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THE APPLICABILITY OF THE 2016 GLOBAL BAN ON IVORY TRADE WITH RESPECT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSERVATION AND PROTECTION OF THE ZIMBABWEAN ELEPHANT POPULATION IN THE ZAMBEZI TRANS FRONTIER PARK

By

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Abstract

The Zambezi Trans frontier park is one of the world's largest conservation areas and is one of the homes for the African elephant, scientifically known as the loxodonta Africana. The African elephant is one of earths largest land mammals and also one of the worlds objectified creatures. Over the years since 1970 the global demand for ivory has risen to levels that are threatening the extinction of elephants due to poaching. Poaching has resulted in massive decline, by almost half in the elephant population in Africa in the period 1970 to 1985. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wildlife Fauna and Flora (CITES) in 1989 had the majority of its 115 member countries deciding to completely ban the international trade of ivory in an effort to restore the elephant population to healthy levels. However in 1996 and 1997, countries such as Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia had the ban partially lifted due to their large elephant populations which were even increasing beyond capacity. In 2016, at the CITES 17th Conference Of Parties (COP17) held in South Africa, CITES endorsed the closure of all domestic markets on ivory despite arguments by Zimbabwe, Botswana, South Africa and Namibia who had proposed to resume ivory trading to beef up their conservation budgets. Such a decision by CITES has disastrous consequences for countries with large elephants populations with Zimbabwe being one of them. The ban which comes with an absence of any regular trade has removed incentives for locals to conserve elephants. Such a situation has caused many parks to be surrounded by hostile rural communities who are trying to recover their wasted investments in elephants. The Zambezi Trans frontier park will lose out as countries like Zimbabwe have protected area management schemes that are self-funding in nature and thus the country's resource protection is financed through the sustainable utilisation of various wildlife resources. The African elephant for one is Zimbabwe's biggest draw card species from a hunting perspective and thus the ban on all trade will result in non-utilisation of the country's natural resources.

Approval form

The undersigned certify that they have read this dissertation and have approved its submission for marking after confirming that it conforms to departmental requirements.

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Supervisor   Date

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Co-supervisor   Date

Declaration

I, Tafadzwa Venge hereby declare that this research project is my own work and has not been copied or lifted from any source without acknowledgement of the source.

Signature…………………………………..

Date:……………………………………….

Dedication

This project is dedicated to my mother, Mrs FN Venge, who inspired me to take up the programme and supported me throughout the period of my studies, Thank you mama. I also dedicate this project to my son, Anesu Dhlakama for the motivation that kept me going; this is for you my boy.

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List of abbreviations

CITES- Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna

CAMPFIRE-Communal Areas Management for Indigenous Resources

CoP- Conference of Parties

KAZA-Kavango Zambezi Trans frontier Park

MIKE-Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants

SADC-Southern African Development Communities

TFCA-Trans Frontier Conservation Area

NGOs- Non Governmental Organisations

WILD-Wildlife and Livelihood Development

ZimParks –Zimbabwe Parks and Wildlife

List of Tables and Figures

TABLES

FIGURES

Table of Contents

1.0 Chapter 1

1.1 Introduction and background of the study

The trans-frontier parks are established wildlife areas in the subcontinent managed as integrated units across international borders. They involve the establishment, development and management of wildlife reserves. CITES is an international agreement between governments whose aim is to ensure that international trade of wildlife and plants does not threaten their survival. The convention is renowned for the number of governments who agreed to implement its provisions and has the ability to impose trade bans on parties that do not comply with its tenets. The Kavango Zambezi Trans-frontier Park also known as KAZA is the world's largest trans-frontier conservation area occupying the Okavango and Zambezi river basins situated in a region where international borders of five countries converge. It encompasses areas within the borders of Zimbabwe, Angola, Botswana, Namibia and Zambia, including 36 national parks and game reserves and game management areas. These five countries have embraced the opportunity to harmonise regional legislations towards landscape approaches to conservation and ecological areas.

Sands and Bedecarre (2013) asserted that, elephant poaching has become a global challenge which has resulted in increased public pressure on consumer countries such as the European Union, USA, and Japan to enforce stricter measures. Such a development resulted in a ban on ivory imports by the US and UK with countries like Japan and Hong Kong implementing amplified controls like burning confiscated ivory stockpiles, (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 2012). Lawson and Vines (2014) argued that elephant poaching has been on the peak for 20 years and yet that is not the first time that killing of elephants has risen. Africa's elephant population dwindled from 1.3 million to 600 000 from 1979 to 1989, during a phase of uninhibited legal ivory trade. Following such events, in 1989, CITES agreed on a global ban on ivory trade which resulted in a drop in poaching levels for the immediate years.

TRAFFIC (2007) reported that, quite often there is discordance between national legislation and institutional capacities on one hand and multilateral environmental agreements like CITES on the other hand. National legislation always ends up remaining insufficient to

support initiatives in protecting endangered species and regulating cross border trade. Akella and Allan (2014) postulated that despite the transnational trade on ivory, ivory remains one of the highest globally demanded wildlife products. Wyler and Sheikh (2013) concurred by noting that ivory consumers are willing to pay exorbitant prices, valued much higher than ivory's weight in gold. The high global demand for ivory and large profits for traders has fuelled a growing illicit ivory trade, (Akella and Allan, 2014).

Local support for conservation has been key to the success of conserving elephants in the Zambezi trans-frontier park with Zimbabwe being the leader in putting conservation in the hands of rural communities and tribes instead of leaving sole responsibility to the state, (Berger, 2000). Zimbabwe's view to sustainable use is based on consumptive use where it bases elephant management on culling, promoting trophy hunting and lobbying for legislation of illegal trade. Hitch (1998) concurred by noting that Southern African states argue that effective elephant management is expensive and can only be successful if the sale of ivory from culling and natural deaths of elephants is promoted to ensure sustainable conservation of the elephants.

Zimbabwe for example launched the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in 1989 as a way to give local communities responsibility for conservation (McBride, 1998). The government's idea was for local communities to financially benefit from wildlife in their areas in promotion of sustainable use of resources. As such communities benefited from revenue generated from hunting permits and the proceeds are used to improve communities through infrastructural development, among other things, (Hitch, 1998). The 2016 ban on ivory trade will therefore affect such initiatives by the government as communities will cease to receive benefits of conserving wildlife and such a situation is likely to give birth to more human and wildlife conflicts.

Patel (2015) asserted that communities which supplemented meagre rural incomes through hunting or sale of hunting concessions feel aggrieved at the hunting ban. Boboloki Autlwetse who is the Kalahari Conservation Society's acting CEO urged governments to help such communities so that they did not become opponents of conservation or resort to poaching

from desperation. Steve Johnson of Sarep also expressed that he feared that the hunting ban had been put in place with insufficient understanding of the vital importance of hunting income for small remote communities without any other form of subsistence. Such could endanger the community based rural management schemes (CBRM) in the region, which are important in developing and maintaining both local incomes and support for sustainable conservation (Patel, 2015).

Leakey (2001) argued that the plight of elephants may not necessarily be solved by international agreements such as CITES but rather national and local policies by individual countries need to be implemented and enforced in order to protect wildlife. Complete ivory trade bans have been implemented thrice in the history of CITES with political pressures being the main reasons for down listing and not necessarily the actual increase or decrease of elephant populations being the cause. The African elephant population will continue to face pressures of illegal trade and ivory if the needs of their "human caretakers" are not met, (Leakey, 2001).

This research therefore sought to analyse the applicability of CITES decision to completely ban trade in ivory on the Zambezi Trans frontier park, given the existing massive elephant populations in the region. The research explored the implications of the decision on local conservation methods employed by individual countries to protect wildlife and the likely repercussions of such blanket decisions on conservation. The research used previous ivory trade bans by CITES as case studies to assess the applicability of such a decision with respect to conservation and protection of the elephant population on the Zambezi Trans-frontier park.

1.2 Statement of the problem

In 2016 CITES regulated international trade by prohibiting ivory trade permanently. Before the complete ban on domestic ivory markets, the Zimbabwean government for example through Zimbabwe's wildlife management had organised a system (CAMPFIRE) by which rural communities received economic benefits for community development in exchange for sharing their habitats with wildlife. The initiative reduced illegal culling of elephants for meat or in desperation to save crops by communities. The 2016 ivory trade ban may therefore

come with a loss of community support and reduced benefits to rural people from sustainable conservation which in the long term has damaging effects as poaching and illegal ivory trade would sprawl. Heightened human wildlife conflicts may arise as wildlife land may be turned into other land use options and conservation efforts will be derailed. Kothari (2004) assumed that western media sources were able to impose "western" values on the rest of the world. This is because the voice of the rural African populations who are competing with elephants for scarce resources are seldom considered during debates surrounding elephant conservation and ivory trade. Zimbabwe's efforts to meet the sustainable development goals through poverty eradication and rural development will be compromised by the up listing of elephants to Appendix 1. This research therefore sought to understand the applicability of the 2016 complete ban in ivory trade with respect to the development of conservation and protection of the Zimbabwean elephant population in the Zambezi Trans frontier park.

1.3 Purpose of the study

The purpose of the study was to understand the applicability of CITES' 2016 global ban on ivory trade ban and the consequences of such decisions on the Zimbabwean elephant population in the Trans Zambezi frontier park.

1.4 Significance of the study

The study focused on the applicability of CITES' 2016 global ban on trade with respect to the development of conservation and protection of the Zimbabwean elephant population in the Zambezi Trans frontier park. The study will go a long way in adding into the body of knowledge on how international conventions such as CITES influence decisions that individual countries abide by and the applicability of such decisions to countries given their different circumstances.

1.5 Delimitations of the study

The study focused on the applicability of CITES decision to completely ban ivory trade in a bid to curb poaching and illegal ivory trade. The research was carried out in the Kavango Zambezi Trans- frontier park which interlinks the borders of Zimbabwe, Namibia, Zambia, Botswana and Angola but only focused on Zimbabwe for convenience.

1.6 Assumptions

The research was premised on the assumption that CITES' complete ban on trade in elephant ivory is not the most effective way to protect and conserve Zimbabwe's elephant populations in the Zambezi Trans frontier park as her population already outweighs the carrying capacity. Instead, sustainable use of natural resources should be considered for individual countries depending on their elephant populations and their environments carrying capacity. Countries like Zimbabwe fund their elephant conservation from the proceeds of ivory sales thereby rendering a complete ban on ivory trade detrimental to her conservation efforts. Strong legal frameworks and monitoring tools for ivory trade within countries are ways which can be adopted to deal with the challenge of poaching instead of completely banning ivory trade as it will fuel illegal trade and exacerbate poaching resulting in an even bigger challenge on elephant's existence.

1.7 Objectives

1. To explore the applicability of CITES 2016 decision of global ban on ivory trade with respect to the development of conservation and protection of Zimbabwean elephant population in the Zambezi Trans frontier park.
2. To explore the implications of CITES decisions on Zimbabwe's wildlife (elephant) management.
3. To come up with recommendations on CITES in relation to the management of Zimbabwean elephants.

1.8 Research questions

1. How is CITES 2016 global ban on ivory trade applicable in the protection and conservation of Zimbabwean elephant populations in the Zambezi Trans-frontier park.
2. What are the implications of CITES decision on the management of Zimbabwean elephants.
3. What are the possible recommendations on CITES in relation to the management of Zimbabwean elephants.

