the Somali conflict resulted in the loss of more than 10 000 lives most of them civilians and forced thousands to flee. The situation was made worse by a 2011 drought which initiated the worst humanitarian crises in decades (Roach and Walser, 2012). However, the political developments and withdrawal of al-Shabaab from Mogadishu in 2012 saw internally displaced people and Somali refugees return to the capital. According to the BTI 2014 Somalia Country Brief, Somali diaspora returnees have started investing in the country especially in the capital Mogadishu where they are setting up restaurants, shops, hotels and other businesses.

In addition, AMISOM has been very instrumental in supporting consultations in Mogadishu (Segui, 2013). For instance, the AMISOM Gender Office organized a one day workshop on the topic *Empowering Somali Women and Engaging Elders and Politicians in Mogadishu* on 12 November 2012. The aim of the workshop was to discuss the way forward for the peacekeeping process, bearing in mind the local dynamics, the roles played by main stakeholders including AMISOM.

According to Manahl (2013) the entry of AMISOM ushered a new political era which has brought hope for a lasting stabilization of southern Somalia which has been dominated by a vicious cycle of poverty, clan rivalries and sectarian violence. Nduwimana (2012) points out that the inauguration of a new Federal Parliament and the swearing in of Hassan Sheik Mohamoud as President on 10 September 2012 brought a ray of hope in Somalia. He maintains these political and security developments are considered milestones in helping bring stability thereby ushering a possibility of a safe, secure and peaceful Somalia which is at peace with itself and its neighbors. According to Segui (2013) since the defeat of al-Shabaab in Mogadishu by AMISOM the capital has been witnessing improved security although reported incidents of asymmetric attacks and intimidation of locals remain a concern.

Meanwhile, Segui (2013) argues the immediate and most challenging goal for AMISOM is to figure out how the stabilization of the so called “liberated areas” can be effectively achieved and maintained. According to the AU the concept of “stabilization” consists of a multi-dimensional process which involves extending the administrative authority of the government, the delivery of public goods and services to the local populace and supporting security sector reforms. Segui (2013) underscores the fact that the AU is simply playing a supportive role in Somalia thereby leaving the ownership of the process to the government. Consequently, the AU multi-dimensional strategy is hinged on two major approaches namely the security oriented approach and the politically oriented approach (Segui, 2013). The success of the security oriented approach depends on effectively enhancing the security system and the continued defeat of insurgent groups. On the other hand, the politically oriented approach is premised on the promotion of good governance. Segui (2013) goes on to state it upon these two approaches that

AMISOM initially structured its deployment in terms of military, the police and the civilian components.

The AMISOM military component is mandated to retrieve back the areas controlled by al-Shabaab, secure the liberated areas and provide the necessary support to institutionalize the Somalia's National Security and Stabilisation Plan (NSSP). Meanwhile, the police component is mandated to assist with capacity building of the Somali Police Force (SPF) with the aim of transforming the force into a credible body that is able to provide the necessary security for its population. Lastly, the mandate of the civilian component involves assisting the rebuilding of Somalia's legitimate and effective political institutions. Segui (2013) maintains the civilian component is critical because the success of the military oriented strategy depends on the former. In this regard, the support of AMISOM could be very useful when it comes to mobilizing and bringing key actors such as district commissioners, traditional and religious and civil society leaders. Furthermore, Segui (2013) asserts the enhancement of the civilian component is crucial if sustainable peace is to be achieved.

During the AU PSC first historical field visit to Mogadishu on 26 October 2013, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud expressed his governments appreciation for the support rendered to his country from the AU through AMISOM.⁶⁰ During the visit President Mohamoud stated:

“The Somali problem is an African problem to be dealt with all Africans.....Somalia is hugely indebted to the AU for helping us emerge from war and for the relative stability the country is experiencing.”

During the same visit the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (SRCC) for Somalia, Ambassador Mahamat Saleh Annadif stated:

“AMISOM is continuing to train and build up the capabilities of the Somali forces to eventually take over responsibility for the nation.”

⁶⁰ See *Somalia: AU Peace and Security Council in historic visit to Mogadishu*, 26 October 2013 <http://www.horseedmedia.net/2013/10/26/au-peace-security-council-historic-visit-mogadishu> accessed 14 April 2015

The two above statements are clear testimony that the AU through AMISOM has played an important role in bringing some form of stability in Somalia. Guided by the notion “African solutions to African problems” the AU has engaged Somalia with the aim of helping resolve the conflict.

Despite the successes that AMISOM has achieved in Somalia, Hull (2013) argues AMISOM just like other AU missions faces various challenges including lack of military resources, funding and institutional capacity to manage its operations. Therefore, these challenges undermine AMISOM’s mandate to effectively bring peace and security to Somalia thus rendering the mission ineffective in contributing to the overall security situation in the country (Hull, 2013). When AMISOM initially deployed its first troops it was below the projected 8 000 member force. As a result, in December 2010 the UNSC raised the force level to 12 000 and in February 2013 the Council unanimously raised the AMISOM force to 17 731⁶¹. According to Segui (2013) AMISOM has challenges when it comes to sourcing and deploying personnel and capabilities to the mission. Some of the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) are faced with lack of clarity concerning logistical, institutional or financial aspects thereby complicating implementation. Segui (2013) notes for example the expected troop deployment by Sierra Leone was delayed as a result of logistical support problems involving the acquisition of ammunition.

According to Williams (2011) the AU lacks adequate financial and logistical capacity thereby making the organisation rely on external assistance which he estimates to be approximately US\$800 million from the UN alone between 2008 and 2012 for AMISOM operations. The concept of logistical support for AMISOM by the AU PSC involves mobilizing support for the TCCs, as well as funding from AU member states and partners to ensure that TCCs are reimbursed for the costs incurred in the course of their deployment. This concept confirms that for AMISOM to effectively fulfill its mandate in Somalia it needs logistical and funding assistance from international institutions. In an effort to establish an effective coordination network, AMISOM together with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

⁶¹ AMISOM Press Release “*First AMISOM Troops Deployed Outside of Mogadishu*,” 5 April 2012 <http://amisom-au.org/2012/04-first-amisom-troops-deployed-outside-mogadishu/>. accessed 7 April 2015

(UN-OCHA) on 24 November 2014 launched the Somalia Country Specific Guidelines to govern relations on civil military coordination in Somalia. The objective of the guidelines is to establish agreed principles and practices for constructive civil-military relations between AMISOM and humanitarian actors operating within the country. The Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary General to Somalia, Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator (DSRSG/RC/HC), Philippe Lazzarini during the launch emphasized that the guidelines are very important in ensuring better structured relations and in turn more effective aid delivery.

With regards to achieving sustainable peace and security in Somalia, Manahl (2013) opines the new federal government should be given substantial and sustained international assistance to ensure it succeeds in its endeavors to bring about peace and reconciliation and address challenges that may arise. Manahl proposes that the international community should review its institutional architecture in support of Somalia. On the other hand, Segui (2013) stresses it is important that AMISOM peace building initiatives should complement Somalia's peace building strategies thus giving the Somali government space to maneuver and be the leading institution in the process. However, Segui (2013) argues AMISOM with the purpose of filling the gap especially with the Somali government lacking the capacity to govern effectively has actually created a culture of dependency. According to Segui (2013) such a scenario prevents the government from taking over power and prevents the AU PSO from planning a strategy to pull out their troops from the operating areas. As such AMISOM has been accused of failing to understand the local dynamics and governing methods thereby provoking confusion and producing limited and non-existent outcomes in their interventions (Segui, 2013). Therefore, it is crucial that AMISOM makes an appreciation of the local initiatives in order to help build a legitimate and effective security strategy in Somalia.

3.3 USA engagement in Somalia and its impact on the AU's peace and security efforts with reference to the 2007-2014 Somalia conflict

Roach and Walser (2012) maintain although the conflict in Somalia impacts the USA it is not considered a USA foreign policy priority. As such the Obama administration has taken limited

steps toward engagement with Somalia's local governing entities (Carson, 2010). The Obama administration has made it clear that direct USA military engagement will continue to be limited. To clarify this point, in March 2010 Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson stated, "*The USA has no desire to Americanize the conflict in Somalia*"⁶². According to Dagne (2002) the USA has been taking constrained engagement in the Horn of Africa since the infamous Battle for Mogadishu in 1993.

Although the USA has over the years taken constrained engagement with Africa, since the creation of AFRICOM the Command has taken responsibility for USA operations in Africa. According to Volman (2008), since its establishment AFRICOM assumed the role of coordinating USA peacekeeping activities, humanitarian aid missions and military partnership operations with African countries. In addition, AFRICOM offers defence support in non-military operations such as Millennium Challenge Account (which awards grants to countries which meet the USA's governance criteria), the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR-an initiative to combat to combat HIV and AIDS), the Africa Education Initiative (for assisting poor children), the Water for the Poor Act (meant to provide affordable and reliable access to clean water and sanitation) and the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)-an initiative which allows nearly forty economies in sub-Saharan Africa to export specific goods duty and quota free into USA markets (US Africa Command 2008a). In summary Volman (2008) states AFRICOM coordinates USA military support by bringing the humanitarian work of the State Department, the US Agency for International Development Aid (USAID) and other USA government agencies engaged with Africa under the direction of the USA's DoD.

According to Ploch (2009) efforts by both EUCOM and CENTCOM to increase their communications with and support for activities coordinated by the AU were assumed by AFRICOM at the Command's establishment. Unlike other USA military commands, AFRICOM is fully integrated with other USA agencies in Africa including USAID, the State and Commerce

⁶² See News Release *U.S Diplomat: "We Do Not Plan, Direct or Coordinate Military Ops for Somalia"*, Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa 13 March 2010 <http://www.hoa.africom.mil/getArticleFresh.asp?art=4155> accessed 7 April 2015

and Treasury departments. According to Opalo (2014) this approach informs AFRICOM's focus on a 3-D approach namely defense, diplomacy and development in the region. In order for AFRICOM to conduct its counter-terrorism activities in the region, the USA has recruited a motley crew of African allies especially those facing direct threat of terrorist activities. Therefore, countries which include Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti and Ethiopia have become key USA partners in the war against al-Shabaab (Opalo, 2014).

The AU and USA received a wakeup call on the capabilities of al-Shabaab to cause destabilization in the region and beyond when it launched its first transnational attacks with synchronized bombings in Kampala, Uganda on 11 July 2010. Traditionally al-Shabaab had limited its targets to those in Somalia. According to Carson (2010) the incident showed al-Shabaab's aspirations now targeted beyond Somalia thereby raising concerns that the militant group had the ability to destabilize East Africa. In response, the USA increased its counterterrorism operations in the region through the intelligence community, the deployment of proxy forces, armed drones and Special Forces Missions (Roach and Walser, 2012). The USA carried out its first known drone operation in Somalia which was an attack on a vehicle convoy in an established al-Shabaab stronghold city of Kismayo⁶³. The strike wounded two senior al-Shabaab operatives. Although it is not clear how many drone operations have been conducted by the USA to date, Roach and Walser, (2012) state the strikes are being expanded with drones being reportedly operating out of the CJTF-HOA. They note just like other parts of the world, the Obama administration has made technological advancement a key component of its anti-terror operations in Somalia.

In August 2009 the USA pledged its support for the TFG and through the State Department 40tons of weapons and military equipment were given to the NSF. However, Ross (2010) reported that human rights groups such as Amnesty International were concerned the weapons could be used against civilians⁶⁴. Roach and Walser, (2012) note although the USA supports the

⁶³ "US Extends Drone Strikes to Somalia" Aljazeera, 1 July 2011
<http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2011/06/201163018229379353.html> accessed 7 April 2015

⁶⁴ Will Ross "Amnesty International Urges Tougher Somali Arms Checks," BBC, 21 January 2010
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8471599.stm> accessed 5 April 2015

TFG the country relies upon regional partners to lead diplomatic efforts. In that regard, it is worth mentioning that the USA closed its embassy in Mogadishu and transferred its diplomatic responsibilities to Nairobi, Kenya following the collapse of the Said Barre regime.

Roach and Walser, (2012) state the Obama administration has presented a multifaceted strategy for Somalia. In September 2010, the Administration unveiled what it has described as a “dual track” approach. They note through this strategy the USA aims to curb terrorism and emphasizes its support for the TFG. With the first track the USA plans to improve the TFG’s effectiveness and address its capacity to deliver security and governance. This strategy includes strengthening AMISOM forces. As of 2013 the USA has provided an estimated US\$258 million for logistics support, equipment and pre-deployment training for its forces, as well as US\$85 million for the NSF’s capacity building initiatives (Roach and Walser, 2012). With the second strategy the USA hopes to expand its engagement with Somali local entities. According to Roach and Walser, (2012) by working with the local government structures and populations the USA will be able to create more enduring relations with political actors. They however argue this approach overlooks the importance of good governance.

In relation to the threat of piracy, the UNSC Resolution 1816 provides for the use of “*all necessary measures to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery.*”⁶⁵ The UNSC went on to further adopt Resolutions 1838 and 1851 in 2008 which emphasize and authorizes the expansion of counter-piracy activities. However, Mason (2012) states the USA has been facing challenges in prosecuting pirates in the Horn of Africa which range from the determination of legal jurisdiction, due process for detained pirate suspects and the role of foreign military forces in anti-piracy law enforcement. Despite these various challenges being encountered the USA in partnership with the EU and other non-western partners have responded to the threat of piracy by dispatching military ships to the Gulf of Aden. According to Roach and Walser (2012) the military initiative has had limited impact. They argue it is largely as a result of a lack of

⁶⁵ News Release, “*Security Council Condemns Acts of Piracy, Armed Robbery off Somalia’s Coast, Authorizes For Six Months’ All Necessary Means to Repress Such Acts,*” United Nations Security Council, 2 June 2008 <http://www.un.org/news/press/docs/2008/sc9344.doc.htm> accessed 5 April 2015

harmonized international counter-piracy strategy which has led to poor coordination of naval activities. Consequently pirates have taken advantage of the shortfall by avoiding patrolled areas. Moreover, Roach and Walser (2012) maintain the counter-piracy measures have produced limited success as they are only reactionary measures and fail to address the root of the problem which is Somalia's lack of good governance which has allowed piracy to establish itself as a multi-dollar industry. As stated by Martin Murphy at the Atlantic Council:

*“Piracy is a symptom, not a cause of Somalia’s current predicament. It arose as a result of Somalia’s domestic turmoil....Dealing with piracy requires engagement on land”*⁶⁶

The 2011 drought and famine saw the TFG failing to effectively respond to the crises. As a result the USA took a leading role in responding to the crisis by providing more than US\$1.1 billion in humanitarian aid to the Horn of Africa (Voice of Africa, 25 April 2012)⁶⁷. However, as noted by Roach and Walser (2012) corruption and continued instability in Somalia caused the USA to resort to putting in place strict restrictions on aid distribution. Although the UN announced that the famine conditions had ended in February 2013, an estimated 2.51 million people in the Horn of Africa still required emergency support (USAID Fact Sheet, 3 April 2012).