1.9 Proposed Chapter Online

The research was comprised of five chapters with the following sequence:

Chapter One: Introduction and Background of Study

This chapter gave an introduction and background to the study, highlighting the statement of the problem, significance of the study, research objectives translated into research questions and the delimitations.

Chapter Two: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

This chapter began with linking the study to the theoretical framework of the complex interdependence theory as propounded by Keohane and Nye. It then explored various secondary sources of data in relation to CITES and its provisions; previous CITES bans, poaching, implications of trade bans and challenges to combatting illegal trade in ivory. This exploration confirmed the researcher's assumption that the 2016 ivory trade ban is not applicable with respect to the conservation and protection of the Zimbabwean elephant population in the Zambezi Trans frontier park.

Chapter Three: Research Design and Methodology.

This chapter outlined the research design used to conduct the research. The research was mainly qualitative in nature. The chapter also indicated the data collection methods used in the research which were key informant interviews and documentary research.

Chapter Four: Data Presentation, Analysis and Discussion of Findings.

This chapter presented findings gathered from key informant interviews and documentary research. The main thrust was to present whether or not the 2016 global ban in ivory trade is applicable in conserving and protecting the Zimbabwean elephant population in the Zambezi Trans frontier Park.

Chapter Five: Summary, Conclusions, Recommendations and Areas of Further Research.

This chapter gave a summary of the research, conclusions and recommendations. It highlighted the gaps identified from the research and proposed areas of further study.

CHAPTER 2

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter explored relevant sources (secondary data) on CITES, mainly focusing on its applicability in protecting endangered species. It also provided an overview of the theoretical framework which best described the collectiveness of states in subscribing to national conventions like CITES in an effort to protect wildlife. As such, the theory of complex interdependence as propounded by Keohane and Nye was explored to explain the collective efforts by nation states in curbing global challenges like poaching. The research then gave an insight on what other scholars have gathered on CITES and its provisions and the implications of global trade bans in ivory trade. The literature sought to bring out the gaps in blanket decisions by international conventions like CITES and how they affected some countries with high elephant populations with specific reference to Zimbabwean elephants in the Zambezi trans-frontier park. Literature also highlighted possible solutions by different schools of thought on the effective conservation methods CITES can adopt to protect elephants.

The research identified CITES provisions and how they have been received with different perspectives by member states and how previous CITES bans in ivory trade have resulted in both a decrease and increase in poaching. Such revelations indicated that complete bans in ivory trade may not necessarily provide the intended outcomes of reducing poaching and conserving elephants but may require other factors to produce the desired results. The research explored the African situation in relation to elephant populations and how a complete ban in ivory trade would affect conservation efforts particularly for Zimbabwean elephants in the Zambezi trans-frontier park which holds one of the largest elephant populations in the world.

2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.2.1 COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE THEORY

The theory of interdependence as propounded by Keohane and Nye (1977) refers to situations characterised by mutual effects among states and other actors within the world. Keohane and Nye (1977) assumed that the mutual effects of interdependence always entail both cost and benefits as interdependence restricts autonomy and benefits are not guaranteed. In this system of 'Interdependence', states cooperate because it is in their best common interest and direct result of this cooperation is prosperity and stability in the international system. While the high politics of national security and military power still remain important and relevant, the theory argues that economic, social and environmental issues are high priorities on the international agenda. As such interdependence among nations will directly or indirectly constrain state behaviours as states try to maximise benefits and minimise the costs of interdependence.

The interdependence of the world through the lens of this theory can also help us explain the growth in power and number of international organizations using what is referred to as international regime as the rule of the game. These international regimes which are rules, procedures, and norms agreed by states to follow include environmental and wild life preservation, arms control, foreign trade, disarmament of nuclear non-proliferation etc. United Nations, European Union, World Trade Organization use the "rule of the game" as set by themselves to influence governmental decisions. Regional and international trade in natural resource products is required to be aligned to international standards for them to be globally accepted, (Child, 1995).

The research highlighted how complex interdependence is realised in the nature of international wildlife trade. Hutchens (2014) postulated that CITES was formulated in recognition that international action is necessary for the control and regulation of international trade in threatened species of animals and plants to guarantee their survival. The convention provides a framework to guarantee interstate cooperation in respect to flora and fauna, (Mrema, 2014). CITES secretariat which is the primary decision making body receives

support from various international actors like qualified NGOs for example TRAFFIC which is a wildlife monitoring organisation, the United Nations Environmental Program, UNEP and the international Union on the Conservation of Nature. Kaempfer and Lownberg (2012) concurred that NGOs play a big role in CITES' decision making process. Contracted NGOs sometimes have too much influence over CITES decisions and fail to consider the needs and capabilities of countries with elephants known as range states, (Reeve, 2006).

Mrema (2014) postulated that the trans- boundary character and threats created by cross border illegal traders made several states to realise that individual efforts are no longer efficient in providing effective protection to the African species from illegal trade mostly by structured international crime syndicates. Complex interdependence has thus prompted states in wildlife conservation to come up with collective measures to deal with wildlife conservation through bodies like CITES. Therefore states become dependent on each other in upholding the provisions of CITES in the conservation of wildlife evidenced by CITES' over 118 members.

The need for cooperation also necessitated rigorous and concerted efforts at regional level to complement the existing global mechanisms in place. For instance the Lusaka Agreement on Cooperative Enforcement among others was developed and adopted towards illegal trade in wildlife. This was an attempt by African (the Eastern and Southern) states to ensure more stringent measures are in place for the conservation and protection of flora and fauna in the region (Mrema, 2014). Reeve (2006) suggested that, because CITES has no means to measure compliance, it relies on reports from CoP proceedings by member states. In the event of none compliance by a member, other member states impose sanctions on the non-complying member and this has helped in keeping member states in check. Danaher (1999) posits that another way of ensuring compliance is through shaming by the international community.

Mrema (2014) reiterated that the 1999 SADC Protocol on wildlife conservation and Law enforcement was also developed to promote regional cooperation in the development of common frameworks for conservation of natural resources, and the enforcement of laws

governing their sustainable use. Keohane and Nye (1977) emphasised that the strengths of interdependence in international politics are the multiple channels linking societies among them trans-governmental, interstate and transnational transactions. This is in contrast to the assumptions of unitary realists as they postulate that there is no hierarchy among issues and that domestic and foreign policy issues are indistinct. Ellis (1994) purports that states sovereignty is literally given up by CITES member nations in order to facilitate wildlife conversation.

However the interdependence approach has its limitations. Powell (1991) argued that militarily and economically powerful states usually dominate in a range of organisations and a diversity of issues by pursuing their own in the shadow of crucial issues. They use their supremacy and economic strength to prevail on their weak issues and try to influence the outcome of issues. This can be related to the international ban on ivory trade which some argue to have been orchestrated by the first world, economically dominant nations who then influence decisions of African countries who are the major elephant population states. Kaempfer and Lownberg (2012) indicated that the West especially benefit from the existence value of elephants as well as just mere knowledge that elephants live somewhere in the wild yet they rarely if ever come in contact with the elephants. Conservation is indeed about power as it involves the control of natural and human resources by different actors but the challenge emanates because the benefits of conservation accrue in different ways and in different degrees among the various actors, (Ellis, 1994). Moore (2010) postulated that while it may seem as if countries like Kenya and Tanzania were behind the 1989 ivory trade ban, NGOs and Western governments were the primary forces behind them. This they assumed is the reason why African locals are labelled as "environmental villains "who will not save elephants unless they benefit something from them, (Moore, 2010).

Messer (2000) also argues that under the complex interdependence, disgruntled domestic groups may politicise issues and may force previously considered domestic issues into interstate agenda. The fact that interdependence constrains states to cooperate with others appears more to be coercion rather than attraction, and this solution would be therefore closer to hard power than soft power. Nye's writings agree with that in the sense that a state with significant economic resources is likely to exert pressure on, and change the behaviour of,

other states that are economically weaker. However, 'economic resources can also produce soft as well as hard power. Kreuter and Simmons (1994) assumed that NGOs capitalised on West interests around nature take away the sovereignty of African nations to decide on how they can use their natural resources in ways beneficial to their states and people. They base their perspectives on the rhetoric assumption that they think elephants face yet they do little to help the African nations in financing their conservation efforts. These arguments explain the debates on the advantages of interdependence in relation to ivory trade bans as advocates of the bans have no clue on the implications they have on conservation.

2.3 CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES OF FLORA AND FAUNA (CITES) 1975.

CITES was formulated in 1975 due to the sprawl of animal killing to feed trade like the ivory industry (Harland (1990). Ginsberg (2002) asserted that CITES protects the trade in wildlife species namely mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians, fish, invertebrates and fauna. CITES has over 30 000 species listed under it, some which are endangered while others are not endangered and not all endangered species are listed under it. Harland (1990) comments that ivory has been prized by humans for many generations as it assume many uses across the globe. CITES therefore provides a framework for its 181 member states known as Parties to pass national legislation that regulates trade and protects wildlife. CITES however does not have enforcement power on its own but depends on the cooperation of its signatories for enforcement through integrating CITES mandates in their domestic laws, a position which some scholars view as CITES' limitation, (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 2012). The success of the treaty thereby depends on the adequacy of domestic legislative enactments of individual Parties and the severity of their enforcement.

The fundamental principle of CITES as outlined in Article 11 of CITES 1975 are as follows:

1. Appendix i shall include

a) *All species threatened with extinction which are or maybe affected by trade. Trade in specimens of such species shall be subject to particularly strict regulation in order not to further endanger their survival and must only be authorised in exceptional circumstances.*

2. "Appendix ii shall include:

a) *All species although not necessarily threatened by extinction now may become so unless trade in specimens of such species is subject to strict regulation in order to avoid utilisation incompatible with their survival; and*

b) *Other species which must be subject to regulation in order that trade in specimens of such species referred to in sub paragraph (a) of this paragraph may be brought under effective control.*

3) Appendix iii shall include:

a) *All species which any Party identifies as subject to regulation within its jurisdiction for the purpose of preventing or restricting exploitation and as needing the cooperation of other Parties in the control of trade.*

4. Appendix iv shall include: *the Parties shall not trade in specimens of species in appendix i, ii, and iii except in accordance with the provisions of the present Convention".*

CITES conducts what is known as a Conference of Parties (CoP) held every two to three years to deliberate and amend agreements. Elephant conservation has sparked heated debates in nearly every CoP since its inception in 1985. Under CITES in 1975, the elephant was placed under Appendix ii, which allowed for limited trade. However Appendix ii was insufficient in protecting the African elephant as the demand for ivory steadily increased to alarming rates leading to it being lifted to Appendix i which marked the first ban in all international trade in ivory (Hitch, 1998). Sajbel (1997) highlighted that in addition to legal worldwide trade approximately 90% of ivory was obtained illegally and poaching was rampant resulting in a fear of elephant extinction.

Following a dramatic decrease in elephant populations as a result of the poaching crisis of 1970-1980, CITES took its first decision to ban international ivory trade. Consequently the African elephant population began to recover and grow especially those in Southern and Eastern Africa, (UNEP et al, 2013). Such countries because of their well-managed elephant populations began to petition for the down listing of their elephants to Appendix ii which later saw Zimbabwe, Namibia and Botswana being down listed in 1997 and South Africa in the year 2000. Hitch (1998) estimated that in the 1980s, Africana elephant populations

plummeted from about 1.2 million to just 600 000 mainly due to poaching. The enormous reduction in elephant populations prompted international public pressure on consumer countries with specific reference to the United States of America, Japan and the European Union to put stricter restrictions in place like ivory trade bans.

The Southern Times (2016) commented that before the 2016 global ban in ivory trade, the Zimbabwean government in a bid to control elephant populations in the country had sold calves to the United Arab Emirates, China and Thailand. In January 2016, it was recorded that the country had more than 80 000 elephants, a population which is more than the recommended national game parks requirement as the herds use up scarce resources for feeding. The Peace Parks Foundation (2016) argued that from a sustainable use of natural resource perspective, the large elephants' population in Zimbabwe have continued to adversely affect the sustainable management of natural resources that the animals depend on.

Stiles (2004) highlighted that despite the improvement of elephant populations following the trade ban, another alarming poaching crisis emerged in the year 2007 resulting in a massive decline of the elephant populations. This poaching crisis is believed to have been fuelled by the growing demand for ivory especially in the Asian continent which in turn increased illegal ivory trade to meet the demand. CITES has been criticised for politicisation of conservation decisions as parties use politics within CITES to promote changes that will protect their own interests. These changes according to Mofson (2000) involve the structure of the regime itself and domain over which the regime exerts regulatory and normative influence. Hemley (1992, 1) concurs by noting that, "many conference decisions were made without regard for scientific data, with the results reflecting political expediency rather than practical conservation". Politically powerful nations are believed to influence other member states about what they believe should or should not be listed during CoP as was the case in the three ivory trade bans to date among other issues.

Roe (2006) corroborates that trade bans undermine the treaties of Westphalia 1648 principle of sovereignty and The Convention on Biological Diversity which highlight that States 'have sovereign rights over their own biological resources. Martin (2000) concurs by noting that

Western parties under CITES control the voting system as it allows parties that are not directly affected by conservations costs to influence decisions that affect parties that bear the costs of conservation especially in relation to elephants. CITES decisions are passed if the motion is supported by two thirds of Parties and thus Western Parties use the economic strength to attend in numbers and ultimately having strength in numbers. Roe (2006) argued that such was the case in the year 2000 Conference of Parties (CoP) 11 hosted in Nairobi where United States brought 35 delegates compared to 4 from India, 2 from Burkina Faso and 11 from Zimbabwe and ultimately garnering more votes as compared to other countries.

The strength of CITES is mainly in that it can protect many species and the convention with about 181 signatories, is one of the most signed international laws and thus regulates across borders, (CITES, 1975). CITES is legally binding to its Parties therefore it obliges member states to be politically willing to enforce and implement local laws where poaching or trade may be happening. Zimbabwe for example in 1993 adopted the shoot to kill policy on poachers. This measure produced the fastest results in reducing poaching although it was later criticised for violation of human rights.

However CITES faces a challenge of enforcement as implementation varies from country to country. Stile (2005) mentioned that wildlife authorities in nation states do not have the adequate authority, political will from their governments and resources to effectively carry out their duties. Hwange National park for example is said to have only fifty (50) rangers which is disproportionate to the numbers of endangered animals they are supposed to protect. CITES has been faced with the challenge of globalisation which has created the advent of free trade areas, eliminating trade boundaries. The SAIIA (2016) postulated that globalisation creates a sense of convergence among disparate societies and has rendered states dysfunctional in the economic sense. States have been replaced with region states as national boundaries have been reconfigured to fit relative market demands.

SAIIA (2016) pointed out that locally embedded values and the forces of globalisation have developed a complex environment characterised by a challenging aspect for the implementation of policies required to give CITES meaningful effect. Conrad (2012) also

pointed that it is evident that previous CITES ivory trade bans failed to diminish illegal ivory trade and poaching. CITES does not manage national legislations and domestic ivory trade within countries hence many countries have unregulated domestic ivory trade markets which often find their way into parallel markets, lure poachers and overall, making trade bans less effective. Courable etal (2003) asserted that by definition CITES does not specifically prohibit ivory trade within borders of countries. Rather policies and law enforcement practices governing the domestic sale of ivory are determined at level national and so CITES would be limited in its ability to completely ban ivory trade. This then means that individual countries are responsible for the absence or presence of unregulated domestic markets as such unregulated markets exacerbate poaching and illegal ivory trade with or without a ban in place.

2.4 KAVANGO ZAMBEZI TRANS FRONTIER PARK (KAZA)

A trans-frontier park is an area that comprises two or more designated or protected areas which border each other across international borders and whose main focus is wildlife conservation. According to a streamlined management plan and in accordance with a mutually agreed framework, authorities for the respective areas formally agree to manage the area as one integrated unit. The authorities also undertake to remove all man made barriers within the Trans-frontier Park so that people and mostly animals can roam freely (Peace Parks Foundation, 2016).

The Kavango Zambezi Trans-frontier Park also known as KAZA is the world's largest trans-frontier conservation area occupying the Okavango and Zambezi river basins situated in a region where international borders of five countries converge. It encompasses areas within the borders of Zimbabwe, Angola, Botswana, Namibia and Zambia, including 36 national parks and game reserves and game management areas. These five countries have embraced the opportunity to harmonise regional legislations towards landscape approaches to conservation and ecological areas, (Rice, 2006). Immeasurable ecosystem services are also provided by the area across the region. The park is home to the largest population of the African elephant (approximately 250,000). KAZA is therefore important to long-term conservation of species and habitats as its main thrust is to provide an excessive protected area with corridors linking countries and habitats to enable wildlife to disperse and repopulate areas affected by poaching.

The Trans-Frontier Conservation Area (TFCA) is home to about two million people who reside within the park as part of the unique features of the TFCA. Communities have been engaged as partners within the TFCA with the aim of improving the socio economic conditions of development and conservation to their benefit. Through such initiatives conservation had begun to be a more locally viable and land use option. Martin (2000) postulated that the KAZA region does not only provide vital wildlife corridors along three perennial rivers namely the Zambezi, Okavango and Kwando rivers but is also home to culturally and ethnically diverse communities. The mandate of the KAZA is to manage the regional ecosystem for biodiversity conservation, sustainable natural resources and maintaining the rich cultural heritage while developing the surrounding communities in the region.

Patel (2015) highlighted that the KAZA initiative relies on cooperation across the five political boundaries to provide elephants and other wildlife to move freely across corridors following perennial rivers in the region. Poaching is reported to be increasing in the region, negatively affecting tourism efforts and reducing community benefits with regards to elephant hunting and safari photography. It is therefore important for everyone to collaborate in the maintenance of wildlife corridors to guarantee the success of such a regional initiative, (Hitch, 1998). Kaempfer and Lownberg (2012) reiterated that although national parks and conservation areas were established to separate humans and wildlife, elephants still often leave the confines of the parks to the detriment of surrounding communities in what is known as human-elephant conflict. This situation results in elephant killings as local people encounter elephants as a menace as they destroy their crops and wildlife and sometimes have human attacks.

While the KAZA is vital to long term conservation of species and habitats, the Kalahari Conservation Society heads believes that KAZA is still a paper entity which requires each member state to develop clear national plans and implement viable anti-poaching and law enforcement regimes while at the same time working on sustainable community support and benefits (Rice, 2006). Martin (2000) also suggested that the successful conservation

initiatives in the KAZA must hinge on a balanced approach which meets the needs of both humans and wildlife sharing the environment. Game wardens and rangers are needed to protect the wildlife to reduce human wildlife conflict but most African countries are too poor to afford them prompting the need for ivory trade in order to raise funds to complement the conservation efforts and guarantee success in effective wildlife (elephant) protection, (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 2012).

2.5 POACHING OF ENDANGERED SPECIES

Hara (1997) postulated that elephants are found in over 37 countries in Sub Saharan Africa and have been renowned not only for their source of bush meat but for their tusks known as "white gold" which is an incentive to poachers. Over 30,000 elephants are reported to be killed annually mostly for their tusks and to satisfy the global demand for ivory especially in Asia. International trade in wildlife and endangered species is a very lucrative business bringing in approximately five billion United States (US) dollars annually. Porter and Brown (2002) remarked that while wildlife trade is one of the world's largest industries, one third of this trade is illegal as millions of animals suffer and die each year because of human greed and vanity. They also suggested that despite the ivory trade ban in the 90s, elephant poaching has risen due to the increased global demand for ivory products. As such, as a result of the actions of poachers, species like elephants and rhinoceros face the risk of massive declines or worse of face extinction.

The 2015 trends in elephant poaching reported by CITES MIKE (Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants) programme showed that the most serious levels of poaching were found in Central and Western African countries, (Padgett, 1995). However Southern African governments are known for their aggressive anti-poaching policies like Zimbabwe's "shoot to kill" policy which is one of the reasons for its decreased poaching levels and ultimately increased elephant populations. The United Nations Environmental Programme, UNEP (2013) alluded that species like elephants and rhinoceros face the risk of considerable decline or even extinction because of actions by poachers. Rice (2006) concurred by noting that the illegal trade in flora and fauna presented a risk to many uncommon species and ultimately to biodiversity and such a scenario has attracted the interest of a number of conservation agencies. During the past decades, conservation agencies have demanded national governments to stiffen laws and legal penalties for wildlife crimes, (Milliken, 2012). In some

African countries, forestry and fishery officers have been employed to enforce wildlife laws and in some instances have arrested traffickers and impounded plants and animals. However such actions often led to violence as there have been cases of armed conflicts between poachers and officers resulting in casualties and even deaths on either side.

Milliken (2012) postulated that apart from Zimbabwe and Japan, CITES has done little to be directly involved in the evaluation to the conformity with recommendations for internal trade in ivory as stipulated in the Resolution Conf. Domestic trade in ivory has since been rising as most ivory markets remain unregulated prompting the sprawl of poaching and illegal trade in ivory to meet the parallel market demand. Several African militia groups such as the Janjaweed in Sudan, Al Shabaab in Somalia and Lord Resistance army of Uganda have been engaged in elephant poaching and used the profits they get from ivory sales to fund their terrorist activities.

The UNEP report (2013) entitled "elephants of dust" reported that poverty and food insecurity are the main root causes exacerbating elephant poaching in most African countries. Milliken, (2012) concurred by noting that poverty and insufficient bureaucracy enable criminal groups to corrupt poorly remunerated enforcement authorities. Not only elephants are at risk of being killed but human life is also cost as park rangers who protect wildlife and nature are also targeted by poachers. However the 2007 TRAFFIC report does not consider poverty as a driver to poaching but regards wealth as factor to reckon. The report points out that in South East Asia wealth is a strong driver of illegal and unsustainable wildlife trade than poverty due to the dynamics of economic escalation of wealth and economic growth in the region (TRAFFIC, 2007).

The increase in human populations has resulted in the expansion of settlements and negatively caused habitat loss for elephants and loss of ancient migratory routes. The loss of habitats then pushes elephants into frequent contact with humans increasing the human-elephant conflict which some rural communities try to alleviate by killing the elephants to protect their lives, livestock and crops, (Moore, 2010). Following the 2013 incident of deadly string of cyanide poisoning of 300 elephants at one of Zimbabwe's biggest national parks, the

Zimbabwe council for tourism blamed the CITES trade ban for the increased poaching in the country (Sibanda, 2013). The Human Society International (2012) commented that more than 35 000 elephants were killed for their tusks in 2012 with an estimate of 100 elephants killed per day. Mrema (2014) also pointed out that only poachers were benefitting in Zimbabwe's rich environment and wildlife resources leaving the Zimbabwean government and citizens frustrated with CITES for not granting the country full capacity to trade their elephants, something they think they deserve.