The launch of AFRICOM in 2007 was marred with controversy and sparked protests within many African states (Bruton and Williams, 2014). As such its impact on Africa's peace and security efforts is also characterized by controversy with some African states raising concerns of a possible neo-colonial agenda by the USA while others believe the Command could assist the continent address its economic, security and developmental challenges. As noted by Dr Okumu (2007) the establishment of AFRICOM is likely to be regarded as being an obstruction to the AU's guiding principle of “African Solutions to African Problems”, therefore Such a development could be interpreted as violating Africa's common position on the continents

⁶⁶ Martin Murphy in Charles H. Norchi and Gwenaelle Proutiere-Maulion (2012, eds), *Piracy in Comparative Perspective; Problems, Strategies, Law*, Paris and Oxford

⁶⁷ “U.S Gives \$120 million more to drought stricken Horn of Africa,” Voice of America, 25 April 2012
<http://blogs.voanews.com/breaking-news/2012/04/25/us-gives-120-million-more-to-drought-stricken-horn-of-africa>
accessed 30 March 2015

defense and security strategies and is feared it could undermine the continent's Non-Aggression Pact, solemn declaration on Africa's common defense and security.

Local perceptions with regards to USA engagement in the Somali conflict have mostly been pessimistic due to the controversy surrounding the establishment of AFRICOM. As a result, the USA since 2007 attempted to avoid direct military engagement in the country (Bruton and Williams, 2014). As indicated earlier AMISOM just like other AU missions faces various challenges which include lack of financial and military resources and institutional capacity to manage its operations (Hull, 2013). These shortcomings have made the continental body rely on external assistance to ensure it effectively and efficiently conducts its peace and security mandate. The USA has played a significant role in assisting the AU implement its peace and security initiatives in Somalia. Since 2007 the USA has provided vital logistical, political and financial support to AMISOM. However, this support has been through bilateral aid to AMISOM's TCCs initially Uganda followed by Burundi, Kenya, Djibouti, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia (Bruton and Williams, 2014). Total USA assistance to Burundi and Uganda soared in the wake of AMISOM operations. For example the total bilateral assistance to Uganda increased from US\$390 million in the fiscal year 2007 to US\$528 in 2012 (2012 USA Congressional Budget). According to the USA Government Assistance to the AU May 2013 Fact Sheet the USA has been AMISOM's largest bilateral contributor.

In the initial stages of AMISOM the AU struggled to source and deploy personnel for the mission to the extent that it failed to raise the targeted 8 000 troops. Moreover, the TCCs failed to deploy their troops due to lack of clarity with regards to logistical, institutional and financial aspects (Segui, 2013). Bruton and Williams (2014) note in the early years of its inception AMISOM managed to attract only two TCCs until 2012 mainly due to lack of resources and lack of political commitment by most African states. As a result, USA assistance to TCCs helped address the deployment challenges AMISOM was facing. According to Mangala (2008) the Command helped deploy 1600 Ugandan peacekeepers in Somalia and provided equipment to the Burundian battalion as part of its support to AMISOM. In a statement before the US Senate Armed Services Committee in 2013 General Carter Ham maintains sustained operations by

African forces with the assistance of the US and the international community has successfully managed to weaken al-Shabaab thereby creating a suitable environment for Somalia's transition to a constitutionally based government.

In addition to financial support, the USA has provided equipment, training advice and logistical support to AMISOM's TCCs. In 2012 the USA provided small drones to some TCCs to help combat al-Shabaab (Bruton and Williams, 2014). It is worth mentioning that most of the assistance to AMISOM was done through the Department of State (DoS) Global Peace Operations Initiative's Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. ACOTA is a DoS initiative to train African peacekeepers. In Somalia, the ACOTA program covers topics which include protection of civilians, human rights, countering improvised explosive devices (IEDs), maritime security and mechanized infantry operations. Referring to the ACOTA program General Ham (2013) confirms AMISOM forces receive pre-deployment training including specialized training in intelligence analysis and countering improvised explosive devices which have ultimately improved AMISOM's operational capabilities. AFRICOM has provided military mentors and trainers for ACOTA events and conducted specialized logistical training activities through programs such as the Africa Deployment Assistance Partnership Team (Bruton and Williams, 2014). Despite such initiatives meant to improve AMISOM operations, General Ham (2013) maintains that al-Shabaab remains a threat and could disrupt AMISOM's operations and the newly formed Somali government. Therefore, he suggests that AFRICOM works with the DoS to help develop security cooperation initiatives that could assist with developing a unified Somali security force.

USA Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Johnnie Carson (2012) said that in 2010 Washington embarked on a five-year long project to help AMISOM install a new command, control and communication information system in the hope to overcome the threat of al-Shabaab and safeguard the Somali political process. The impact of this development on AU's mission could see it establishing an effective early warning system thereby ensuring quick response against any possible threat. Moreover, Schmitt (2014) states the USA in 2013 established a military

coordination cell in Somalia to provide planning and advisory support to AMISOM and the Somali Security Forces (SSF).

Although the US has tried to avoid direct military action in Somalia it has on limited cases done so against al-Shabaab in an effort to counter terror. However, Bruton and Williams (2014) note these strikes especially in 2007 were largely counterproductive as they failed to hit their targets but instead caused multiple civilian casualties. However, they maintain since 2008 its direct military action operations became more effective as and even resulted in less civilian casualties. As result Bruton and Williams (2014) claim these actions helped undermine al-Shabaab's operations especially its relations with al-Qaeda. They argue the ability of the USA strikes to avoid more reputable or clan-affiliated Somali leaders such as Hassan Turki, Muktar Robow and Hassan Dahir Aweys has led to less public criticism because the death of the two could have sparked a strong public backlash. In addition, there has been fear among the al-Shabaab operatives that they could be traced through the use of satellite phones and contacts in the Middle East as the USA embarks on direct action. Consequently, to Bruton and Williams (2014) there is evidence of reduced movement of al-Shabaab leaders which has in turn dampened Somalia's attractiveness as a jihadi terrorist destination.

Bruton and Williams (2014) contend the USA engagement in Somalia has negatively affected the AMISOM in two key aspects. Firstly, they maintain AMISOM has borne the brunt of public anger against Washington's use of surveillance drones and direct action. For example the retaliation of al-Shabaab following the killing Aden Hashi Ayro the military commander of the Hizbul Shabaab in 2008 saw an immediate surge of violence and witnessed two large scale attacks on AMISOM headquarters in February and September 2009. The incidents led to the killing of twenty-eight peacekeepers including the Burundian deputy force commander. Secondly, Bruton and Williams (2014) conserve the designation of al-Shabaab as a terrorist organization has thwarted any hopes regarding AMISOM's capacity to initiate or conduct dialogue with potential al-Shabaab defectors. They contend in theory peace negotiations with al-Shabaab were initially the responsibility of the Somali central authorities including the current Federal Government but all have failed to promote peace negotiations with the opposition.

Consequently, the AMISOM had become the potential negotiator of peace deals with opposing forces in Somalia but the USA declaration of al-Shabaab as a terrorist organization has complicated the situation.