UNEP et al (2013) concluded that there has been an increase in poaching levels since 2007 which is almost similar to the occurrences recorded before the 1989 trade ban. Factors such as corruption by governments, the growing demand in Asia, increased land use competition, climate change and globalisation threaten elephant populations and not necessarily poaching per se. Kenya's wildlife director commented that elephants cannot be saved unless wildlife conservation is made profitable making the ivory trade ban very contentious as it removes the benefits of conservation while at the same time trying to conserve elephants.

2.6 IMPLICATIONS OF CITES DECISION ON ZIMBABWES ELEPHANTS ON THE ZAMBEZI TRANS-FRONTIER PARK.

Balint and Mashinya (2006) remarked that the great opposition on the ivory trade ban debut is grounded on a moral sense that it is wrong to trade in elephants despite the fact that it may be the best means of preserving and conserving the species. Some economists have argued that no state has the right to allow for the destruction of any species even if its habitat was restricted to the country's own territory. Tsiko (2016) commented that environmentalists and wildlife experts in Zimbabwe noted that the move by CITES at the 17th Conference of the Parties (Cop17) will spell the beginning of massive extinction of elephant populations in Zimbabwe and other Southern African countries with healthy elephant populations. While a number of scholars agree that the ivory trade ban served its purpose and managed to conserve dwindling elephant population in Central and Eastern Africa, it was an interim solution but not a permanent solution to effectively manage elephant populations in Africa, (Padget, 1995).

According to The Chronicle (2017), Zimbabwe's Environment Minister, Oppah Muchinguri Kashiri argued that, "without meaningful benefits accruing to communities from wildlife utilisation and management, communities have little reason to protect and conserve wildlife". As such, the species like elephants that should be protected will be under stress from poaching and their survival is not guaranteed. The current economic situation in Zimbabwe has seen most rural communities living in abject poverty and this is a situation that poaching syndicates are aware of. With the ban in place which removes economic benefits to communities, poachers will take advantage of the plight of these rural people and lure them to help in poaching activities in return for money, a situation which will threaten the existence of elephants.

Patel (2015) noted that some experts at the UN commented that the large elephant population in Zimbabwe have continued to adversely affect the sustainable use and management of the natural resource. This is because Zimbabwe's elephant population is above the carrying capacity and so measures like culling and selling had been adopted by the government to maintain equilibrium. The CITES ban is therefore likely to increase the pressure between elephant populations and the limited resources available to sustain them including human wildlife conflicts which are likely to soar. Padgett (1995) concurred by reporting that Southern African countries view the trade ban as a waste of natural resources because of the stress placed on the ecosystem as a result of the continued multiplication of elephants.

Ginsberg (2002) suggested that East African countries argue that a complete ban by CITES penalises states that were successful in protecting and utilising their elephant populations while rewarding those who failed to shield their elephant populations from harm. Such a scenario can be related to countries like Zimbabwe whose elephant population continued to rise even before the complete ban in 1989 whereas countries like Kenya had her elephant populations deteriorating way before the ban and indeed faced risk of extinction. Conrad (2012) reiterated that trade bans are usually inadequately enforced due to a lack of political will. This is evidenced from a failure to prosecute criminals, little or no sentences and trivial fines. Trade bans can be costly and perceived by many African states as too low a priority to be effectively implemented, (Conrad, 2012).

The Southern Times (2016) reported that at one time, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) complained that the 1989 trade ban had severely eroded revenue for animal conservation in many countries in Africa resulting in increased poaching by local community members as they were no longer benefiting from ivory trade proceeds. In most SADC states, wildlife is a critical component of socio-economic development hence the conclusion that the ban increased ivory stockpiles which cannot be disposed, affecting revenue and other economic sectors of countries especially tourism, (Conrad, 2012). Krieps (1996) suggested that the trade ban for countries like Botswana, Zimbabwe and Namibia have resulted in increased populations which are leading to extensive environmental degradation through increased soil erosion, loss of biodiversity and vegetation loss.

Peace Parks Foundation (2016) commented that the growth in elephant populations in Zimbabwe is exerting pressure on water resources as the elephants are mostly concentrated in drought prone areas. This has forced Parks and Wildlife Management Authority to use borehole water to supplement water points in the respective areas, an initiative which is very costly and not sustainable. The ivory trade ban is therefore detrimental to Zimbabwean elephant populations hence the recommendation by some Southern African Countries to lift the ban and advice CITES to put in place a controlled marketing system instead of a trade ban as it fuels demand in the absence of a legal market, (Conrad, 2012).

2.7. PREVIOUS EVALUATIONS OF CITES BAN.

In a study conducted in Botswana and Zambia, Barnes (1996) concluded that the effectiveness of CITES ban in the past has been varying depending on conservation policies, pressures of human population and enforcement resources. Stiles (2004) remarked that the ban was detrimental to countries that depended on ivory markets to fund elephant conservation. He reckons that the ban had positive effects in some regions of Africa like Kenya as elephant population improved but certainly not in others. Kenya benefitted as the ban stopped the sharp decline in their elephant populations although the lack of infrastructure and funds to enforce the ban properly decreased the effectiveness, (Hitch, 1998). Lemieux and Clarke (2009, 46) assumed that the full effect of the trade ban has not and will most

likely not come to fruition as declines in elephant populations were case studies of a few countries and also other factors such as the presence of unregulated domestic markets, inadequate ban enforcement, corruption, civil wars and human wildlife conflict contributed to declines in elephant populations.

Bulte and Van Kooten (2007) postulated that a ban in ivory trade helped countries such as Zambia to restore their elephant populations but was unnecessary in countries with adequate law enforcement as they managed to curb poaching and conserve their elephants. In another study, Burton (1999) correlated anti-poaching activities in Zimbabwe as defined by (budget per square km and the number of carcasses found) concluded that there was no change in elephant populations with the ivory trade ban in place. Balint and Mashinya (2006) suggested that the ivory trade ban unpleasantly reminded Zimbabwe of their colonial history characterised by racist restrictions placed on wildlife by the white regime. The ban is believed to have undermined Zimbabwe's conservation goals as it removed a significant source of revenue for no apparent reason making CITES less legitimate to most Zimbabweans. Hitch (1998) asserted that the 1989 ban forced poachers out of the business with some countries realising a 90% decline in poaching. For example Kenya's yearly poaching average dropped from 3,500 elephants a year in the 1980s to about 50 in 1993. The ban therefore had a tremendous positive effect on their elephant populations. Countries like Zimbabwe, Namibia, Botswana Angola and others saw a drastic increase in their elephant populations including older herds and large herd sizes.

However, even with the ban in place, Zimbabwe is reported to have illegally exported vast quantities of ivory to Japan, South Africa, Philippines, China, Thailand, Hong Kong, Indonesia and the USA. A 2008 report by the Humane Society of the USA revealed that despite the 1990 international ban on ivory trade, the global demand for ivory products continued to fuel the elephant poaching crisis with China and the USA being the largest markets for illegal ivory trade (Humane Society International report, 2012). Lemieux and Clarke, (2009) posit that the ban did not necessarily lead to the recovery of elephant populations in all countries as the benefits are unevenly distributed.

Madlela (2016) commented that some African States especially in Southern Africa argue that western proposals aimed at influencing CITES to effect blanket restrictions on commercial trade of wildlife undermines sovereignty of African States. Moore (2010) postulated that countries like Namibia insist that CITES ban ultimately harms its conservation efforts as it denies locals income that could be reinvested to conservation purposes thereby reducing the value of the elephant to locals. Krieps (1996) concurred by arguing that the up listing of the African elephant does not guarantee increase in elephant populations as case studies from countries in East, Central and West Africa can attest to that.

The Guardian (2016) reported that while the 1989 ivory trade ban was supposed to protect elephants, it had counter-productive results. The argument is that the trade ban restricted supply yet Asia was at the wake of increasing its wealth and had a huge demand for ivory thereby driving prices up and providing incentives for poachers. The Zimbabwe Parks and Wildlife Authority (2017) argued that Zimbabwe's elephant populations are already high especially in the Zambezi trans-frontier and the Greater Limpopo Trans-frontier parks. The high numbers are already exerting pressure which tends to compromise the survival of other plant and animal species and therefore a complete ban on ivory trade would not help in alleviating such a challenge.

East African countries were blamed by Southern African countries for poor management of their elephants which is assumed to have led to the plummeting of elephant population in the 1980s instead of trade being the cause, (Ginsberg, 2002). Southern African countries therefore found the ivory trade ban as an unfair decision by CITES as they felt that they were being punished for the incompetence of East African countries while the East African countries were rewarded for inefficiency. Ginsberg (2002) indicated that Southern African states had sustainable management techniques which were able deter poaching; involve communities in wildlife conservation and successfully managing healthy elephant populations.

On the other hand, East African countries applauded the ban for they felt it was necessary for them to re-strategize their enforcement mechanisms, re-evaluate their conservation methods

and come up with solutions to their conservation efforts while poaching was low, (Ginsberg,2002). Southern African states blamed Western control over resources which they argued was driving the whole system into catering for the needs of inept government's instead of rewarding successful conservation efforts. As such trade bans benefit some countries while inconveniencing others as noted in the arguments of Southern and Eastern African countries. Stiles (2004) concluded that the success of the ivory trade bans does not hinge entirely upon decreased poaching but also depends on whether or not enforcement efforts remain effective.

2.8 CONFLICTING PERSPECTIVES ON THE IVORY TRADE BAN

This section explored the conflicting perspectives on ivory trade ban and provided recommendations for CITES to consider in ensuring conservation of wildlife is observed without disadvantaging other countries while at the same time ensuring challenges like poaching identified to be resulting in elephant killing are addressed. The preservationist and utilitarian perspectives are the main perspectives used to explain the debate over the CITES ban on ivory trade. Preservationists are in support of a complete ban in ivory trade as they are against any kind of trade in elephants and their products. On the other hand, utilitarian support limited, sustainable trade in ivory and claim that the ban actually does more harm than good to elephant conservation, (Milliken, 2012).

Burton (1999) postulated that advocates of the trade ban mostly from Asian nations as well as Eastern and Central African nations claim that even a partial lift of the ban, for countries with high elephant populations would increase harmful poaching activities. Such activities they claim may even spill over to other countries without healthy elephant populations exacerbating vulnerability of elephants across the globe. These supporters of the ban are sceptical about the statistics of elephant populations provided by opponents of the ban as they doubt the validity and reliability of the monitoring tools used given that most elephants live in the wild and so may be difficult to count efficiently. Burton (1999) concurred by indicating that surveying requires significant resources which most African governments may not afford reducing the credibility of the data of elephant populations presented.

Utilitarians argue that elephants fall victim of the tragedy of commons as their extinction is not a question of if resources should be used but how they will be used. They believe that an attempt to completely eradicate ivory in the world does not guarantee elimination of elephant poaching as demand for the ivory necessitates the spring of markets whether it's legal or illegal, (Sugg and Kreuter, 1994). Sands and Bedecarre (1990) concurred by acknowledging that a total ban in ivory trade eliminates a source of funding for the infrastructure required for the conservation of species especially for developing nations who do not have much funding to spare. Utilitarians therefore seek to simultaneously maximise ivory production and preserve a significant portion of elephant populations.