According to Campbell (2011) USA's counterterrorism activities and humanitarian assistance in Somalia and the Horn of Africa contribute to the regions entrenched problems. He argues the immediate cause of the destabilization in Somalia is the USA war on terror which is pursued under the pretext of humanitarian aid. Campbell (2011) maintains the militarization of the conflict by the USA has led to the mass movement of people thereby leaving no one to farm the land in turn reducing regional capacity to deal with the crisis. The militarization of the Somali conflict has also been condemned by the Human Rights Watch. In a 2011 report titled "*You Don't Know Who to Blame: War Crimes in Somalia*" the Human Rights Watch brings out the reality of how USA military activities have exacerbated the situation in Somalia. In the report the Human Rights Watch documented numerous cases of abuse which occurred during renewed fighting in 2010. In addition, in 2011 BBC Africa Correspondent Andrew Harding in an article titled "*Top 10 Culprits for Horn of Africa Hunger*" stated USA policy on piracy, oil and war on terror have been the number one root cause of the failure to deal with the 2010-2011 drought which led to a famine.⁶⁸

In another development, in an article titled "*The CIA Secret Sites in Somalia*" Scahill (2014) exposed the CIA of participating in the running of secret detention and interrogation centers in Somalia.⁶⁹ Therefore, to Campbell (2011) famine and dictatorship are two outcomes of the USA counterterrorism strategies in Africa. Moreover, Campbell (2011) argues the Congressional testimony by the USA Department of Defence, the Department of State and USAID which represented AFRICOM as a development agency having the resources to carry out humanitarian assistance in Africa have given further propaganda advantage to the al-Shabaab forces which usually refuse humanitarian assistance for those displaced by drought and famine. Such cases

⁶⁸ <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14291581> accessed 14 April 2015

⁶⁹ Jeremy Scahill 10 December 2014 "The CIA Secret Sites in Somalia"

<http://www.thenation.com/article/161936/cias-secret-sites-somalia> accessed 10 April 2015

could be argued are undermining initiatives by the AU through AMISOM in Somalia as the mission is likely to face resistance in al-Shabaab controlled areas.

Furthermore, Opalo (2014) in an article titled “*The Consequences of the US War on Terrorism in Africa*” argues the USA war on terror has provided opportunities for some African leaders to enact sweeping anti-terrorism laws meant to silence dissent. He gives an example of Ethiopia (one of the TCCs to AMISOM) which he states as of June 2014 had convicted over 35 journalists and opposition leaders under the country’s anti-terrorism proclamation. Opalo (2014) states what is puzzling is how the USA continues to turn a blind eye to such cases of human rights abuses. Such developments continue to undermine the AU’s peace and security efforts especially when it comes to issues of human rights. The double standard attitude by the USA makes it difficult for the AU to enforce the respect of human rights uniformly across the Horn of Africa.

In addition, Opalo (2014) opines the USA inherent bias toward military approaches to security threats in Africa limits the options available for African governments facing domestic challenges. As indicated earlier on USA emphasis on non-negotiations with entities it designates a terrorist groups as part of its anti-terrorism laws has undermined the AU’s initiatives to bring together opposing parties in Somalia in an effort to negotiate peace deals. Lastly, USA military operations and engagements with African militaries risks compromising the professionalism of African militaries (Opalo, 2014). For examples, despite Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni being accused of personalizing the Ugandan military by even appointing his son to a top post, the USA has turned a blind eye to these allegations because Kampala is a key military ally and even houses a Washington facility at the Entebbe airport. According to Opalo (2014) such a scenario is likely to see the growth of military units outside normal chains of command thereby creating problems for effective civilian control in the long run. The development of such parallel structures could greatly undermine AMISOM’s chain of command as Uganda is a leading partner in the mission.

3.4 Conclusion

The impact of AFRICOM on the AU's peace and security efforts with reference to the 2007-2014 Somalia conflict has both been negative and positive. It is without doubt that the USA financial and logistical support to the AU through AMISOM has gone a long way in ensuring the effectiveness of the mission's operations in Somalia. In particular the USA assistance to TCCs has helped address the deployment challenges AMISOM was facing. As a result, AMISOM has successfully managed to weaken al-Shabaab thereby creating a relatively stable and peaceful Somalia. However, AFRICOM's operations in Somalia have made it difficult for the AU to negotiate peace deals among the opposing parties due to the USA's anti-terrorism laws which include forbidding any negotiations with entities it designates as terrorist groups.

The next chapter shall discuss the constraints facing a possible AU-AFRICOM partnership in implementing peace and security initiatives in Somalia.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONSTRAINTS FACING A POSSIBLE AU-AFRICOM PARTNERSHIP IN IMPLEMENTING PEACE AND SECURITY INITIATIVES IN SOMALIA

*“Somalia has seen too much conflict. It is now demanding new solutions.”*⁷⁰

4.0 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the constraints facing a possible AU-AFRICOM partnership in implementing peace and security initiatives in Somalia. The chapter begins by discussing the basis for a possible AU-AFRICOM in implementing peace and security initiatives in Africa with a specific reference to Somalia. The chapter will then proceed to discuss the constraints facing a possible AU-AFRICOM partnership in implementing peace and security initiatives Africa with particular reference to Somalia.

4.1 The basis for possible AU-AFRICOM partnership in implementing peace and security initiatives in Somalia

Article 17(4) of the AU PSC Protocol stipulates that the Council should cooperate and work closely with relevant international partners on issues of peace, security and stability in Africa (AU 2000 Constitutive Act). This provision offers the basis for a possible working partnership between PSC and AFRICOM. Meanwhile, AFRICOM in its 2010 Posture statement underscores the importance of “region-wide” efforts to establish common security networks, such as the AU’s cooperative security architecture. In a statement before the House of Armed Services Committee on 29 February 2012, General Carter Ham reiterated the Command’s commitment to build upon existing relationships and developing new partnerships in Africa with the aim of strengthening the defence capabilities of partner nations in an effort to assist them provide their

⁷⁰ Comment by USA Ambassador to Ghana Donald Teitelbaum

own security. In that regard General Ham stated AFRICOM would seek new ways to work with and through the AU and its regional organisations by supporting their leadership in preventing and responding to African security challenges.

Aning and Aubyn (2013) maintain the USA through its multiple engagements and grand strategies has become a key partner of the AU's institutionalization process. They note that since the establishment of AFRICOM there has been increased interaction with the AU, an indication of the USA growing confidence in the organization as a crucial player in the maintenance of peace in Africa. In that regard, USA Ambassador to the AU Michael Battle argues this emerging partnership demonstrates how the USA government views the AU as a critical partner to the development of its policy toward the African continent. Although there is evidence of increasing collaboration between the AU and the USA over the years, Aning and Aubyn (2013) argue the nature of the relationship has not yet been clearly defined as it has been largely ad hoc and crisis driven. This lack of clarity is reflected by the constant shifting and changing nature of the USA security strategies toward the continent. Resultantly, the AU-USA relationship is usually characterized by suspicion, competition and outright hostility (Aning and Aubyn, 2013).

In addition, Ploch (2007) notes AFRICOM's new security paradigm which emphasizes what has been termed "phase zero" by military strategists creates possibility of a partnership between AFRICOM and the PSC as Article 6(e) of the Council gives it responsibility for post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Phase zero also referred to as "peacetime engagement" seeks to address threats at their inception through increased emphasis on security and cooperation and capacity building of partners and allies (Ploch, 2007).

To cement the increasing AU-AFRICOM relations, the AU and the USA signed a MoU on 1 February 2013. The MoU is centered on four pillars or areas of mutual interest; peace and security, democracy and governance, economic growth, trade and investment and promotion of opportunity and development. Since then Joint Technical Working Groups from the AU and USA have been meeting in order to expand and expand further on these areas of mutual interest (AU Commission, 12 June 2013).

4.2 Constraints facing a possible AU-AFRICOM partnership in implementing peace and security initiatives in Somalia

Williams (2007) argues while the AU has great potential as a US partner in Africa the regional bloc's practical capabilities of conflict management suffers from persistent capabilities which include an expectation gap which falls short of the ambitious vision and rhetoric enclosed in its founding documents. As such he states the USA could bolster the AU's conflict management capacity in both the short and long terms. Although there is possibility of increased AU-AFRICOM collaboration in continental peace and security initiatives and Somalia in particular, the partnership also faces a number of possible challenges. According to Opalo (2014) the main challenge for AFRICOM and its African partners (the AU included) is to devise strategies that ensure that security objectives are not pursued at the expense of democracy, military professionalism and respect for human rights. In that regard, --namely public opinion, USA misconceptions with regards to Africa's security issues, limited funding, logistic and operational capabilities and conflicting AU-USA interests could pose a challenge to a possible AU-AFRICOM partnership in implementing peace and security initiatives in Somalia.

4.2.1 Public opinion

Although the issue of public opinion and its influence in foreign policy has been a matter of dispute between different schools of thought during and after the Cold war (Guraziu, 2008), its influence cannot be flouted. Liberal theorists suggest that public opinion on international affairs is stable, sensibly structured, consistent and has the ability to influence foreign policy making in a reciprocal relationship (Katz, 1997). In line with this liberal thinking public opinion has the ability to influence a possible AU-AFRICOM partnership in helping resolve the Somalia conflict.

Since its establishment AFRICOM has been marred by controversy such that Makinda (2007) stated that African response to the project has been mixed. Although some African leaders like Liberian President Ellen Johnson expressed support for the Command the majority of African's are skeptical about embracing the project. According to Dr Kfir (2008) Africa's bitter colonial legacy continues to shape African perceptions and thinking especially when it comes to

interacting with the global community. As a result, the possibility of the presence of foreign military base in Africa is an anathema to many Africans as it evokes notions of neo-imperialism. This analysis could explain why most Africans are cynical when it comes to embracing AFRICOM. Such negative perceptions with regards to AFRICOM are likely to influence the AU's interaction with the Command.

Questions whether the establishment of AFRICOM is meant to enhance Africa's security and developmental challenges in Africa or is merely the USA's guise to pursue its economic, political and security interests on the continent have been raised on various forums. According to Uzodike and Isike (2009) AFRICOM is more about addressing USA security requirements than addressing Africa's developmental challenges. In that regard, they argue it is reasonable to conclude that AFRICOM is a deliberate USA neo-imperialistic and hegemonic design to control Africa's military in order to advance its strategic interests. Meanwhile Nigerian journalist Dulue Mbachu opined:

“Increased U.S military presence in Africa may simply serve to protect unpopular regimes that are friendly to its interests, as was the case during the Cold war, while Africa slips further into poverty”⁷¹

Murithi, Behabtu and Lulie (2012) agree that AFRICOM has a serious image problem which relates to how it was conceived and operationalized. As a result, the Command is still viewed as a foreign military as a foreign combat force in Africa. Moreover, Murithi, Behabtu and Lulie (2012) argue that USA intervention in Somalia has been perceived as its projection of power which has exposed AMISOM to further targeting by opposing forces in the country. Against this perception some Africans are against any further USA engagement in Somalia and Africa at large as they fear it could worsen already volatile regions and undermine Africa's peace and security initiatives. According to Dr Okumu (2007) such criticisms against AFRICOM led a USA State Department official conclude:

“We've got a big image problem down there. Public opinion is really against getting into bed with the U.S. They just don't trust the U.S”.

⁷¹ See Dr Okumu (2007)

Dr Kfir (2008) asserts that due to African opposition to the establishment of AFRICOM, if some African leaders decide to support the new initiative they would need to first contend with the opposition. In that regard, Dr Kfir (2008) opines that African leaders are aware that it is never smart to upset one's neighbor in a continent with porous borders and a history of cross border interventionism and meddling. As such, it is likely the AU member states will put this into consideration when drafting terms of cooperation with AFRICOM especially when it comes to Somalia's peace and security initiatives through AMISOM.

In light of the foregoing, the AU's partnership with AFRICOM is likely to continue being clouded by resistance especially from Africans who are against the creation of the Command. According to Dr Okumu (2007) when Africans reflect on the continents relations with the USA they see ambiguity, neglect and selective engagement as was the case during the decolonization period. As a result, most Africans are not comfortable dealing with the USA on military matters especially when it comes to issues concerning Africa's development and sovereignty. In addition, there are also concerns that AFRICOM could suffer from what has been termed "mission creep" by being transformed from engagement in humanitarian missions to an interventionist force as was the case with Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1992. According to Thomas-Jensen (2008) most Africans would prefer a more mutually beneficial relationship between their states, the AU and the USA of which at the moment might be absent.

4.2.2 USA misconceptions with regards to Africa's security issues

The possibility of an AU-AFRICOM partnership is likely to be affected by the USA's misconceptions regarding Africa's security priorities. Okumu (2007) states misconceptions that the USA needs to address these misconceptions before it can effectively engage with Africa. Firstly, the misconception that Muslims in Africa are attracted to radical ideology promoting violence against Western states. This misconception has led the USA to establish the GWOT policy as a top priority in Africa thereby influencing its engagement with Somalia and AMISOM. The USA views Somalia as a safe haven for violent extremists linked to the Muslim group al-Qaeda. According to Burgess (2013) the designation of al-Shabaab as a terrorist organization is likely to reduce the chances of dialogue with potential al-Shabaab defectors.

What this illustration brings to light is the potential of conflict on how to deal with al-Shabaab between the AU and AFRICOM. For the AU negotiations with al-Shabaab especially through the Somali government could assist in resolving the Somali conflict between opposing forces. However, the USA stance maintains no possibility of negotiations with a group it designates as a terrorist group.

In addition, USA perceptions with regards to AMISOM AND the Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF) are likely to affect a possible AU-AFRICOM partnership in resolving the Somali conflict. According to Burgess (2013) since the creation of AFRICOM up to around 2012 USA DoD officials were reluctant to engage AMISOM and the SNAF. He maintains some officials were dismissive of AMISOM and the SNAF believing that both were too weak and poorly led and incapable of defeating al-Shabaab.

4.2.3 Funding challenges

The possibility of an AU-AFRICOM partnership is likely to face funding challenges. According to Arieff (2011) the financial support of AFRICOM has been vulnerable to raids from other budget lines and has since remained uneven year after year. The current fiscal environment in the USA has led to ongoing debates over the Department of Defence budget (Major Krulick, 2013). Considering that foreign aid is always a budget-cut target, funding to the AU is likely to be significantly affected. Therefore, any AFRICOM program to develop AMISOM operational logistics will likely face intimidating funding challenges. This is despite the AU revealing that support from the international community “remains below the optimal level required to substantially turn around the political and security situation in Somalia (AU PSC Communiqué CXCV, 214th meeting, 8 January 2010). Therefore, a budget cut is likely to affect the AU’s capacity to pursue its peace and security initiatives in Somalia. There is already growing pressure from TCCs requesting for a more predictable payment system while the AU has requested that its personnel be paid at a level comparable to UN peacekeepers to incentivize deployment (Ploch, 2010). Issaka and Mushemedza (2010) maintain the challenges of funding regional organisations are always significant and impede their ability to build logistical and operational capabilities.

4.2.4 Logistical and operational challenges

Law (2014) maintains all security interventions, peace support operations and humanitarian assistance in Africa require a strong and adaptive logistics network. As a result of various lessons captured from international community support to operations across Africa there is growing need to synchronize and optimize all common logistical activities. Effective responses to contingency, peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations depend on partner logistics capability to procure, move, receive and distribute supplies to sustain necessary operations (Law, 2014). The USA since 2007 at the request of the AU has provided logistical support, equipment and pre-deployment training to AMISOM's TCCs which as of 2010 totaled an estimated US\$230 million (Ploch, 2010).

In order to effectively respond to conflicts and humanitarian crisis the AU in 2004 established the African Standby Force (ASF). Unfortunately since its creation the ASF has not yet improved its operating capability. As a result, various members from the international community have provided logistical support for the AU's peacekeeping missions including AMISOM (Hull and Svensson, 2008). According to Vego (2009) the AU's operational capability is currently missing. Consequently, this shortfall on the part of the AU is likely to affect its partnership with AFRICOM. As a result, the USA has turned its focus on developing the AU's capacity to ensure continental security and stability. With a looming budget-cut the USA through AFRICOM is likely to focus on training of AMISOM troops at the expense of providing humanitarian assistance to Somalia.