Southern African countries are mostly against the trade ban as their savannah elephants are less threatened, have maintained healthy elephant populations and sometimes even exceeded their environments carrying capacity, (Burton, 1999). SAIIA (2016) also concurred by arguing that the conversation of African elephants would be more successful if it allowed for more extensive limited trade instead of depending on a blanket ban which disadvantages countries with well managed elephant populations. Limited trade would even be more successful if local communities held the rights to African elephants, which would result in incentives for people to protect elephants as valuable resources instead of being seen as pests or threats. Sugg and Kreuter (1994) posit that a trade ban reduces the value of elephants in the eyes of the people who compete with them for resources yet do not benefit anything from their existence.

Lemieux and Clarke (2009) highlighted that in order for a complete ban to be effective, CITES needs to have legal enforcement mechanisms in place which would identify the poachers, how the poachers find elephants, where they poach, how they transport the ivory, identify the ivory markets, how they evade law enforcement, how much they are paid and ultimately the final destination of the ivory. Sands and Bedeccare (1990) mentioned that a total ban in ivory trade would eliminate a source of funding for the infrastructure required for conservation especially in Africa where there is not much funding to spare. Foreign currency form ivory sales have been a key contributor to conservation for countries against the trade ban. Hiemert (1995) assumes that the estimated cost of wildlife protection is $305 million and yet states such as Zimbabwe argue that the revenue from ivory and other elephant

derived products was the only method of income generation for continuous conservation of elephants. A complete ban in ivory trade would therefore pose as an obstacle to not only conservation but sustained protection efforts for such states.

Bulte (2004) suggested that preservationist arguments are that there is no certainty in what will happen if trade in ivory is resumed and stakes are very high if utilitarian supporters are wrong. On the other hand utilitarians argue that governments and residents of African states argue that a lack of significant returns on the sale of ivory represents a lack of incentive to invest in protection, (Hitch, 1998). Overall, controlled trade is therefore argued to be crucial as it would incentivise protection.

2.9 LOCAL CONSERVATION STRATEGIES BY ZAMBEZI TRANS FRONTIER PARK MEMBER COUNTRIES.

2.9.1 Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) - Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwe and Namibia have since been proposing to CITES to be allowed to trade their accruing ivory by open auction at the level of the state, (Wu et al, 2016). This is because pre and post 1990 ban, the two countries have maintained healthy elephant populations and therefore do not see trade bans as applicable in their elephant conservations. The Zimbabwe program for sustainable management of resources formed the CAMPFIRE program in 1989 whose mandate was to integrate the lives of poor communities and that of elephants, (Corn and Fletcher, 1997). CAMPFIRE provides a vehicle through which communities manage their local wildlife and turn the once controversial elephants into income. CAMPFIRE has since been emulated by a number of countries in Southern and Eastern Africa for its role in effective wildlife population management. CAMPFIREs two objectives of providing revenue for anti-poaching activities and ensuring local cooperation in elephant conservation have been able to combat poaching from outside and within. Because CAMPFIRE operates in communal lands, it is home to over 42% of Zimbabwe's poorest communities.

Moore (2010) concurred by noting that under the CAMPFIRE program, local authorities gave communities control over and profit from natural resources as an incentive to maintain them. Profits come from various sources including hunting exhibitions, eco-tourism and photo

safaris. Communities have benefited from income, meat, hides and ivory from elephant culls. Between 1989 and 2001, CAMPFIRE is reported to have generated over US$ 20million of transfers for the participating communities and increased household incomes by 15- 25%, (Moore, 2010). The economic profit obtained from the use of wildlife provides genuine motive for communities to manage and conserve resources. Corn and Fletcher (1997) emphasised that by engaging locals in the management of their own environment, CAMPFIRE has provided new economic and social development. The success of CAMPFIRE has been greatly attributed to the great returns that communities have been getting from utilising wildlife rather than other traditional land uses. Since CAMPFIREs inception, elephant numbers have increased, buffalo numbers have been either stable or witnessing a slight decrease, habitat loss has diminished or a number of infrastructural development from proceeds of eco-tourism. Moore (2010) reiterated that CAMPFIRE has reduced some of the pressures exerted on the rural poor to indiscriminately kill elephants by careful management supported by aggressive anti-poaching measures.

However CAMPFIRE has been criticised for its reliance on hunting and its inability to become self-reliant, (Hitch, 1998). CAMPFIRE is reported to have been funded by the United States of America since its inception prompting criticism on its reliance on outside funding. The use of hunting as a primary means for operation has been condoned by some Westerners as an immoral practice. This is despite the greater returns communities have gained from utilising wildlife through the CAMPFIRE program. Wu et al (2016) postulated that the CAMPFIRE program was under threat from recurrent macroeconomic crises that leave officials desperate for "conservation financing".

2.9.2 Namibia's Conservation Success Story

According to WWF (2011) Namibia is the first country in Africa to incorporate environmental protection into its constitution following its independence in 1990. The Namibian government passed a law enabling communities to set up conservancies which gave communities the right to manage and benefit from their local natural resources. Elephant populations in one of the region, Kunene, is said to have trebled compared to the statistics in early 1980 due to the success of conservancies. Trophy hunting is said to have formed the cornerstone of community based resource management whereby communities derive substantial material benefits and bush meat from hunting quotas allocated. This is contrary to

Botswana's situation as hunting was banned by the state and only focused on photographic tourism instead. This confirms the notion that elephant conservation methods differ from country to country and the same is true for the success of these strategies, resulting in either a decrease or increase in elephant populations and not necessarily implying that the decrease was due to poaching.

About one sixth of Namibia's land is already under protection through the conservancies which have since benefitted the locals as it has generated over USD5.5 million annually, (WWF, 2011). The communities that manage the conservancies are reported to have also benefited from jobs, gathering ingredients and returns from eco-tourism. In return the communities have helped authorities in catching poachers. Entrusting communities with the power to protect is commented for building a better life for wildlife, humans and the environment. Conservancy management also facilitate interactions with government departments and non-governmental organisations to compensate communities for losses due to human wildlife conflicts.

Kaempfer and Lowenberg (2012) suggested that before the ban took effect in the 1980s, Namibia's Kaokoveld area had a rewarding sustainable use program in place which was designed to address the poaching of elephants and poverty of the local rural communities. The locals depended more on game hunting for both funds and food following a four year drought period which had left them very poor. Improved elephant populations in Namibia are attributed to a South African NGO enlisted by a conservationist in the area, which funded the creation of Conservation and Development Committee and the participation of local communities in the tourism business, (Kaempfer and Lownberg, 2012). Privately funded game rangers were hired and were more efficient than government ones as they were successful in slowing poaching and ultimately resulting in increased tourism.

2.10 OBSTACLES TO EFFECTIVE APPLICATION OF TRADE BANS

Previous CITES bans have been unsuccessful due to factors such as rising demand for ivory, lack of infrastructure, challenges within CITES itself, lack of conservation incentives for locals and globalisation. These obstacles affected supply and demand of wildlife trade,

implementation and enforcement and ultimately posed complex challenges to combatting wildlife trade especially that of elephants.

2.10.1 RISING DEMAND FOR IVORY

The highly demanding global market for ivory poses challenges to the efforts in combatting illegal wildlife trade. The growing Asian economy has increased the global demand for ivory despite the decrease in demand from the European Union and Unites States of America, (Hitch, 1998). Stiles (2004) reiterated that Asian countries for example Chinas growing economic prosperity has intensified its interest in luxurious ivory products since around 1990. Hong Kong on the hand is well known for its sizeable carving industry which caters for the elites around the world. Demanding consumers are even willing to pay exorbitant prices for ivory products as long as their demand is met. This is because the use of wildlife and their products is deeply rooted in the Asian culture, history and tradition. Milliken (2012) pointed that it was ironic for Chinese officials who vowed to completely enforce the ban yet China remains one of the main destinations for illegal ivory trade as it is facilitated by Chinese middlemen residing in Africa who represent a significant number of buyers of raw ivory sold in markets.

2.10.2 Lack of Infrastructure

CITES faces a challenge of compliance as there is no international police force to enforce its regulations, (Smith, 2005). Each member state within CITES appendices is mandated to have both Management and Scientific authority in charge of granting permits for trade. In the event of failure of enforcement at national level, CITES unfortunately becomes crippled. A key aspect of enforcement is the ability of Parties to properly measure their elephant population numbers and in the vent of deaths, to be able to figure out the causes of death. Burton (1999) suggested that significant resources are required for elephant population surveillance, a means which most African governments do not have the capacity to conduct. Extensive financial support, scientific training and technical support over a period of time are required for such a process of properly monitoring elephant populations.

2.10.3. Limitations of CITES itself

A number of scholars agreed that CITES has some limitations within its framework which make it difficult to overcome illegal trade. UNEP et al (2013) pointed out that in many African countries, there are a lot of unregulated domestic ivory markets and these are present even in countries without elephant populations of their own. Danaher (1999) identified lack of legal enforcement mechanisms as another challenge affecting CITES as it depends on the cooperation of member states. Its effectiveness is therefore rendered upon its ability to guarantee that its regulations are enforced and implemented as countries like Japan have very weak local enforcement especially on carved ivory ready for resale.

Heimert (1995) estimated that the annual cost for wildlife protection in Africa was around USD 305 million and so the trade ban poses a challenge in itself as most countries fund their own wildlife conservation. Zimbabwe for example argued that revenue generated from ivory and other elephant products was the only way it could afford to successfully meet conservation needs, (Heimert, 1995). Sibanda (2013) concurred by noting that the Zimbabwe Council for tourism blamed the trade ban for the upsurge of poaching in the country as Zimbabwean nationals feel they deserve full capacity to benefit in ivory trade. Kothari (2004) concurs with the notion as he indicated that the destruction of elephants as a result of cyanide poisoning confirms that poachers are benefitting from the trade ban.

2.10.4 Lack of Local Incentives to Conservation

UNEP et al (2013) postulated that most rural communities who share habitats with elephants have no or little stake in elephant conservation resulting in increased human wildlife conflict. Trade bans without consideration of community incentives for shared wildlife conservation are likely to fail as these communities perceive the elephants as threats to their survival and therefore have motive to kill them. Social economic factors play an important in the incentives local people think they deserve with regards to elephant conservation. Organised criminal syndicates take advantage of the poverty rooted in communities to bribe, threaten or partner both commons and officials in poaching. Berger (2000) suggested that economic crisis often exacerbates illegal killing of elephants and so there is a strong positive correlation between economic condition indicators and elephant killing.

2.10.5 Globalisation

Globalisation is another barrier to combatting illegal wildlife trade as evidenced by the increased use of the internet promoting the growth of illegal wildlife trade. Akella and Allan (2012) assumed that the internet has facilitated greater access to illicit trade as it allows for the cheap and easy flow of illicit sales and purchases of wildlife and their products. Such transactions online are said to pose new challenges to law enforcement as it requires different approaches to combatting the illegal trade. Globalisation is considered a barrier to combatting illegal trade as it has interlinked states which has resulted in the growth of the Asian market for example China and Vietnam which have become markets for ivory trade, increasing demand and ultimately necessitating poaching business as lucrative for individuals and groups. UNEP et al (2013) concurred by pointing out that globalisation and international trade liberalisation have lured transnational crime networks to use the increasing porous borders to skirt around law enforcement making it very difficult to trace illegal shipments once they leave a host country. For example Philippines has been notorious for buyers and sellers of ivory sharing pictures of their illegal merchants online using platforms such as Flicker and Facebook, increasing the rates of transactions and fuelling illegal trade.