Moreover, USA's humanitarian assistance to Somalia through the AU is likely to be affected by the fact that the AU and most of the TCCs have limited aircraft capability and rely on external assistance to deploy and sustain forces. According to Major Krulick (2013) Africa's austere environment presents difficult logistical challenges which include limited transportation infrastructure which requires that airlift be present to augment ground and sea transportation assets responding to crisis and conflict situations. On the part of the USA this shortfall is likely to make its partnership with the AU in solving the Somalia conflict expensive and difficult to coordinate.

4.2.5 AU security and humanitarian objectives versus AFRICOM's mandate

According to Major Krulick (2013) a military to military partnership is always haunted by the possibility of a clash of interest. In this case the AMISOM and AFRICOM share the mission of promoting stability in Somalia although they have differing motivating factors. Therefore, in order to establish a sustainable relationship the AU's objectives in Somalia should coincide with AFRICOM's and vice versa. As discussed in previous chapters USA sudden shift in policy toward Africa is motivated mainly by combating terrorism, ensuring access to energy resources and countering China's growing influence in Africa. As such AFRICOM's engagement in Somalia will be guided by these interests. On the other hand, the AU's desire is to address Somalia's security and humanitarian challenges by providing African solutions to crisis. As a result, there is likely to be a clash between the AU and AFRICOM on how to plan, execute and lead AMISOM.

As indicated in the previous chapter, the USA forbids any negotiations with organisations it has designated as terrorists groups. However, the AU seems to adopt a different approach as it has on several cases attempted to facilitate negotiations among opposing forces in Somalia. Therefore, the AU and AFRICOM are likely to differ on how to deal with al-Shabaab and other opposing forces in Somalia.

4.3 Conclusion

The chapter discussed the various challenges that could face a possible AU-AFRICOM partnership in implementing peace and security initiatives in Somalia. From the discussion it can be concluded that the major challenge relates to image problem facing AFRICOM. The establishment of AFRICOM has been received with mixed reactions among Africans as some feel the Command's mandate is to serve USA's economic, political and security interests on the continent. However, the chapter also discussed how funding, logistical and operational challenges, USA's misconceptions with regards to Africa's security issues and possible clash of AU-AFRICOM interests could be other constraining factors towards a possible AU-AFRICOM partnership.

The next chapter shall provide a qualitative analysis of the research findings.

CHAPTER FIVE

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

5.0 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to provide a qualitative analysis of the research findings obtained through interviews and questionnaires conducted. The findings were analyzed based on the concepts discussed in the theoretical framework and literature review. For the purpose of interpreting research findings the researcher adopted the content analysis approach.

The research attempted to answer the following research questions:-

- a) What is the impact of AFRICOM on the AU's peace and security efforts with reference to the 2007-14 Somalia conflict?
- b) What are the possible challenges facing AU-AFRICOM partnership in enhancing peace and security in Somalia?
- c) How can AFRICOM work with the AU to ensure sustainable peace and security in Africa particularly in Somalia?

5.1 Demographic Data

Four military and two peace and security studies lecturers participated in the interviews while two military personnel, four security personnel and three academic scholars responded to an open ended questionnaire. One of the participants once worked as part of the peacekeeping mission in Somalia for 10 years.

5.2 The role of AFRICOM in Somalia

During the interviews the majority of the respondent's particularly military personnel opined that one of the key motivating factors for AFRICOM's engagement in Somalia is the USA's GWOT policy. One military personnel in a questionnaire stated that AFRICOM's role is to protect USA interest and ensure access to oil and other resources especially in the Horn of Africa. In that regard, some participants opined AFRICOM is thus performing the role of ensuring military

investments and enhancing the US `political interests in Africa under the guise of helping resolve the Somali conflict. On the other hand, academic scholars pointed out that AFRICOM's role in Somalia also includes assisting with the prevention of the spread of HIV and AIDS and the eradication of poverty. However, one of the academic scholars were quick to point out that AFRICOM's engagement in Africa is meant to counter China's growing influence in Africa especially in economic, political and security terms.

On the other hand, one security personnel was optimistic about AFRICOM's role in Somali. The respondent opined that AFRICOM was helping neutralise terrorist camps in Somalia by providing tactical intelligence to Somali Security Forces. The responded also pointed AFRICOM is conducting strikes against terrorist groups' particularly al-Shabaab, preventing foreign fighters from accessing al-Shabaaab camps and destroying al-Shabaab's external supply supply routes. One academic also noted that AFRICOM's role in Somalia includes Assisting the TFG repel al-Shabaab forces, train Somali intelligence officers, supervised the training of Somali forces and offer logistical support to AMISOM. However, the academic was quick to point out that these initiatives by AFRICOM were motivated by the USA need to safeguard its oil interests in the Ogaden region.

Although some of the respondents were optimistic about AFRICOM's role the issue of AFRICOM's role to ensure the USA and its allies access to Africa's natural resources particularly energy also surfaced. Many are concerned AFRICOM is assisting the USA exhaust Africa's resources due to the country's capital strength which allows it to establish frameworks to make investments. The evidence from the research shows that one of the key functions of AFRICOM in Somalia is to establish common security networks so as to monopolize its global defense motives. Besides maintaining peace and stability in Somalia, most of the respondents suggested that AFRICOM's role in Somalia was also to ensure access to the sea lines of transportation. This shows that AFRICOM's engagement with Somalia is meant to protect the USA's economic interests.

5.3 The impact of AFRICOM on the AU's peace and security efforts in the 2007-2014 Somalia conflict

Meanwhile research findings from the questionnaires on the impact of AFRICOM on the AU's peace and security efforts in the 2007-2014 Somalia conflict are presented on Table 5.3.1

Table 5.3.1

AFRICOM's mandate	Strongly Agree	Agree	Not Sure	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
AFRICOM is bolstering security in Somalia	23%	38%	21%	12%	6%
AFRICOM is responding to humanitarian crises in Somalia	8%	15%	19%	41%	17%
Enhancing the AU's capability in enhancing security in Somalia	5%	15%	24%	43%	13%
Making enduring efforts in assisting the AU prevent wars rather than fight wars	11%	14%	18%	31%	26%
Improving cooperative efforts between the US and the AU to stern transnational terrorism	4%	10%	23%	41%	22%

Source:

According to Table 5.3.1 the majority of the respondents either agreed or strongly agreed to the statement that AFRICOM is bolstering the security in Somalia. This could be the case since the financial and logistical support from the USA to the AMISOM is believed to have facilitated the

defeat of al-Shabaab from most urban centers resulting in a relatively peaceful and stable Somalia.

With regards to whether AFRICOM is responding to the humanitarian crises in Somalia the majority of the respondents disagreed. This indicates that since its inception AFRICOM is yet to improve its humanitarian assistance to Somalia. Therefore it could be concluded that the USA through AFRICOM is more concerned with fighting terror and ensuring access to sea lines of transportation than helping resolve Somalia's humanitarian crisis.

On whether AFRICOM is enhancing the AU's capability in enhancing peace in Somalia the majority of the respondents disagreed to the statement. This could support the view that AFRICOM is regarded by many Africans as an obstruction to the AU's guiding principle of "African Solutions to African Problems". Of which such a development is interpreted as violating Africa's common position on the continent's defense and security strategies and is feared it could undermine the continent's Non-Aggression Pact, solemn declaration on Africa's common defense and security.

On the statement whether AFRICOM is making enduring efforts in assisting the AU to prevent wars rather than fight wars, the majority of the respondents either disagreed or strongly disagreed. This goes on to show that most Africans feel the presence of a foreign military command on the continent is likely to result in the escalation of violent activities. However, respondents who indicated not sure support the view that AFRICOM suffers from a low level of recognition among Africans.