2.11 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The literature review clearly highlighted the mandates of CITES in relation to elephant conservation, its limitations and the barriers to combatting illegal wildlife trade as well as the position of poaching in Zimbabwe. The two main conflicting perspectives to the CITES ban debate which are the perspectives of the preservationist and utilitarian explaining the arguments for proponents for and against ivory trade bans were explored. These two perspectives brought out the idea that CITES as a conservation convention has always triggered contention with regards to issues of elephants as others argue that it is influenced by different pressures from member states and quite often makes decisions based on the political pressures exerted. As such blanket decisions like the complete ban in ivory trade of 2016 have often caused heated debates as they affect both countries with large or low populations or those with successful conservation measures or not.

Adoption of strong legal frameworks and sustainable programs like CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe which nation states are advised to adopt is recommended despite criticism by some who view sustainable measures as exploitative. Other recommendations include CITES

employing strong monitoring structures of ivory trade and financial gains from proceeds of elephant sales instead of punishing countries with successful conservation management programs together with those that are struggling. Such recommendations if considered will guarantee wildlife conservation as individual nation states will employ national strategies to complement international efforts in the subject matter.

CHAPTER 3

3.0 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter unpacked the methods and procedures used in conducting the study. It specified the steps taken in selection, collection and analysis of data. The research design, sample, sampling technique, data collection procedures, research instruments, data presentation and analysis were clearly highlighted in this chapter.

3.2 Research Design

A research design is defined as a master plan that specifies the methods, and procedures for collecting and analysing data (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2007). Burns and Grove (2007) described the design of a study as the end result of a series of decisions made by the researcher regarding how the study will be conducted. It is therefore a plan and structure of the investigation used to obtain evidence to answer probing questions. The research used the case study design which is defined by Yin (2003) as a pragmatic inquest that investigates an existing experience within its real life context. Baxter and Jack (2008) postulated that a case study ensures that issues are not explored through a single lens but through a variety of lenses allowing for the several facets of the phenomenon to be explored and understood. Yin (2003) reiterated that case studies allow the researcher opportunities to discover or describe a phenomenon in context using a variety of data sources. The research therefore used the case study design to explore the applicability of an ivory trade ban in relation to elephant conservation in Zimbabwe.

3.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Kumar (2011) described research methodology as the procedures by which researchers describe, predict and explain phenomena. It is a methodological way to solve research problems. It is a science of studying how research is done scientifically using various steps adopted by the researcher in studying the research problem along with the logic behind them. The research mostly used the qualitative methodology and a bit of quantitative secondary analysis to answer the research questions. Mouton (2004) suggested that the qualitative methodology is important in answering explanatory questions while Strauss and Corbin

(1998) explained the qualitative approach as "any type of research that produces findings not gotten by statistical procedures or other means of quantification." The qualitative research was used in the study to get an understanding of CITES provisions and their applicability in combating poaching and global ivory trade with respect to conservation of the Zimbabwean elephants. The qualitative methodology helped the study to focus on CITES as a convention advancing wildlife conservation. The quantitative secondary analysis was relevant in assessing the trends in previous bans on ivory trade and their attributions.

3.4 POPULATION AND SAMPLE

Flick (2009) asserted that a sample is cross sectional representation of individuals in the population. The sample of my study was collected using the non-probability purposive sampling method. This sampling method was the most ideal as it was based on individuals with specialist and policy knowledge on issues of elephant conservation in Zimbabwe and the applicability of trade bans in elephant conservation and protection. According to Healey and Perry (2001), non-probability sampling is when the researcher does not select a sample randomly but rather selects them deliberately for specific reasons. The respondents purposively selected to represent the study sample included the Zimbabwe Parks and Wildlife Authority representative, World Wild Fund (WWF), Ministry of Environment, Water and Climate, Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) and community leaders (Chief Representatives) from Hwange. The information obtained from the sample focused on possible implications of global trade bans with respect to conservation efforts and community engagement with wildlife.

Smith (2005) defined a population as the entire set of objects or people from whom the researcher intends to determine characteristics. The population of my study was all occurrences of the transnational commercial ivory trade bans since the first occurrence 1989 while the sample was drawn from various stakeholders in Harare where CITES headquarters are located.

3.5 DATA COLLECTION METHODS

3.5.1. PRIMARY DATA COLLECTION

Silverman (2000) defines primary data as data collected for the first time from their point of origin. It is data in its natural state that is not organised or grouped and is important as there is greater control over data accuracy. My study therefore used key informant interviews as primary data.

3.5.2 KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS

Boyce and Neale (2016) postulated that key informant interviews are a qualitative research technique that involves exhaustive interviews conducted with persons who can provide detailed information and opinions on a particular subject matter based on their knowledge of a particular issue. Key informant interviews focus on people selected for their first-hand knowledge about a topic of interest, (Bennis and Nanus, 2003). Interviews were loosely structured relying on a list of issues to be discussed. Key informant interviews were used to get a clearer picture on the effects of the ivory ban on Zimbabwe's elephants and poaching. Key informants were able to give an insight on policies, histories and plans of organisations that work around environmental conservation and wildlife protection. The research targeted key informant interviews from representatives from Zimbabwe Parks and Wildlife Conservation (Zimparks), Ministry of Environment, Water and Climate, World Wild Fund (WWF), and Communal Areas Management programme for indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE).

3.6 SECONDARY DATA

Secondary data is data that has been arranged, classified or categorised by statistical means or methods. It is data that already exists, or is available in the public domain, whether published or unpublished. Secondary data is only suitable if it is reliable, sustainable and adequate, (Kothari, 2004). Secondary data was therefore used to validate findings from key informant interviews

3.6.1. DOCUMENTARY RESEARCH

Bailey (1994) defines documentary research as a reflective process in which researchers confront "moral underpinning of societal inquiry". Documentary research includes review of

institutional memoranda, reports, census publications, diaries and other written, pictorial and visual sources in different forms. Atkinson and Coffey, (1997, 55) advised that documents should not be used as a stand-alone but need to be situated within a theoretical frame of reference in order for the content to be understood. For this research, documentary research was based on texts that served to record, document, narrate and educate the research on elephant poaching in Zimbabwe and the effectiveness of legal frameworks such as CITES to guard against it with specific reference to the implications of a global ivory trade ban. Data collected included elephant populations around the area of study.

3.7 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Research ethics have been developed to underpin research practices with the overall objective of acknowledging and respecting human dignity. Homans (1991) postulated that research ethics provided a standard code of conduct that is universally agreed upon to empower professionals as they promote moral values through their work. Research ethics promoted research values essential for collaborative work like accountability, trust, fairness and mutual respect. Research ethics promote the aims of the research such as truth, knowledge and avoidance of error through provision of guidelines which prohibit against fabrications, misrepresentations and falsifying. All these guidelines minimise research errors and promote authenticity. Research ethics in accordance to the Helsinki declaration of 1964 are important as they preserve the accuracy of research results. Homans (1991) also commented that research ethics ensure that researchers pursue objectivity through upholding of professional integrity without fear or favour. This also includes selection of research methods that do not produce misleading results, misrepresented findings by commission or omission. The research considered ethical issues seriously as these are guidelines and standards to which researches should be conducted. Informed consent from participants was ensured before the research kicked off while briefings for the purpose and relevance of the research were clearly explained to them. The research did not pose any potential risk or harm to participants and ensured participants took part through voluntary participation, ensured respect for persons and maintained their dignity.

3.8 DATA PRESESNATION AND ANALYSIS

The researcher used a qualitative content analysis to analyse data from interviews generated into transcripts as the research method allows the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). Kondracki and Wellman (2002) highlighted that there are three different approaches to qualitative content analysis although the researcher chose a conventional content analysis approach as coding categories are derived directly from the text data and the relevant literature used above. There are procedures developed within the framework of qualitative approaches for text interpretation and the coding style inductive category development was more appropriate because the researcher's analysis codes came directly from reading and thinking about the data acquired from interviews transcripts (Mayring, 2000). The researcher then coded texts in order to easily categorize it relating to research questions, themes and concepts. During and after coding, the researcher looked for connections between codes and began with descriptive themes, subcategories and cause-effect relationships. A matrix of codes and themes was then developed. These codes were inputted into HyperRESEARCH version 3.7.3 a computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software which analysed these codes by creating, applying and refining categories, tracing linkages between concepts, and making comparisons between cases and events. The advantages of using HyperRESEARCH are that it makes it easier for researchers to experiment with different codes, exploring different possibilities of data analysis and interpretation, test different hypotheses about relationships, and facilitate diagrams of emerging theories and preparation of research report. Tables and graphs were then used to present findings while discussion and conclusions were later drawn from those findings.

3.9 CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter focused on the research design employed to answer the research questions. Both primary and secondary data was used for triangulation purposes, with key informant interviews and case studies being selected as tools for data collection. Ethical issues were highly considered while data was analysed and presented using relevant tables and charts.

CHAPTER 4

4.0 DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter deliberated and presented findings from data collected through key informant interviews and documentary research as presented in Chapter 3. The key informant interviews were mainly representatives from government ministries and departments. The findings were then discussed and presented thematically with themes derived from selected texts and responses relevant to the study. Data presentation and analysis makes sense out of large amounts of raw data, giving a clear understanding of spatial processes, and is one of the most important parts of research, (Gwimbi and Dirwai, 2003). Marshall and Rossman (1990) defined data analysis as processes of bringing order, structure and meaning to the mass of collected data. Boyatzis (1990) stipulated that thematic analysis is a method for identifying, analysing and reporting the themes, patterns and categories within data. The research findings were presented thematically as they were brought out by key respondents dominating the interviewing process in order to bring out emerging issues. Themes minimally organise and describe data sets in detail. Similar concepts were grouped into categories aligning them to a particular phenomenon. Data is then presented using appropriate tables and graphs and supporting narrations.

4.2 ELEPHANT NUMBERS, POACHING AND IMPLICATIONS OF TRADE BANS.

CITES' system for monitoring illegal killing of elephants (MIKE) has over the years struggled to produce results (Stiles, 2004). The table below shows the African elephant populations between the period 1979 and 2002 which is the pre and post ban era of CITES global ban on ivory trade. Some countries attributed the decline in elephant numbers due to increased poaching while findings reveal that other factors are at play among them political instability, corruption, deaths by culling among other things.

Table 4.1: Elephant population estimates in Africa (rounded to the nearest 10)

Area	1979	1989	1991	1998	2002
West Africa	17,100	18,480	10,100-16,800	3,100-12,800	5,460-13,180
Central Africa	497,400	275,600	268,000	34,400-125,500	16,450-1957,50
Eastern Africa	546,600	110,650	102,000-122,000	106,500-125,200	117,720-163,670
Southern Africa	282,200	203,300	168,700-244,700	213,900-236,700	246,590-303,920
Total	1,343,100	608,030	548,800-651,500	357,900-500,200	386,220-676,520

Source: Stiles (2004)

The table above reflects a significant drop in African elephant population due to ivory trade with Central and Eastern Africa being the hard hit. However Southern Africa reflects substantial gains in elephant populations between 1990 and 2002 (a period after the 1989 trade ban was put in place) as shown above. Stiles (2004) commented that elephant populations were growing in some countries like Zimbabwe, Botswana and South Africa even before the trade ban came into effect and as such had healthy elephant populations. Whereas serious population declines were experienced by countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Central African Republic years after the trade ban, (Barnes, 1996). This indicates that factors other than legal trade resulted in changes in elephant populations. These factors may be economic and political in nature with political stability, governmental investment in conservation, law enforcement and good governance being the contributing factors to healthy elephant populations and the opposite is true for declines. Key informants from the parks and wildlife management and WWF concurred that Zimbabwe has some of the most effective anti-poaching laws together with sustainable programmes like the CAMPFIRE which have been essential in the conservation of elephants.

Figure 4.1 below shows the estimated country specific elephant populations for African countries.

Figure 4. 1: Elephant populations in Africa

Number of Elephants Counted

| Country	Number
Botswana	130.451
Zimbabwe	82.304
Tanzania	42.871
Kenya	25.959
Zambia	21.758
South Africa	17.433
Mozambique	9.605
Niger, Burkina Faso, Benin	8.911
Uganda	4.684
Angola	3.395
Northeastern DRC	1.959
Malawi	817
Ethiopia	799
Chad	743
Mali	253
Northern Cameroon	148

Source: WWF Global, (2011)

Figure 4.1 above shows specific elephant population numbers counted in the year 2011. As is shown, Southern African countries have the highest numbers of elephant populations with Botswana in the lead followed by Zimbabwe. Patel (2015) highlighted that experts believe Zimbabwe's environment capacity holds at most 50 000 elephants yet it currently holds over 80 000 elephants as shown above. Such numbers if left uncontrolled following the ivory trade ban will become a burden to the environment. Policy demands in elephant conservation demands that the ecological carrying capacity of land should not be exceeded as it will have detrimental effects on the conservation of other species that depend on the same environment for survival, (Wu et al, 2016). It should be noted that elephant statistics including poaching statistics are contentious as other scholars argue that the numbers are unverified through official audits to determine the exact numbers thereby resulting in possible over or under estimates. Patel (2015) narrated that from a sustainable use of natural resources perspective,

the ivory trade ban will strain the environment and endanger the survival of both elephants and humans as a result of increased human-wildlife conflict.

Previous studies did confirm that the ivory trade ban helped to improve elephant populations in Africa by about 140 000 between the years 1989 and 2007 with Kenya and Tanzania having suffered more in terms of elephant population declines. However Stiles (2004) noted that although the African continent lost a great number of elephants before the ban, about 13 countries actually realised an increase in elephant populations. The majority of elephant losses were presumed to be concentrated in a few countries as were the cases in population growth. As such the trade ban affects other countries while benefitting others hence the researcher's assumption that a blanket decision to ban ivory trade is not applicable to conserve Zimbabwean elephants.

Figure 4. 2: **Elephant populations: Kenya vs Zimababwe, 1973-2011**

Source: Perry (2011).

Figure 4.2 above shows a comparison of elephant populations between Kenya and Zimbabwe for the period 1973 to 2011. It is evident from the graph that Zimbabwe's elephant populations were not affected by the 1980 ivory trade as they actually increased during both the pre ban and post ban period. Unlike Kenya, her elephant populations around 1975 were experiencing a sharp decline from around 170,000 to about 15,000 hence were nearing extinction in around 1989. Such elephant population declines prompted CITES and the international community to take action and therefore imposed an international ivory trade ban. The trade ban indeed saved Kenya's elephant populations as they stopped declining and started improving although at a very slow pace as evidenced by an increase from 15,000 in 1989 to about 30,000 in 2011.

Balint and Mashinya (2006) suggested that Zimbabwe's elephants were not in danger when the 1989 trade ban was put in place and so she did not benefit from the trade ban at all. Moore (2010) concurred by noting that Zimbabwe unlike Kenya was not affected by poaching owing to the governments effective monitoring and enforcement efforts through park authorities. Zimbabwe's elephant population stability is attributed to its robust legislation capable of combatting wildlife crime thereby conserving wildlife resources. Adoption of the CAMPFIRE program which achieved the conventional intelligence status in Southern Africa and internationally can also be attributed to Zimbabwe's success in elephant conservation, (Child, 1995). Barnes (1996) postulated that, owing to the ivory trade ban, Kenya's elephant populations were resuscitated thus it is clear that the ban was successful in the conservation of Kenya's elephants. Because of her encounter to near elephant extinction, Kenya is one of the countries in Africa against lifting of the ivory trade ban to the extent that they burnt their ivory stockpiles in protest of poaching and to lead by example, (Child, 1995).

Key informants from the Parks and Wildlife Authority and the Ministry of Environment, Water and Climate confirmed that Zimbabwe has strong legislative frameworks that deter poaching and promote wildlife conservation. Respondent C from the Parks and Wildlife Authority commented that:

"*Blanket approaches such as the ivory trade ban do not work; they failed to work before and will not work again now. Zimbabwe as a country has well developed policies and legislation*

which view wildlife as economic resources that should be used sustainably to benefit the country especially the local communities that share the burden of conservation. While poaching exists in the country, the rates are low and efforts to bring the culprits to book are always top priority which is the reason why Zimbabwe's elephant populations have remained healthy. CITES' decision to impose yet another trade ban despite calls by Zimbabwe and Namibia to be allowed to trade, will definitely reverse the gains of maximum conservation and likely to pose more harm than good to elephant populations.".

Bulte and Van Kooten (2007) suggested that despite the many failures attributed to the 1989 trade ban, it managed to stop rapid elephant population decline and may have prevented the disaster of an irreversible elimination of elephant populations in some regions. This therefore means that the trade ban was worthwhile although it should not be a long term solution to elephant conservation as its success is not experienced by all countries alike. Trade bans may be ideal as a "quick fix" for species facing extinction and thereby serve to temporarily avert harm against particular species, (Lawson and Vines, 2014). However evidence has shown that trade bans can cause tensions with local communities as they remove benefits and a purpose to conserve thereby undermining its effectiveness.

4.3 COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT

Adam and Hulme (2001) defined community conservation as the principles and practices that emphasize the role of local residents in decision making about natural resources. The main goal of community conservation is to increase the quality of habitat across communities to provide habitat for wildlife and natural experiences for people. Community initiatives span around co-management, parks outreach and resource sharing. They also asserted that development can be retarded by the alienation of local people in environmental resource management which can underwrite economic and social change.

In Zimbabwe, the CAMPFIRE program was formed to provide as a vehicle through which communities manage their local wildlife in an effort to integrate the lives of communities and wildlife surrounding them (Corn and Fletcher, 1997). By engaging the locals in the management of their own environment, CAMPFIRE has provided new economic and ecological stability. The program since its inception has reduced the number or elephants

killed by poaching and hunting, benefitted communities with meat and hides from culling and proceeds from eco-tourism have contributed to infrastructural development for participating communities and improving household income.

Key informant interviews revealed that the CAMPFIRE program has been successful in most of the participating communities. They highlighted the need for programmes such as CAMPFIRE to continue as they gave communities a purpose to protect the wildlife they share resources with.

"*We have been living with elephants for as long as we can remember, suffering the brunt of them destroying our homes, crops, livelihoods and in extreme cases human attacks. However with the emergence of CAMPFIRE our communities have been rewarded for protecting elephants, compensated in the event of losses and this has reduced hostility of people to elephants. Villagers now even help wildlife rangers to report suspicions of poachers A lot of improvements have been seen in our communities as you can see , there are schools and clinics that have been built from our shares in the CAMPFIRE programme and we continue to that thank our Government for engaging us in such a way.*" Chief, Hwange district.

The ivory trade ban would reverse the benefits of elephant conservation for communities as their motivation for protecting the animals is through the accrued rewards they get. Bennet (2014) concurred that locals with no alternative livelihood turn to elephant poaching to sustain their families. The environment Minister, Oppah Muchinguru has reiterated that "without meaningful benefits accruing to communities from wildlife utilisation and management, communities have little reason to conserve wildlife". Findings from an interview with Mr M (ZimParks) revealed that the outcome of CoP 17 will jeopardise all conservation efforts by the Zimbabwean government to protect elephants. He indicated that elephant populations in the KAZA are already past the recommended numbers with Hwange national park estimated to be carrying the largest numbers and is already under pressure.

"*The outcome of CoP 17 was a major blow to the country and its conservation efforts as we thought our arguments were strong enough to allow Zimbabwe, Namibia, Botswana and South Africa's elephants to remain in Appendix ii. The community livelihoods interests will be threatened and the country's conservation efforts which are hinged on the sustainable*

utilisation of the resources will be compromised. CITES has again made a decision based on pressure from party members yet it is evident that Southern Africa's elephant populations are healthy and should not have been affected by a blanket approach. The ivory ban will increase poaching as it will reduce supply yet demand for ivory remains high thereby increasing process and in turn becomes an incentive for poachers".

Child (1995) recommended that the main lesson to be drawn is that any future wildlife conservation initiatives in communal lands should transfer significant rights to the land holders. Alienation of the indigenous people to utilise and benefit from their local resources would naturally entice them to access the resources illegally. Such a case would be inevitable if the ban on ivory trade continues to disadvantage the very people who are constantly suffering attacks and protecting elephants at the same time. Another key informant from the CAMPFIRE department commented that,

"*Poaching will decline if locals benefit from the trade of ivory and ivory products as there won't be reason to poach. CITES should give locals reason to protect and not perceive elephants as a menace*".

4.4 APPLICABILITY OF THE IVORY TRADE BAN

CITES rationale for imposing the ivory trade ban was on the assumption that stopping the legal supply of ivory would in turn result in a decline in elephant poaching, thereby conserving elephant populations (Stiles, 2004). However there is no data published for any country to show the number of elephants poached pre and post 1990 period. Hunter et al (2004) commented that the ivory trade ban did not achieve its stated objectives in Africa's sub regions. WWF (1997) attested to that despite the ban in place, African elephants were still being poached in large numbers. The upsurge of illegal poaching and illegal trade over the years is believed to be driven by increasing demand in Asia. The international ban in ivory trade is acknowledged to have allowed elephant populations to recover especially in countries where elephants are adequately protected.

Political pressures that swung CoP 10 into voting to resuming trade are the same pressures that swung CoP 17 into voting for a complete ban in ivory trade. In an Interview with the representative for World Wildlife Fund (WWF), he remarked that there was politicisation of

the elephant issue. He suggested that, "*Zimbabwe continues to be a member of CITES in order to ensure that some wildlife products find the best market in the world otherwise CITES has not helped the country with any conservation*".

In a key informant interview with a representative from the Ministry of Environment, Water and Climate, Mr X strongly opposed CITES decision to ban international trade in ivory. He had this to say:

"*Zimbabwe is already having a challenge with a large elephant population due to its effective management programmes and as such the elephant population has exceeded the country's carrying capacity. Systems such as CAMPFIRE and Wildlife and Livelihood Development (WILD) have created employment, contributed to infrastructural development and provided meat and hides for locals thereby motivating communities to participate in elephant conservation. The 2016 ban in international ivory trade will continue to increase elephant populations which will threaten the environment, increase human-wildlife conflicts and even threaten the survival of other species in the wild*".

Conrad (2012) presented that there is contention on CITES ivory trade bans as they have failed to diminish illegal ivory trade and poaching. He argued that CITES does not manage the national legislation and domestic ivory trade of individual countries which has resulted in many countries having unregulated domestic ivory trade markets. These domestic markets continue to feed demand, find their way into the parallel market and provide incentives for criminal syndicates to kill elephants thereby rendering the trade bans useless. A key respondent from Parks and Wildlife Authority responded that:

"*Banning ivory trade or burning ivory stockpiles is not a solution to elephant conservation. Kenya adopted the ivory trade ban for years and even burnt its ivory stockpiles but evidence is clear that her elephant populations haven't changed much. Poaching is still rampant in Kenya coupled with implementation and legal systems so CITES should consider their decisions based on the performance of individual countries not imposing blanket bans affecting both performing and poor performing elephant management efforts as it is unfair for others*".