The majority of respondents either disagreed or strongly disagreed to the statement that AFRICOM is improving cooperative efforts between the USA and the AU to stem transnational terrorism. This could be the case because since its creation the agenda of AFRICOM has not been well understood. As a result, most Africans fear any possible AU-AFRICOM partnership is likely to benefit the USA at the expense of Africa.

The research went further to investigate if AFRICOM is making efforts to bring development to Somalia in terms of health, education, economic growth and democracy. The responses from the participants are presented in figure **5.3.2** below.




Figure 5.3.2 AFRICOM mandate fulfilment

The research findings indicate that most respondents were less optimistic about AFRICOM’s commitment to ensure Somalia’s developmental challenges were addressed. It goes on to confirm that USA’s engagement in Africa and Somalia in particular are motivated by security, political and economic interests.

Interviews were also conducted out to find out whether AFRICOM is fulfilling its mandate to Africa. Most of the military forces participants reiterated that AFRICOM is failing to do because its agenda is more concerned by pursuing its interests on the continent. One respondent from the military accused the USA government of having overriding economic and geo-political interests which trump the humanitarian and mutual health, democratic, educational and developmental goals. The responded said AFRICOM is a USA vehicle which is meant to secure access to Africa’s resources particularly oil through the guise of fighting terror. In addition, some interviewees expressed a level of dissatisfaction with the achievements of AFRICOM, citing the lack of clear information about the nature of AFRICOM’s engagement with AU.

The military personnel who once worked in Somalia as part of a peacekeeping mission highlighted that in theory the role of AFRICOM is support to assist the AU maintain peace and security in the country including ensuring that development is being fostered. However, he opined that the Command is failing to be effective because AFRICOM is not pursuing its alleged core mandate but rather its pursuing its own agenda by pursuing its GWOT policy in Somalia.

5.4 AFRICOM’s enhancement of AU’s peace and security effort in Somalia

The researcher asked the respondents whether it was true or false that AFRICOM is enhancing the AU’s peace and security effort in Somalia. The responses are presented in the figure 5.4.1 below.




Figure 5.4.1: AFRICOM enhancement of AU’s peace and security efforts in Somalia

The majority of the respondents as evidenced by 62% disagreed and stated that AFRICOM is not enhancing the AU’s peace and security efforts in Somalia. On the other hand, 38% of the respondents agreed that AFRICOM is enhancing peace and security efforts in Somalia. The 38% respondents maintained that due to the financial and logistical support that AMISOM is

receiving from the USA is helping address some challenges the mission faces including lack of advanced equipment and communication systems. Furthermore, they maintain the pre-deployment courses offered by AFRICOM have enhanced AMISOM's capabilities to respond to violent attacks and other crisis situation in Somalia.

The interviews conducted to assess the reasons why AFRICOM is not enhancing the AU's peace and security efforts in Somalia showed that most of the respondents believe there is failure by both the AU and AFRICOM to address the root causes of the conflict in Somalia as they are crucial if a sustainable solution is to be implemented. In addition, some of the interviewees maintain AFRICOM is has brought no new solutions to Somalia.

5.5 Advantages of an AU-AFRICOM partnership in enhancing peace and security efforts in Somalia

The research `sought to find out the advantages of an AU-AFRICOM partnership in enhancing peace and security efforts in Somalia. The participants were asked to give the advantages of such a partnership in helping resolve the 2007-2014 Somalia conflict. From the interviews the researcher gathered that AFRICOM through its training programs targeting AMISOM and the SNAF is improving the capabilities of two forces to fight violent extremism. Findings from the interviews shows that the advantages of an AU-AFRICOM partnership in enhancing peace and security efforts in Somalia is that AFRICOM has equipped the AU to increase the SNAF capability to defend its sovereignty in the wake of terrorist activities. In addition through AFRICOM's specialized training in intelligence analysis and countering improvised explosive devices (IEDs) there is evidence of that the initiatives have improved AMISOM's operational capabilities. In this regard, through the findings it can be concluded that the AU-AFRICOM partnership to a large extent is benefiting Africa particularly Somalia especially through the trainings conducted under ACOTA. Due to limited resources and tactical capabilities the partnership will go a long way in ensuring the AU fulfills its peace and security mandate.

5.6 Possible challenges facing AU-AFRICOM partnership in enhancing peace and security in Somalia

The responses from mostly military and security forces highlighted that the USA approach of putting its national interests first at the expense of AU and Somalia's peace and security

initiatives may foil AU's efforts in finding a lasting solution to the Somalia crisis. Furthermore, the USA in most cases is training and supporting selected militaries in its fight against global terrorism on the continent without involving the AU. Respondents with this line of thinking fear that USA training of selected militaries could divide African nations considering that AFRICOM is shrouded by controversy among Africans.

The majority of the respondents agreed that AFRICOM's activities could undermine the AU's peace and security efforts in Somalia. The academics cited that AFRICOM lacks a commonality of approach with the AU. AFRICOM is more concerned with counterterrorism and its agenda to safe guard oil resources hence ignoring sustainable development on Somalia. Another challenge that emerged during the research is that the USA is accused of sponsoring and training selected military forces especially in relation to AMISOM's TCCs not through the AU. Therefore, due to this divide and rule approach AFRICOM's activities could lead lack of unity among Africans.

5.6.1 How can the AU enhance its peace and security efforts in Somalia

Most of the respondents agreed that first and foremost the AU needs to address the root causes of the conflict in Somalia in order to come up with a sustainable solution. The AU despite its funding and other challenges relating to logical and tactical capabilities needs to ensure that the solution to Somalia's crisis is driven by the principle "African solutions to African problems". In addition, an effective Continental Early Warning System (CEWAS) could improve AMISOM's response to crisis in Somalia.

5.6.2 How AFRICOM can work with the AU to ensure sustainable peace and security in Africa particularly in Somalia

One of the respondents stressed that AFRICOM should capacitate the Somali military through funding, training and bringing the warring factions together by encouraging them to find common solution. In addition, AFRICOM should ensure that all its efforts to engage Somalia should be conducted under the auspices of the AU instead of going to individual states. In that way AFRICOM would not only show its growing confidence in the AU but also assist the

regional bloc provide African solutions to the Somali conflict. Moreover, some respondents underscored the fact that AFRICOM should provide its assistance to Somalia and Africa at large in accordance to African needs not impose its own solutions.

5.7 Conclusion

The research findings show that although the USA through AFRICOM is playing a vital role in helping the AU resolve the 2007-2014 Somalia conflict most of this assistance is motivated by its growing strategic interests in the country particularly the fight against terror, securing natural resources and ensuring access sea lanes of transportation. The findings show that an AU- AFRICOM partnership could be beneficial to ensuring sustainable peace and security in Somalia but only if the latter's initiatives are conducted through the AU.

The next chapter shall provide the conclusions and recommendations in relation to the research findings.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.0 Introduction

The aim of this chapter to present the conclusion and recommendations of the study based on the previous chapters. An effort will be made to illuminate the extent to which the study was able to address the research objectives and questions. Essential to this chapter is the evaluation of the link between the literature reviewed and the research findings so as to come up with sound recommendations. The chapter proffers recommendations on how AFRICOM can work with AU member states in achieving sustainable peace and security on the continent more specifically in Somalia. Lastly, the chapter suggests possible areas for further research.

6.1 Summary of conclusions

The research provides the following conclusions:

The research concludes that AFRICOM's role in Africa includes enhancing the continent's peace and security architecture. AFRICOM's mandate in Africa also includes curbing international terrorism, providing developmental security in health care, food security, education and poverty alleviation in accordance to the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). However, the research findings show that USA's economic and security interests in Africa (Somalia included) are overriding developmental issues. Therefore, AFRICOM's support tends to be biased toward strengthening the military and intelligence gathering capacities of African forces.