4.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter analysed and presented findings relevant to the research. Data was analysed based on findings gathered from key informants and documentary research. Tables were used to present the data thematically which gave a pictorial view of findings. The data produced was able to bring an understanding of elephant population in Africa and its relation to poaching. Community participation in wildlife conservation produced evidence on the need for such engagements for the success of conservation efforts. The findings correlated with the researcher's assumption of blanket decisions like that of the ivory trade ban not being applicable for all countries. As such CITES' 2016 global trade ban is not applicable to Zimbabwe in relation to protection and conservation of her elephant population in the Zambezi Trans Frontier Park

CHAPTER 5

5.0 SUMMARY, CONCLSUIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter provided a summary of the research project. It highlighted the key components of the research and referred back to the research questions in Chapter one. The chapter summarised the findings on the applicability of the 2016 global ban on ivory trade with respect to the conservation and protection of the Zimbabwean elephant in the Zambezi Trans frontier park. Scholarly and policy recommendations are then drawn based on the findings.

5.2 SUMMARY

Chapter one covered the introduction and background of the study. It unpacked the statement of the problem, the purpose and the significance of the study. The research objectives were constructed in this chapter which were then translated to research questions.

Chapter two reviewed literature from various scholars which then identified the gaps in CITES policies in terms of monitoring and implementing their mandates. The chapter discussed CITES convention and its provisions, unpackaged previous CITES bans on ivory trade and analysed the conflicting schools of thought with regards to ivory trade ban. The research was also linked to the theoretical framework of the complex interdependence theory as propounded by Keoyane and Nye. The chapter also implored on the strategies of community participation in elephant conservation for Zimbabwe and Namibia.

Chapter three explored the research design and methodology. The research used both the quantitative and qualitative methodologies and used the purposive sampling method. It also highlighted the data collection methods used mainly key informant interviews and documentary research.

Chapter four presented data analysed it and discussed the findings of the research. The chapter was dedicated to bringing the voices of the key informants and findings from previous CITES bans.

Chapter five gave the summary, conclusion and recommendations.

5.3 CONCLUSIONS

The key findings of the research addressed the research questions raised in chapter one. The main question was on the applicability of the 2016 global ban on ivory trade with regards to the conservation and protection of the Zimbabwean elephant populations in the Zambezi Trans frontier park. As alluded to by Hitch (1998), "the elephant plight cannot simply be resolved by international agreements". While it is evident from previous studies that the CITES ban on international ivory trade is effective in reversing the decline in elephant populations and decline of poaching, the ban does not benefit all countries alike. The existence of unregulated domestic markets leaves open a loophole for poachers who then increase the global demand for illegal ivory. The history of human wildlife conflict illustrates the need to come up with conservation ways that benefit both parties and thus blanket decision to ban ivory trade do not promote that. Hitch (1998) concurred by noting that "Comprehensive efforts that account for both human and elephant needs must be enacted in order for CITES to function properly".

Objective two sought to explore the implications of CITES decision on Zimbabwe's elephant management. The main findings identifies resource constrains as the main challenge with financial limitations being key. As alluded to by Frost and Bond (2008) , wildlife pays for its conservation, thus Zimbabwe's wildlife management currently funds itself as it does not receive any funding form the central government. However the resources available are not sufficient for full scale conservation efforts and as a result open loopholes for poaching. Such resources prior to ivory trade ban were generated from proceeds of elephant selling and culling which were sustainable efforts by the government to maintain equilibrium in terms of population against the environment. Elephants in Zimbabwe are also argued to have large populations, almost above the carrying capacity which adversely affect sustainable management of the environment. As such a global ban on ivory trade would see a continued

increase in Zimbabwe's elephant populations, a move viewed by environmentalists as unsustainable as it threatens the environment.

Zimbabwe has for long be renowned as championing the CAMPFIRE programme, a vehicle through which communities manage their wildlife as they are rewarded for protecting their natural resources including elephants. Corn and Fletcher (1997) reiterated that CAMPFIRE has provided new economic and social development for communities as the locals are engaged in the management of their own environment. As such, the 2016 global ivory trade ban would give communities no reason to protect and conserve elephants, increase human wildlife conflict and increase poaching as even the local communities would participate in it. Russo (2012) concluded that community participation is critical in wildlife management as without it, challenges become greater. Governments and residents of African states have also argued that a lack of significant returns on the sale of ivory represents a lack of incentive to invest in protection, (Hitch, 1998) and thus the ivory trade ban will disadvantage countries who have done well in conserving their wildlife and maintained healthy elephant populations through their local policies as is the case of Zimbabwe.

The third objective sought to come up with recommendations for CITES to be more applicable in wildlife conservation. This will be explained in detail below.

5.4 RECOMMENDATIONS

- CITES should consider that prohibiting ivory trade drives demand into the parallel market thereby leaving trade in the hands of criminals. Therefore CITES should not only ban international trade but make measures to ban domestic ivory trade, having put in place monitoring systems and alternatives to fund conservation efforts.
- The international ban on ivory trade as a global norm should be congruent with local realities that account for societal values in order for conservation to be successful. Programmes such as Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE should be emulated as they reduce human –wildlife conflict.
- In order for CITES provisions to be successful enacted, comprehensive efforts that account for both human and elephant needs must be considered.

- CITES should put in place Hi-tech certification using (DNA testing), tracking , registration and taxation of legal ivory so that it is able to distinguish it from illegal ivory.

- The ban alone will not be able to save African elephants. Instead CITES should find mechanisms to strengthen countries capacity to manage wildlife as some countries lack anti-poaching capacity, have weak law enforcements and corruption which continue to threaten elephant survival.

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Annexure

Appendix A

RE: REQUEST TO CONDUCT RESEARCH

The above matter refers:

I hereby request permission to conduct interviews with your organisation/ institution. The research is in partial fulfilment of the requirements of a Master of Science in International Affairs with Midlands State University. The title of the research is **THE APPLICABILITY OF THE 2016 GLOBAL BAN ON IVORY TRADE WITH RESPECT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSERVATION AND PROTECTION OF THE ZIMBABWEAN ELEPHANT POPULATION IN THE ZAMABEZI TRANS FRONTIER PARK.** The research objectives are:

1. To explore the applicability of CITES 2016 decision of global ban on ivory trade with respect to the development of conservation and protection of Zimbabwean elephant population in the Zambezi Trans frontier park.
2. To explore the implications of CITES decisions on Zimbabwe's wildlife (elephant) management.
3. To come up with recommendations on how CITES can be more applicable in the management of Zimbabwean elephants on the Zambezi Trans frontier park.

Your authority is sought to conduct key informant interviews with authorities with knowledge on wildlife management with specific focus on elephant conservation. The data is required for solely research purposes and will not compromise the integrity or reputation of your organisation/institution. The responses will be strictly in confidence and will only be used for the purpose of the study.

Your cooperation will be greatly appreciated.

Yours faithfully

Venge Tafadzwa

Appendix B

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR THE ZIMBABWE PARKS AND WILDLIFE AUTHORITY: KEY INFORMANT**.**

Research title: THE APPLICABILITY OF THE 2016 GLOBAL BAN ON IVORY TRADE WITH RESPECT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSERVATION AND PROTECTION OF THE ZIMBABWEAN ELEPHANT POPULATION IN THE ZAMABEZI TRANS FRONTIER PARK.

The researcher is an MSc in International Affairs student conducting a research with the title above. Your responses will be kept in confidence and will only be used for the purpose of the study. Confidentiality will be guaranteed. Your cooperation will be greatly appreciated.

1. What do you think about the recent global ban on ivory trade?
2. What are the likely challenges on elephant management after such a decision?
3. How does the global ban affect the CAMPFIRE programme and community participation in elephant conservation?
4. How does the global ban affect elephant populations in the Zambezi Trans frontier park?
5. How is elephant conservation going to be funded going forward?
6. How bad is poaching in the Zambezi Trans frontier park?
7. What measures are in place to control poaching in Zimbabwe?
8. As the parent Ministry, how is elephant conservation going to be managed going forward?
9. What are your recommendation for CITES in relation to making decisions such as

Appendix C

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR CAMPFIRE ASSOCIATION REPRESENTATIVE.

Research title: THE APPLICABILITY OF THE 2016 GLOBAL BAN ON IVORY TRADE WITH RESPECT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSERVATION AND PROTECTION OF THE ZIMBABWEAN ELEPHANT POPULATION IN THE ZAMABEZI TRANS FRONTIER PARK.

The researcher is an MSc in international Affairs student conducting a research with the title above. Your responses will be kept in confidence and will only be used for the purpose of the study. Confidentiality will be guaranteed. Your cooperation will be greatly appreciated.

1. What is the role of CAMPFIRE in the management of wildlife in Zimbabwe?
2. How successful has CAMPFIRE been in wildlife conservation?
3. How have communities benefitted from the CAMPFIRE programme?
4. What are your views on the recent CITES global ban on ivory trade?
5. How will the global ban affect CAMPFIRE efforts in elephant conservation?

Appendix D

MIDLANDS STATE UNIVERSITY

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR THE MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT, WATER AND CLIMATE

Research title: THE APPLICABILITY OF THE 2016 GLOBAL BAN ON IVORY TRADE WITH RESPECT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSERVATION AND PROTECTION OF THE ZIMBABWEAN ELEPHANT POPULATION IN THE ZAMABEZI TRANS FRONTIER PARK.

The researcher is an MSc in international Affairs student conducting a research with the title above. Your responses will be kept in confidence and will only be used for the purpose of the study. Confidentiality will be guaranteed. Your cooperation will be greatly appreciated.

1. What is your organisations mandate in wildlife conservation?
2. What is your responsibility with regards to elephant conservation?
3. What is the recommended capacity of Zimbabwean elephants in the Zambezi Trans frontier park?
4. What are the challenges of increasing elephant populations?
5. How does the CITES ivory trade ban affect the environment with regards to elephant populations?
6. What are your recommendations for elephant management with regards to CITES trade ban and Zimbabwean elephant population in the Zambezi Trans frontier Park?

Appendix E

MIDLANDS STATE UNIVERSITY

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR WORLD WILDLIFE FUND REPRESENTATIVE.

Research title: THE APPLICABILITY OF THE 2016 GLOBAL BAN ON IVORY TRADE WITH RESPECT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSERVATION AND PROTECTION OF THE ZIMBABWEAN ELEPHANT POPULATION IN THE ZAMABEZI TRANS FRONTIER PARK.

The researcher is an MSc in international Affairs student conducting a research with the title above. Your responses will be kept in confidence and will only be used for the purpose of the study. Confidentiality will be guaranteed. Your cooperation will be greatly appreciated.

1. What is your organisations mandate in wildlife conservation?
2. What are CITES' strengths and weaknesses in conserving elephants in Zimbabwe?
3. What do you think about CITES 2016 global ban on ivory trade?
4. As an international organisation that conducts researches on poaching, do you think poaching is high in Zimbabwe?
5. What needs to be done to continue conserving elephants in the face of the ivory trade ban?