Moreover, the establishment of AFRICOM is widely being interpreted as the USA's response to China's growing political, economic, security and developmental influence on the continent. In addition, the USA's motive to secure Africa's resources particularly energy is greatly compromising its peace and security objectives in Africa. As a result, most Africans are of the view that ARICOM's peace and security efforts in Somalia are failing to take a holistic approach due to the USA interest based engagement in the country. Consequently, AFRICOM is

undermining the AU's peace and security efforts to ensure sustainable peace and development in Somalia. Meanwhile, since AFRICOM suffers from funding challenges since its financial support is prone to raids from other budget lines, the Command is likely to face challenges in supporting the AU's peace and security initiatives in Somalia in the long term.

Basing on foregoing discussion it could be concluded that AFRICOM is failing to enhance the AU's peace and security efforts in Somalia especially when it comes to ensuring sustainable peace and development. The root causes of the conflict in Somalia are not being addressed in order to guide the initiatives adopted. As a result, AFRICOM is failing to come up with effective strategies that are specific to Somalia.

The research found that the main advantage of the AU-AFRICOM partnership centers on the pre-deployment training and logistical support the latter provides AMISOM's TCCs. In addition, due to AFRICOM's specialized training in intelligence analysis and countering improvised explosive devices (IEDs) AMISOM has improved its operational capabilities. Resultantly, AMISOM has managed to drive out al-Shabaab from most of the urban centers.

Despite the above stated advantages of the AU-AFRICOM partnership in pursuing Somalia peace and security efforts, the research findings also revealed that the relationship faces various constraints particularly relating to a lack of commonality when it comes to resolving the conflict. What is clear is that the USA's foreign policy toward Africa remains being driven by self-interests.

As such it is justifiable to conclude that AFRICOM's agenda in Africa (Somalia included) remains unclear hence the Command is likely to continue to be affected by an image problem. The fact that the USA prefers to offer pre-deployment training directly to AMISOM's TCCs not through the AU's provisions questions its commitment to work with the regional bloc. In addition, it seems to support the view that the USA is still not confident in the AU's capacity to deal with the continent's peace and security challenges.

6.2 Recommendations

The research proffers the following recommendations;

- For the AFRICOM's training and capacity building strategies to be effective and accepted by the Command's critics should be conducted through the AU structures. AFRICOM should only play a facilitating role and leave the AU provide "African solutions to African problems" in Somalia.
- Before engaging international partners like AFRICOM the AU should first and foremost identify the root causes of the 2007-2008 Somalia conflict and come up with strategies on how it intends to address these challenges to avoid international partners coming with their own solution models.
- The AU should make clear its security and development priorities to possible international partners like AFRICOM so that the latter formulates its mandate in line with these priorities.
- The AU should come up with strategies on how it can fund its own projects and not depend on funding from international partners as this has proved to be very costly on its continental peace and security architecture.
- The AU should continue to advance its training programs in line with the evolving human and security threats. The AU should strive to deal with its own challenges rather than depend on international partners.
- The AU should take the upper hand in deciding and determining whether or how it would want to engage with AFRICOM. This would allow for the harmonization and effective coordination of all AU interactions with international partners.
- It is necessary that AFRICOM strives to complement rather than drive the AU's peace and security efforts in Somalia. AFRICOM should take note of the AU's nascent peace and security architecture.
- For AFRICOM to be accepted by most Africans it needs to deal with its image problem by engaging in a more detailed process of consultation with all relevant stakeholders.

6.3 Possible areas for further study

The study did not examine in detail how the establishment of AFRICOM is shaping the USA-Africa relations. A detailed study on this topic would go a long way in assisting African

governments and policy makers assess how best to deal with the Command. In addition, studies could be carried out on how the AU could better engage AFRICOM to ensure the regional bloc effectively pursues its continental peace and security agenda.

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APPENDIX A: RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE



Midlands State University
P. Bag 9055
Gweru
Zimbabwe

3 March 2015

Letter of Consent

Dear Participant

My name is Nyarai Sabeka, a Master of Science in International Affairs (MSIA) student with the Midlands State University conducting a research on the topic: **Assessing the impact of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) on the African Union's peace and security efforts with reference to the 2007- 2014 Somalia conflict.** The objectives of the research are:

1. To establish the impact of the AFRICOM on the AU's peace and security efforts in the 2007-2014 Somalia conflict
2. To examine the challenges facing a possible AU-AFRICOM partnership in implementing peace and security initiatives in Somalia
3. To proffer recommendations on how AFRICOM can work with the AU in achieving sustainable peace and security in Africa and more specifically in Somalia.

I am kindly asking for your analytical responses to the above stated research topic. Please note that this is purely an academic research and all information received will be treated as such. Your

views in this interview will be presented anonymously. Neither your name nor identity will be disclosed in any form in the study. Participation is voluntary and one can withdraw anytime.

If you have any questions you would like to ask or discuss, please do not hesitate to contact the researcher on the following numbers 0774 944 035 or 0281-31101 or the supervisor Dr S. Maeresera at Midlands State University P. Bag 9055 Senga Road, Gweru, Zimbabwe.

Thank you in advance for your assistance in this matter.

DECLARATION

I.....(full names of participant)
hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the nature of the research project, and I consent to participating in the research project.

I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, should I so desire .I understand the intention of the research. I hereby agree to participate.

I consent / do not consent to have this interview recorded (if applicable)

Signature

Date

Questionnaire

Research topic: Assessing the impact of United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) on the African Union’s peace and security efforts with reference to the 2007 to 2014 Somalia conflict

Instructions

1. Can you please give your most honest opinion on each question by filling in on the spaces provided
2. Where applicable please tick in the boxes or spaces provided

Section A: Demographic Questions

1. Name of respondent.....
2. Occupation of respondent.....

Section B: The impact of AFRICOM on the AU’s peace and security efforts in the 2007-2014 Somalia conflict

3. Indicate whether you agree or disagree to the statement to the statement below by ticking in the desired box

SA=Strongly Agree, A=Agree, NS=Not Sure, D=Disagree, SD=Strongly Disagree

	SA	A	NS	D	SD
AFRICOM is bolstering security in Somalia					
AFRICOM is responding to humanitarian crises in Somalia					
AFRICOM is enhancing the AU’s capability in enhancing peace and security in Somalia					
AFRICOM is making enduring efforts in assisting the AU prevent wars rather than fight wars					
AFRICOM is improving cooperative efforts between the US and the AU to stem transnational terrorism					

4. How true is the statement that AFRICOM is fulfilling its mandate to foster development in Somalia in terms of:

	True	False
Health		
Education		
Economic growth		
Democracy		

5. In your own words, can you state five roles played by AFRICOM in Somalia

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

6. In your own view is AFRICOM enhancing the AU's peace and security efforts in Somalia Yes[] No[]

Can you support your answer:

.....

.....

.....

.....

7. Can you list the advantages of an AU-AFRICOM partnership in enhancing peace and security efforts in Somalia

.....

.....

.....
.....
.....

Section C: Possible challenges facing AU-AFRICOM partnership in enhancing peace and security in Somalia

8. Do you see any challenges that may befall the AU's peace and security efforts in Somalia as a result of AFRICOM's support Yes[] No[]

If Yes can you state the challenges:

.....
.....
.....
.....

9. Do you agree that AFRICOM's activities could undermine the AU's peace and security efforts in Somalia Agree [] Disagree []

Can you give three reasons for your answer

Reason 1.....

Reason 2.....

Reason 3.....

10. In your own opinion how can the AU enhance its peace and security efforts in Somalia

.....
.....
.....

11. How can the AFRICOM work with the AU to ensure sustainable peace and security in Africa particularly in Somalia

.....
.....
.....
.....

The End

Thank you for your participation